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I shall be telling this with a sigh 
Somewhere ages and ages hence: 
Two roads diverged in a wood and I - 
I took the one less travelled by, 
And that has made all the difference.
(from The Road Not Taken 
by Robert Frost 1874 - 1963)
ABSTRACT
This thesis explores contemporary representations and discourses on the nature of animals 
through the development and investigation of the psychodynamics of dehumanisation. 
Psychodynamics integrates the discursive structuring of knowledge with the 
psychoanalytical defence mechanisms of projection and introjection. Hollway’s (1989) 
theory of psychodynamic investment is applied here to account for the reproduction of 
species-differentiated beliefs and behaviours. This provides the parameters for a model of 
dehumanisation which is the referent for the empirical exploration.
The methodological approach employed centres on triangulation. Semi-structured 
interviews with vegetarians and non-vegetarians are discourse analysed to reveal patterns 
of naturalisation in the production of social meanings and the participation in social 
practices. The analysis reveals the content of the psychodynamic investments in three 
hegemonic discourses: nonhuman animals as Objects, Referents and Utensils. In order to 
explore representations of the referent, ‘beast’, newspaper articles are semiologically 
content analysed. This analysis identifies aspects of human experience which are projected 
onto nonhuman animal representations, through anthropomorphism and zoomorphism. To 
explore one example of these metaphors, the fantasy ‘beast’, a semiotic analysis of 
narrative was conducted on Wilderness, the book and derived drama, further articulating 
the symbolic dimension of irresolute species boundaries in a modem twist on the 
lycanthropic myth. The model of dehumanisation is developed to interpret the analysis of 
the texts.
Deconstruction of these texts provide evidence for the anthropocentric, anthropomorphic 
and zoomorphic dialectics of self: other reflected in the violent construction of human 
versus nonhuman animal identity. The synthesised model of dehumanisation illustrates 
both the human desire to acknowledge and oppress nonhuman animals and the ubiquitous 
‘beast within’, as part of the psychodynamic construction of subjectivity. In conclusion, 
the deconstructed ‘beast’ is revealed as a modern-day ideological chimera which signifies 
the ambivalence of humans’ understanding of themselves as animals.
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Is THE NATURE OF THE BEAST
The fact that we are simultaneously both animal and human poses a real 
problem as to how the two categories should be distinguished (Leach, 
1982:121).
Leach’s identification of this problem summarises the motivation behind this thesis. In the 
following chapters, I shall be exploring the ways in which this problem is conceptualised 
through the psychodynamic construction of ‘human’ in relation to ‘animal’. Through my 
experiences, reading and analyses I have been continually confronted with a pervasive theme - 
the idea that humans are not ‘real’ animals. We may share animal bodies but the human 
‘mind’ or, in other discourses, the ‘soul’ elevates humans beyond the animal kingdom. 
Scientifically speaking, in terms of life forms, there are two predominant kingdoms - plant and 
animal. In the taxonomy of things, humans are classified as animals. Yet in the ideologies that 
circulate in Western cultures, humans aspire to another kingdom, whether that be the religious 
kingdom of a god or the more secular kingdom of culture, reason and art. This dual existence 
of humans as both animal and not-animal is the focus of my thesis.
Relations between humans and other animals centre on an issue which currently preoccupies 
the social sciences - the nature of reality. This issue is characterised by two competing 
paradigms - realism versus social constructionism. The emergence of a variety of theories 
within the social constructionist framework has been an attempt to deal with the ideology of 
realism - positivism - the idea that the world can be objectively known, that there is a 
knowable truth which can be identified, measured and predicted. The social control aspects 
of positivistic inquiry have not been lost of those who wish to deconstruct this form of 
scientific knowledge to reveal the subjective investments which all researchers bring to their 
research. The desire to eliminate this ‘bias’ through appeals to ‘reliability’ and ‘validity’ have 
not assuaged fears that positivist methods are inherently biassed and, therefore, they do not 
have an indelible hold on the observation of reality. The debates between the social 
constructionists and the realists rest on this notion - either there is a real world which can only 
be subjectively observed or there is a real world which can actually be objectively observed. 
This is, of course, an oversimplification but to talk to protagonists on either side of the debate,
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1: The Nature o f the Beast
this is certainly my experience of how one camp views the other.
The question of whether there is an objectively knowable reality is important to psychology 
because, historically, psychology has modelled itself on a natural, scientific model which aims 
to observe, measure, explain and predict. The extent to which this is said to be more plausible 
in the natural sciences as opposed to the social sciences neglects the fact that humans are, 
simultaneously, natural and social. That is to say, humans belong to the evolved biological 
world - the animal kingdom - and also to a social, cultural and linguistic world - the human 
domain. This conflation o f‘animal’ with ‘natural’ and ‘human’ with ‘cultural/social’ is at the 
heart of dualistic assumptions about humans versus all other animals.
One way in which social science has recently attempted to address these issues has been to 
acknowledge the problem posed by the human body. Ussher (1997:1) characterises this as 
the ‘material-discursive divide’. Her recent edited collection on human sexuality, madness and 
reproduction, Body Talk, is one of an increasing number (see also Yardley, 1997) of attempts 
to address this issue of the relation between the physical body and the discursive body. In her 
analysis of the debate, Ussher states:
It is arguable that one of the factors which acts to hinder the development of 
coherent and pluralistic theories of sexuality, reproduction or madness, is the 
disciplinary split between those who focus on the corporeal body and those 
who focus on representation - the split between analyses of the material and 
discursive body. Yet this is a false divide, an inappropriate separation. To 
understand phenomena such as sexuality, madness or reproduction, we need 
to examine both bodily processes and practices, and ways in which these 
processes and practices are constructed in the realm of the symbolic. We 
cannot separate the two (Ussher, 1997:7).
Ussher’s edited contribution to the debate is timely and progressive. However, although these 
works go some way to deconstruct the biological:social dichotomy without simply neglecting 
or denying the biological, a strategy which has characterised much of the social constructionist 
work, the focus on the ‘human’ body does not do enough justice to the complexity of this
-11-
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‘disciplinary split’. The crux of the matter is that humans have animal bodies. Humans also 
have animal minds simply because humans are animals - evolved, biological, social, cultural 
and linguistic animals. The complexity of the human animal has historically resulted in the 
polarisation of our understanding of humans as either ‘mere’ animals - as evident in the 
behaviourist paradigm - or, in opposition, supreme humans capable of infinite constructions 
of reality - as evident in some social constructionist writings. As with most things, this 
oversimplification reflects the biases of each paradigm. Ussher’s identification of a ‘false split’ 
is crucial to the critique of the ‘material-discursive divide’. However, the focus on the divide 
within humans neglects the primary split between humans and all other animals.
Social constructionism has gone far in exposing the ethno- and androcentrism of scientific 
knowledge. What it has neglected to espouse is the anthropocentric basis of knowledge and 
meaning. Terms like anthropomorphism only make sense in an anthropocentric world which 
defines humans as not-animal. Because humans are not ‘real’ animals, attributing human 
behaviour to animals (anthropomorphism) is commonly held to be a scientific sin. This links 
the realist claim that humans are simply material animals with the socially constructed claim 
of humans as primarily discursive animals. Human relations to other animals, characterised 
by intense contradictions between eating some and loving others, and to themselves as ‘not- 
animals’ can only be explained by an understanding of how ‘human’ is constructed in relation 
to ‘animal’. My use of the term ‘construction’ requires elucidation. I believe that ‘objective 
representation’ is a contradiction in terms. Language is inherently representative, and the re­
presentation of reality involves a symbolic dimension which is partly defined by human 
subjectivity. I agree with Ussher (1997:7) that:
One of the more constructive consequences of the ‘turn to language’ has been 
the development of qualitative studies of the discursive context and meaning 
of the body and bodily experience.
Where Body Talk addresses the integration of the physical and the material within humans, 
I extend this analysis of discursive meanings to those which are constituted within human
-12-
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relations to other animals. This is not to say, however, that social constructionism has all the 
answers. Evidently it does not - the move away from the purely social to address the 
unconscious elements in the processes of constructing meanings and identities, as well as the 
problem of the ‘material-discursive divide’, are evidence of the need to address the 
inadequacies of the socially constructivist paradigm.
There may not be an objectively known reality but there are degrees of accuracy. The notion 
o f‘truth’ contains within it moral overtones which make questions of the true or false difficult 
to apply to human life, they too easily take on the value assumptions of right or wrong. 
However, ‘accuracy’ tells of levels of knowledge which can describe a phenomenon as closely 
as possible to the objective reality of that phenomenon. There may be different ways of 
knowing that are equally valid descriptions of social life but different epistemologies are not 
equally accurate. How we decide definitely which are more accurate than others is as yet an 
unresolved issue. The problems of ethnocentrism, androcentrism and anthropocentrism will 
perhaps always get in the way. But social constructionism itself has implicit measures of 
accuracy; deconstructing these prejudices has contributed to an increase in the accuracy with 
which the construction of knowledge is understood. If it had not, what would have been the 
point of its initial criticisms of positivist methods?
A major part of this academic battlefield is rooted in the nature:nurture debate, a debate 
which many social psychologists thought they had won by simply denying any influence 
on the part of nature. In a recent article, New Creationism: Biology Under Attack by 
Ehrenreich and McIntosh (1997:12) the debate was succinctly summarised as:
The notion that humans have no shared, biologically based ‘nature’ 
constitutes a theory of human nature itself. No one, after all, is challenging 
the idea that chimpanzees have a chimpanzee nature - that is, a set of 
genetically scripted tendencies and potential responses that evolved along 
with the physical characteristics we recognise as chimpanzee-like. To set 
humans apart from even our closest animal relatives as the one species that 
is exempt from the influences of biology is to suggest that we do indeed 
possess a defining ‘essence’, and that it is defined by our unique and
-13-
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miraculous freedom from biology. The result is an ideological outlook 
eerily similar to that of religious creationism. Like their fundamentalist 
Christian counterparts, the most extreme antibiologists suggest that humans 
occupy a status utterly different from and clearly ‘above’ that of all other 
living beings.
The message here is that humans perceive themselves to exist in a disembodied world 
defined by what is purely social and cultural. Nonhuman animals, on the other hand, are 
relegated to nature. This dualism distorts human perception of all nonhuman animal 
behaviour by elevating humans to the ephemeral status of ‘mind’ and expelling all other 
animals to the biological constraints of the natural world. This dichotomy has religious, 
scientific and cultural implications, and the consequences for other animals are devastating.
My contribution to this debate centres on two main issues. The first is that I shall retain the 
insights of social constructionism whilst upgrading it to a psychodynamic level. The 
integration of the unconscious in some social constructionist theories has been another thorn 
in the side of theoretical determinism. The second is that, although this thesis is not research 
in evolutionary theory, it is, in part, about evolutionary theory and its place in modem social 
science. The basic tenets of evolutionary theory that there is continuity amongst species and 
that humans are, indeed, animals will inform my argument against biological:social dualisms. 
Whilst remaining cogent of the arguments against crude sociobiological accounts of human 
life, I shall also attempt to avoid the equally determinist traps of purely social or discursive 
explanations. In exploring Ussher’s (1997) identification of the ‘disciplinary split’ between 
the material body and the discursive body, I begin with the assumption that humans have 
evolved animal bodies and, consequently, I dispense with creationism, religious or secular, as 
the bedfellow of determinism. However, in theory, I am focussing on human psychodynamic 
constructions o f‘human’ versus ‘animal’ meanings and, in empirical practice, I shall be limited 
by the culture at hand - contemporary British animals - of both the human and nonhuman kind.
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1.1 Psychodynamic Constructions
The legitimate concern about social Darwinism in the 1970s, by social and biological 
scientists alike, has become a mythological legacy for modem social science. The reasons 
for this academic orthodoxy are psychodynamic in nature, they spring from the 
unconscious and conscious fear of acknowledging that humans are animals. The 
consequences of this fear are staggering. It constitutes no less than the systematic, 
institutionalised oppression and exploitation of other animals, all other animals. Moreover, 
it provides the legitimising foundations for the dehumanisation of people based on the 
paradoxical, psychodynamic construction of humans as animals. Humans are animals and 
the bases of that fact can be found in biological literature that spans more than a century. 
Establishing, or even defending, that fact is not my concern here. I wish to show that, in 
the first place, social construction is an inadequate account of human beliefs and behaviour. 
In order to do this, I extend Hollway’s (1989) theory of psychodynamics to theorise the 
construction of human subjectivity in relation to nonhuman animal identity. Furthermore, 
I want to demonstrate why and how people deny that they are animals.
The notion of the ‘beast’ has become a mythologised cultural surrogate for the human 
animal. Where humans are afraid of the relative meaninglessness of being an animal, and 
succumb to the misunderstandings of evolutionary theory and genetics, they need to 
address the fact that humans are flesh and blood like many other animals. One way of 
doing this is, of course, to invoke religious creation myths and supernatural stories. 
However, a more specific and informative psychological strategy is the psychodynamic 
projection and displacement of this animal identity. Humans are ‘beasts’ when they act 
like ‘animals’. But ‘beasts’ are more than that. They encompass human fear and desire 
to know themselves, to account for their animal natures, to displace, culturally or morally, 
unacceptable behaviour and to construct the Other as bestial. The polysemic nature of the 
‘beast’ is, paradoxically, a means of denying the ‘beast’ in the human animal.
-15-
1: The Nature o f the Beast
This thesis is a contribution to social psychological knowledge about human beliefs and 
behaviours in relation to nonhuman animals. It is also an implicit critique of the modem 
social psychology social constructionist paradigm. The irony here is that in order to 
explore the reasons why people deny the fact that humans are animals, it is necessary to 
invoke much of the social constructionist concerns about the nature of beliefs. My aim is 
not to dismiss the social constructionist enterprise but to upgrade it to the psychodynamic 
level of analysis and to provide a strongly theorised rationale for why social psychology 
must embrace both psychodynamics and the implications of evolutionary theory if it is not 
to succumb to accusations of new creationism.
Psychodynamics is a hybrid of psychoanalytical concepts and the deconstruction of 
ideological discourse. Psychodynamics also represents a threat to modem social 
psychology. With the current popularity of ‘discourse analysis’, any attempt to delve into 
the unconscious is viewed with condescension. Psychoanalysis has long been denounced 
as a serious academic enterprise. The simplistic teaching of Freudian theory, the over 
prescriptive accounts of behaviour, the perceived biological essentialism and reductionism 
and the mere difficulty of accessing the unconscious have all conspired to render 
psychoanalytical concepts as nonsensical and irrelevant to modem social psychology. 
There have been some recent exceptions from notable social psychologists (see Parker, 
1994), however, apart from Hollway (1989), psychodynamics has been dismissed as a 
serious theoretical approach. ‘Discourse’ has become a catchall and, in its attempt to 
explain everything, is running the risk of explaining nothing. In light of this, evolutionary 
psychology and psychodynamics are unsurprisingly compatible bedfellows.
My purpose in conducting this research has itself evolved over the years. Originally I 
thought I was just interested in what people thought of other animals. And, to some 
extent, that does remain the focus of this exploration. However, this research has become 
much more than that or, rather, it has given me some insight as to why I found that 
original question so enthralling. As a social psychology researcher, I am interested in what
-16-
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people think and do, and why. So, understanding people’s relationships with other animals 
is not so much about these animals themselves, although the best of the ethologists have 
given us tremendous insight to their lives. For me, exploring what people believe about 
other animals and how they should be treated is significantly about what people believe 
about people and how they should be treated. What we think about nonhuman animals 
speaks volumes about what we think about ourselves. And if we do not think that we are 
animals, we have a ready made rationale for justifying the every day violence we inflict 
on other animals, and humans who are perceived as animals.
To the extent that this thesis is motivated by my concern for animal rights, it is a concept 
of rights which includes our own species. Beyond asking ‘what is an animal?’ my research 
has led to questions of subjectivity, rationality, femininity, masculinity and the social 
psychological paradigm. My thoughts and feelings about animals motivated me to find out 
more and at the end of this thesis I am simply at the beginning. Social psychology needs 
to address these issues, not least because psychology has been responsible for some of the 
most painful, exploitative and redundant experiments on nonhuman animals, because if we 
are to reinstate our interest in the prejudice and violence, enhanced by social 
constructionism not detracted by it, then we must recognise that the primary power relation 
which informs all other inequities is that of humans and other animals.
To this aim, the foci of the thesis are centred on the following theoretical questions:
• What kind of representations do people hold about animals?
• What kind of discourses do these representations support?
• Which discourses are marginalised?
• What are the meanings attached to beast metaphors?
• How does the beast mediate representations of humans and animals?
• How are these representations and discourses used in the psychodynamic
construction of human subjectivity?
-17-
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1.2 Terminology
The word ‘human’ is more than just a noun, it is also an adjective and has implicit 
polysemic meanings. One of those meanings is of human as not-animal and, consequently, 
many people refer to ‘humans and animals’. This discursive practice is somewhat 
analogous to the generic ‘man’ or ‘he’. It would be nonsensical to talk about ‘men and 
humans’ as if men are not humans. It is equally nonsensical, from my point of view, to 
talk about humans as if we are not animals. The estrangement of these terms, however, 
makes it difficult to describe humans in relation to other animals without being 
linguistically cumbersome. Nonetheless, for the sake of theoretical coherence, I shall use 
the phrase ‘humans and other animals’ or ‘nonhuman animals’ when necessary. The 
implicit anthropocentrism is these terms is justified only because I am talking about the 
human perspective and not any other animal’s.
The ‘beast’ is a central concept of the thesis. It signifies, more so than ‘animal’, the extent 
to which nonhuman animals are symbolised as cultural artefacts. It provides a hybrid 
theoretical concept to account for the ‘human’ and ‘animal’ dimensions of animality. It 
is a common image, a rhetorical device used to summarise ideas about human and animal 
behaviour. ‘Beasts’ are implicitly, as well as explicitly, mythological. The legendary 
‘beasts’ of folklore are the distillation of ubiquitous cultural representations which support 
oppressive discourses about nonhuman animals. The clandestine ‘beast’, the creature 
which haunts the human unconscious, is the subject of this research. From this concept 
of the ‘beast’, I take the adjective ‘bestial’ and the noun ‘bestiality’. In common parlance, 
bestiality is exclusively a reference to sexual practices between humans and other animals. 
Again, this culturally manifest representation of animality is an example of the explicitness 
of taboo human-animal relations. In this thesis, bestiality is about the nature of the ‘beast’ 
and, where sexuality is relevant, it is not in the extremities of interspecies sex but in the 
zoomorphism of human sexuality and the representation of what it means to be an ‘animal 
lover’.
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Another term with which the reader may not be familiar is ‘speciesism’. Speciesism is a 
term which was coined by Ryder (1989). It refers to discrimination against any being 
based purely on the fact that the being belongs to another species. Speciesism is analogous 
to sexism and racism, discrimination based purely on someone’s sex or ethnicity. 
Speciesism is systematic discrimination against nonhuman animals. Speciesism is an 
ideology and, therefore, permeates hegemonic discourses about nonhuman animals.
Part of the psychodynamic approach to human behaviour are the concepts of subjectivity 
and subject positions. Although these terms are also used as part of ideological discourse, 
Foucauldian accounts, they are more properly utilised to account for the unconscious and 
conscious positioning of the individual within a given discourse of knowledge. The 
inadequacies of a purely Foucauldian account are centred on the assumed lack of individual 
agency. The lack of theorising about the complex, contradictory and fragmented nature 
of the human self renders discursive accounts about power/knowledge incomplete. Subject 
positioning and, therefore, the totality of an individual’s subjectivity are as much to do 
with the unconscious desires to affirm one’s social identity as they are to do with conscious 
discursive collusions.
The concept of subjectivity is central to qualitative reflexivity. The aim of qualitative 
research is not simply to acknowledge and then eliminate researcher bias but to make that 
‘bias’ explicit as part of the research process. This thesis is not intellectually estranged 
from other areas of my life, rather is it the culmination, at this point, of my thoughts about 
what is means to be ‘human’ and what it means to be ‘animal’. The consequences of those 
meanings are catastrophic. The naturalisation of violence is the most pernicious of human 
behaviours and, here, naturalisation requires further definition. To naturalise a social 
phenomenon is to render it ‘natural’ and the meaning of what is natural is what makes 
naturalisation so powerful. Both secular and religious accounts of what is natural, 
psychologically normal, biologically evolved or God-given, prescribe that what is natural 
is what is right. The conflation of tradition, or evolution, with what is perceived to be
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morally desirable is the confusion at the heart of violence against nonhuman animals. 
Simply because something has always existed does not make it desirable, simply because 
some behaviours have evolved does not make them uncontrollable. Evolution has no 
implicit morality. Humans imbue the natural world with human meanings. Naturalisation, 
therefore, is a psychological strategy for justifying inequity and legitimising violence.
Three other terms will appear throughout the course of the thesis: anthropocentrism, 
anthropomorphism and zoomorphism. Anthropocentrism is used here in the moral and 
epistemological sense, the world viewed not only from the standpoint of humans, but also 
from their position of benefit and superiority. Anthropocentrism is analogous to 
androcentrism in which the world is viewed from the moral and epistemological point of 
view of men. Anthropomorphism is relatively widely used to mean the attribution of 
human characteristics to nonhumans. It is predominantly used to describe the 
representation of nonhuman animals with human characteristics. As will be seen, it is a 
problematic term because of its negative scientific status. However, recent calls for the 
redefinition of anthropomorphism as a heuristic rather than an ontological divide have 
mirrored the increase in ethological knowledge about other animals. Zoomorphism is the 
counterpoint to anthropomorphism. It is the attribution of animal characteristics to non­
animals, including humans. The way in which anthropomorphism and zoomorphism are 
used to construct and interpret animals (including human beings) will be a major concern 
throughout the thesis.
My personal aim has been to illuminate the relation amongst these social phenomena - 
humans, animals, beasts, speciesism, subjectivity, naturalisation, anthropocentrism, 
anthropomorphism and zoomorphism. Through psychodynamics, I believe that I have 
found a way of modelling this relationship. The concept of dehumanisation will be defined 
throughout the thesis as it is developed and explored. This concept is your guide to my 
motivations, my subjectivity and the meanings that I hope you will draw from this 
research.
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1.3 Overview
Part One, Constructing the Beast, locates this thesis as a contribution to the social 
psychology of nonhuman animal representation, and to human-animal relations, by 
proposing a theoretical dialogue between structuralist anthropology and psychodynamic 
modelling. I establish my conceptual model of dehumanisation, based on the dynamic 
relation between discourse and the unconscious human mind, through the psychodynamic 
construction of the Self and the Other. This model contributes to the psychological 
understanding of violence, and the processes of naturalisation which legitimise violence, 
by exploring the symbolic use of nonhuman animals. This exploration continues through 
a contextual and historical account of British relations with these animals, to an updated 
post-structuralist account of patterns of animal use which establishes categories of human 
and other animals. The use of taboo to reconcile anomalies between those categories is 
examined through the lenses of metaphor and metonymy.
Chapter 2, The Structuralist Framework examines whether non-speciesist research is 
possible in the current social psychology paradigm. The prerequisites for identity 
construction are explored in terms of subject-object relations, hierarchical constructions of 
identity and ideological violence. Having assessed social psychological contemporary 
theories on the construction of identity, this chapter establishes Saussure’s structuralism as 
the most appropriate theoretical basis for understanding language use and its central role 
in identity construction. The structuralist platform leads to an exposition of Leach’s 
framework for nonhuman animal categories and verbal abuse. I relate this framework to 
the construction of bestiality and show how the Leach system threatens the theological and 
ontological separation of humans and other animals. This linguistic categorisation allows 
profanity outside human categories but also allows the possible subversion of that structure. 
This chapter proposes my theoretical position through the critical upgrading of Leach’s 
framework to explore how and why the symbolic representations of nonhuman animals 
cause problems which can only be reconciled through mythological or taboo status - the
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rationalisation of contradiction through beliefs, dependent on the psychodynamic 
construction of the ‘beast’. I propose an exploration, through psychodynamic modelling, 
of the concepts of anthropocentrism, anthropomorphism, zoomorphism and 
dehumanisation. These concepts are located in the social psychology of the invisibility of 
violence. From this perspective, discrimination against other animals, speciesism, provides 
both a structural and functional framework for the justification of discrimination against 
people.
Before examining my proposed theory of dehumanisation, in chapter 3, The Historical 
Beast, I provide a British historical and cultural context for emerging modern-day 
representations of nonhuman animals. This history of the ‘beast’ examines the impact of 
Christianity on the ontological and moral separation between humans and other animals. 
It explores the dichotomy between humans and God, and between human and nonhuman 
animals. The church’s need to maintain guilt through reference to the doctrine of original 
sin is explored with reference to the notion of bestiality and the soulless nature of 
nonhuman animals. It is proposed that this separation produces conflict in terms of 
evolutionary continuity and rights for other animals. I examine the effects of Cartesian 
dualism on science in relation to the status of nonhuman animals, effects which are 
characterised as the mind:body split which chastises the body, thus producing 
somatophobia, the fear and, consequently, the denial of the body to the Self. This chapter 
shows how somatophobia leads to the projection of the body (and denial of the mind) onto 
the Other, the nonhuman animal, the ‘beast’. Furthermore, I explore anthropomorphism 
as scientific sin, or scientific heuristic, which allows either continuity or discontinuity 
between humans and other animals. I place Darwinism in relation to contemporary 
rhetoric on animal rights and compare animal welfare to animal rights as currently 
emergent phenomena. Finally, I move from the history of the ‘beast’ to modern-day 
representations and discourses on feminism and animal rights, and social relations.
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In chapter 4, The Psychodynamics o f Dehumanisation, through my reading of Hollway’s 
(1989) psychodynamics, I produce a critical integration of Saussure’s structuralism, 
Lacan’s psychoanalysis, Derrida’s deconstruction, Foucault’s theory of discourse and 
Klein’s defence mechanisms to update Leach’s framework of animal categories and verbal 
abuse aimed towards an expose of the system of dehumanisation. I illustrate how 
mechanisms based on signification and symbolism are key to the maintenance of this 
system. The mythical naturalisation of these structures is analysed in relation to the 
construction of binary oppositions and the exclusion, or marginalisation, of alternative 
identities and discourses. Deconstruction, as both theory and method, is articulated in this 
context of dehumanisation. Structures at both the level of the unconscious and the level 
of language are shown to be implicated in the process of dehumanisation. Investment, as 
a psychological concept, is reviewed as a bridge between individual subjects and their 
contexts. This reproduction of subjectivity, through differential investments in hegemonic 
discourses, is considered central to this argument of human prejudice against other animals. 
In conjunction to this, the content of those investments, in terms of linguistic devices, is 
contextualised. Processes founded on the Lacanian interpretation of metaphor and 
metonymy are seen to serve well as the guardians of dehumanisation. I apply this hybrid 
theoretical framework to develop the conceptual model of dehumanisation to account for 
the psychodynamic construction of the Other as bestial. The possibility of incorporating 
agency to account for change and resistance is examined. A diagrammatic representation 
of the process model is used to frame the exploration of how links between moral beliefs 
and interaction with nonhuman animals can be handled.
In Part Two, Deconstructing the Beast, I explore the contradictions in transactions with 
nonhuman animals, the transformation into pets, meat or metaphor and accounts of 
perception of conflict. I examine the dialectics of Self and Other in constructing 
subjectivities, how the notion of the ‘beast’ contains specific and generalised processes 
which constitute domination and, therefore, prejudice. Here, I investigate how people take 
subject positions within given discourses, and, therefore, reproduce speciesist ideologies.
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Representations, as autonomous reference systems which link the psychodynamic 
construction of the ‘beast’ to social interaction between humans and other animals, are 
examined with reference to systems of legitimised violence. ‘Beast’ metaphors are 
semiologically analysed to reveal the dynamics of anthropomorphism and zoomorphism. 
A specific representation of the ‘beast’ as a fantasy animal is explored through the 
semiological analysis of a narrative, Wilderness. The model of dehumanisation is used to 
interpret these texts.
Beginning with chapter 5, Synthesising Theory and Methods: The Empirical Design, I 
explore the synthesis of the theory, presented in Part One, and methods. Here I set the 
scene for the empirical procedures and analyses. Starting with a review of research 
methodology, scientific knowledge and its relation to psychological empiricism, I review 
the social constructionist perspective in relation to qualitative methods. The concepts of 
triangulation and reflexivity are established as methods of evaluating qualitative research. 
The chapter explores the psychodynamic playground through the integration of discourse 
analytical concepts and psychoanalytical strategies, as well as the symbolic construction of 
the Other. A semiological content analysis is introduced as a method beyond denotation 
and I establish its role in the analysis of animal representations in the media. The media 
are discussed as forms of discourse in which texts can be analysed in order to deconstruct 
representations of nonhuman animals. The structuralist analysis of semiological systems 
is articulated through exploring levels of signification and the concept of the labyrinth as 
applied to a narrative analysis. Finally, this chapter concludes with an account of the 
relation between the design of the empirical studies and the questions of the thesis 
providing justification for the mix of methods employed.
The analyses begin with chapter 6, Bestial Discourses, where interviews are analysed to 
reveal the dynamics of the individual’s internal rhetorical dialogue which constitutes 
thinking. The interview explores the production and reproduction of social meanings from 
the perspective of the individual within the social context of the interview. Here, I focus
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on the analysis of texts. I present the deconstruction of primary texts, the interview 
transcripts, to reveal the social and psychological construction of bestial discourse. I 
examine the naturalisation of violence, and deconstruct the assumptions of the hegemonic 
ideologies to reveal those marginalised or muted subtexts which form part of the system 
of dehumanisation. I examine the contradictions in practice of eating meat and keeping 
pets. Both awareness of the rules of eating meat and breaking those rules are investigated. 
I explore the processes of both anthropomorphism and zoomorphism, the use of ‘humane’ 
to refer to the unhuman, the connection with animal welfare, and the relation between that 
ideological violence and dehumanisation. I illustrate interpretations of the ‘beast’ through 
psychodynamics. This analysis identifies patterns of association and dissociation as forms 
of discourse which constitute subjectivity. The production of social reality and the 
participation in social practices are related and located within the symbolic and cultural 
web which defines the model of dehumanisation.
In chapter 7, Representations of the Beast, I analyse representations of the ‘beast’ in the 
British press by exploring linguistic taboos concerning nonhuman animal categories, 
through the strategies of anthropomorphism and zoomorphism. I investigate when, how 
and why ‘beast’ metaphors are used; what aspects of human experience are projected onto 
the image of animality; what is the structure, function and content of these metaphors; to 
what extent are taboo characteristics dealt with through ‘beast’ metaphors and how taboo 
mediates binary oppositions between humans and other animals. This semantic analysis 
defines the use of ‘beast’ metaphors as units of analysis within signifying systems and 
compares the function of these metaphors in the different domains of Human, Animal and 
Object. The results of this analysis are cross-referenced with the model of dehumanisation.
In chapter 8, Wilderness: A Semiotic Analysis o f Narrative, I explore the media 
representation of a particular ‘beast’, the werewolf. Through a semiotic analysis of this 
novel and derived television drama, I examine associations amongst werewolves, sexuality, 
rationality and freedom and the parallel narratives of lupine symbolisation and social
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commentary on the nature of humans. Signifying bestiality, this semiotic analysis reveals 
the social meanings surrounding concepts of ‘wild’ and ‘civilised’. It marks the 
transformation (physical, metaphorical and ideological) from human to nonhuman animal 
through a semiotic analysis of the plot. Concepts of natural gender and gendered nature 
are utilised to explore the androcentrism of male-female dualism reflected in the 
anthropocentrism of human-animal dichotomies. Anthropomorphism demarcates the points 
of continuity and discontinuity within the dynamics of human-animal relations and is 
assessed for its heuristic values and pitfalls. Bestial sexuality is perused as a play of signs. 
Their meanings, interactions and consequences are related to stereotypical representations. 
The main themes of transformation, sexuality, rationality and freedom are compared 
between the original text and the drama derived from that text. These findings enrich the 
model of dehumanisation.
In Part Three, Reconstructing the Beast, I draw together the empirical findings of the 
research and evaluate the theoretical development of the model of dehumanisation. To this 
end, I examine the discourses on the notion of the ‘beast’ in relation to interactions with 
nonhuman animals as pets, as food and as referents. I synthesise the various discourses 
in order to establish the model of dehumanisation to account for the interplay between 
species-differentiated beliefs and behaviours. The texture of denotative and connotative 
meanings is concluded to be a dynamic multilayered matrix of signification. The model 
is not presented as a concrete reference system but as a guide to the analysis of 
differentiation and integration of the beast signs. Its utility resides in its flexibility. The 
texts and analyses are subject to an intertextual reflexivity, with the awareness that analysis 
produces further representations and supports certain discourses. Production of this text, 
the thesis, is testament to knowledge of the machinery of signification and the ubiquity of 
the sign.
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Chapter 9, Family, Food or Fantasy: Reconstructing the 'Beast Within’, uses the 
conceptual model of dehumanisation to interpret species-differentiated discourses and 
behaviour. I explore how the notion of the ‘beast’ is used to justify violence against 
human and nonhuman ‘beasts’, and to blame human behaviours as animalistic and bestial. 
Inconsistencies and contradictions in behaviour are seen to depend on dehumanisation, 
ideological violence and the psychodynamic construction of the ‘beast’. Anthropocentrism, 
anthropomorphism and zoomorphism, as organising principles for understanding nonhuman 
animals in relation to humans, are deconstructed with reference to the model of 
dehumanisation. The deconstructed ‘beast’ reveals the multiple dimensions of human 
ambivalence towards species identity. In this chapter, I assess the development of the 
model of dehumanisation through the empirical findings. The main theoretical 
developments are examined and the final model of dehumanisation is established to account 
for the role of the ‘beast’ in constructing, mediating, legitimising and mystifying relations 
between humans and other animals. I conclude the thesis with a short review of future 
directions in the social psychology of the ‘beast’ with reference to the extra-terrestrial 
‘beast’ and bestial representations of aliens.
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Part One, Constructing the Beast, locates this thesis as a contribution to the social 
psychology of nonhuman animal representation, and to animal-human relations, by 
extending a theoretical dialogue between discourse analysis, psychoanalysis and 
structuralist anthopology. It begins with a review of the requirements for identity 
construction and identifies subject-object relations, hierarchical definitions and ideological 
violence as the basic tenets of construction. It also contributes to the psychological 
understanding of violence, and the processes of naturalisation which legitimise violence, 
by exploring the conflation between history, culture and morality. I compare the basic 
elements of identity construction with contemporary theories on identity, namely Social 
Identity Theory and Social Representations Theory. This assessment concludes that these 
theories fail to grasp the complexities of identity by ignoring the hierarchical structure of 
identity formation. I propose structuralism as the most appropriate framework from which 
to develop a theory of subjectivity and apply it to Leach's categorisation of nonhuman 
animals and verbal abuse. This exploration continues through a contextual and historical 
account of British relations with nonhuman animals. I explore the change in the status of 
nonhuman animals from industrialisation, through Victorian Britain, to modem discourses 
on animal welfare and animal rights. This historical and cultural tapestry provides a 
backdrop to the development of the theory of dehumanisation. An account of post- 
structuralist theories of subjectivity is applied to patterns of nonhuman animal use which 
establish categories of human and nonhuman animals. The use of taboo to reconcile 
anomalies between those categories is examined through metaphor and metonymy. The 
conceptual model of dehumanisation is used as the theoretical referent for the empirical 
procedures in Part Two.
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It was a comment on human nature that the concept o f ‘animality’ was 
devised. (Thomas, 1983:41)
Overview
This chapter explores the concept of identity, its origins, transformations and theoretical 
accounts. Identity, here, is presented as a social label, the way people view another 
person. It is different to subjectivity because subjectivity contains all the necessary 
elements required to constitute an individual: unconscious and conscious discursive 
positioning and the social identity of a given person. Identity is more restrictive, it is part 
of subjectivity but it is not the whole story. It is, however, a good starting point to get to 
grips with the basic tenets of human relations to other animals. Humans certainly do not 
know enough about the mental lives of other animals to comment on their subjectivities, 
still there is no reason to believe that some of those animals do not have subjectivities. 
Here, however, I am concerned with the subject life of a particular animal, the British 
human. The relation between identity and subjectivity is important because these concepts 
are applied differentially to humans and other animals. This chapter will show how the 
concept of identity construction is relevant to human constructions of animal identity but 
is inadequate as an explanation for human subjectivity. Furthermore, it will explore the 
structure of identity, the relations, hierarchies, implications and consequences of human 
versus animal identity. I identify subject-object relations, the hierarchical nature of 
definition and the invisibility of violence as key elements in the structure of identity. Then 
I review two of the main contemporary theories in social psychology, Social Identity 
Theory and the theory of Social Representations, designed to explain identity construction. 
Given the initial required elements, these theories are found to be inadequate accounts and, 
therefore, I turn to structuralism’s various schools of thought and identify Saussurean 
linguistics, and Leach’s structural analysis of nonhuman animal categories and verbal 
abuse, as the most appropriate framework for the development of the model of 
dehumanisation.
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2.1 Human and Animal Identities
What people think of nonhuman animals, and the way they behave towards them, is 
significantly affected by definitions of ‘animal’ in relation to ‘human’. This section 
explores the meaning of these terms through an examination of subject-object relations, the 
hierarchical nature of the definitions, and the concept of ideological violence.
Subject-Object Relations
Social constructionism is an interactive and continual process which produces and 
reproduces knowledge and power relations. Through this process, the dominant culture 
is rendered invisible, or ‘natural’, through its own construction of reality. All cultures 
depend on subject-object relations. Objectification is the removal, or denial, of agency; 
dehumanisation is a specific form of objectification involving the removal, or denial, of 
human-defining characteristics. Therefore, the definition of ‘subject’ in relation to ‘object’ 
is dependent on the perceived absence or presence of sentience and agency. This 
relationship exists through the general objectification and specific dehumanisation of certain 
groups which are constructed as ‘other’, as opposed to ‘natural’. An acknowledgement of 
the relational construction of identity has the potential to incapacitate this form of 
oppression by analysing and, hence, revealing the relationship amongst knowledge, power 
and violence - by making the invisible visible.
To this end, it is important to recognise that meaning is negotiated and reproduced through 
discourses, and that power is derived from privileged access to the interpretations of such 
meaning (Foucault, 1981). As reality is culturally and socially constituted, the power of 
the norm/given, masked as truth or objectivity, is also the product of social exchange. 
Historically, the matter of truth is one of epistemological objectivity, a masculine 
rationality as Lloyd (1984:2) comments:
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Rational knowledge has been constructed as a transcending, transformation 
or control of natural forces; and the feminine has been associated with what 
rational knowledge transcends, dominates or simply leaves behind.
On the one hand, part of what defines humans is the subjective element of emotions, what 
makes people human and, indeed, subjects of life is their ability to feel things. We are, 
after all, not robots. However, the intertwined relation between emotions and irrationality 
is a psychological tool used to discriminate against people, and other animals, on the basis 
of their supposed lack of rationality or, more precisely, their absent objectivity. 
Discrimination works because the process of objectification transforms the ‘subject’ into 
an ‘object’. Humans are generally considered to have both sentience, the capacity to feel 
pain and pleasure, and agency, therefore, they are attributed with certain rights, including 
the right to life. Conversely, the ‘object’ status of nonhuman animals means that they have 
no such rights. Indeed, based on their ideological status as objects, it would appear logical 
not to grant them rights. This paradoxical relation between what constitutes subjectivity, 
and how it defines the subject, and what defines objectivity, and how it relates to the 
object, underpins this research. In Chapter 3 we shall see how the predominance of 
rationalism, based on the subject:object dichotomy, in the animal rights movement, 
actually undermines the status of nonhuman animal and weakens the rationalist argument 
for their rights.
Subject-object relations are located in this struggle between the true and the false, the norm 
and the abnormal, the given and the other, the masculine and the feminine, the human and 
the ‘beast’. Within these dichotomous battles, power is produced and reproduced through 
definition, naming, discourse and all others arenas of knowledge. These are the unseen 
battles, the ‘invisible’ myriads of violence. In this sense, ideology, literally a body of 
ideas, remains the locus of power production and abuse. Ideology in a psychological sense 
prescribes power relations as commonsense, that which is taken for granted (Parker, 1990). 
The people who produce and disseminate knowledge directly affect the hegemony of any 
given ideology. The power of ideology is based on the representation of discourses as
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‘natural’ or commonsensical. Here, I follow Weedon’s (1987:108) definition of discourse 
as:
...ways of constituting knowledge, together with the social practices, forms 
of subjectivity and power relations which inhere in such knowledges and the 
relations between them. Discourses are more than ways of thinking and 
producing meaning. They constitute the ‘nature’ of the body, unconscious 
and conscious mind and the emotional life of the subject they seek to 
govern.
Consequently, everything from acts of objectification to acts of exploitation are imbued 
with power relations. Indeed, naturalised power relations will determine what is culturally 
acceptable and unacceptable. The relation between subject and object may appear natural, 
commonsensical and, therefore, morally desirable.
The Hierarchical Nature of Definition
Once the construction of human and nonhuman animal identity is seen as a relational 
subject-object process, and ideology, also the product of social construction, seen as a 
legitimate source of violence, it is possible to explore the structure of these identities. 
Here, I consider whether or not identity is fundamentally hierarchical, and how hierarchy 
functions in the question of ideological violence. To determine whether or not definitions 
of human identity are structured hierarchically, it is essential to explore the influences on 
ideas that generate these definitions.
The primary influences in modem culture on the construction of identity are religious texts 
designed to order life, scientific knowledge constructed to explain difference, and cultural 
images manipulated for exploitation and consumerism. On the face of it, Christianity and 
Cartesian philosophy would appear to have little to do with each other. However, both 
Christian and Cartesian dualism, between mind and body, inform our ideas about humans 
and other animals. Christian theology is based on the notion that God created people in 
His own image. Humans, therefore, have divine-given souls which transcend the body. 
Nonhuman animals, on the other hand, are resources which God has given humans
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dominion over. Here, the dichotomy between humans and other animals is mediated by 
the notion of God-given souls. As Leach puts it so eloquently:
We are human beings, not because we have souls but because we are able
to conceive of the possibility that we might have souls (Leach, 1982:108).
In the Christian tradition, nonhuman animals, although frequently used as symbols of the 
son of God, peace and love, are mere animals, soulless and without the prospect entering 
Heaven. On the other hand, traditional Cartesian philosophy, the origin of secular 
mind:body dualism, proposed that nonhuman animals were automata. Not only did they 
not possess souls, they could not feel pain. Their reactions to vivisection were mechanical 
reflexes and, as machines, animals could be used and treated in any way that suited humans 
(Birke, 1994). The effects of Christianity and Cartesianism on the status of nonhuman 
animals will be explored further in Chapter 3.
The legacies of Christian and Cartesian dualism have converged. In the face of Darwin’s 
theory of evolution, Christians began to submit that it was possible that humans were also 
animals but they remained special, God-given animals, and Cartesians, now aware that 
many animals shared human capacities for pain and pleasure, compensated by sustaining 
the mind:body dualism and claiming that the human mind was qualitatively different to the 
nonhuman animal mind. The far reaching results of this was that only humans were 
considered rational, because only humans possess language, and, therefore, only humans 
could be objects of moral concern. This Cartesian ideology is based on Kant’s social 
contract theory which states that only rational beings are capable of participating in the 
social contract of acting morally and therefore, deserving moral concern (Rollin, 1992). 
However, as we shall see in the following chapter, the argument of rationality is not 
relevant to the inclusion/exclusion of nonhuman animals in moral consideration because 
there are many cases of humans who are not rational, yet are indiscriminately included in 
the sphere of moral concern. Human and animal definitions, and identities, are, 
consequently, hierarchical. Moreover, consumerism trades in these images of humans and
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animals, thus, reinforcing them (Baker, 1993).
Modem scientific reason, with its insistence on reductionist rationality has used its 
self-imposed legitimacy to justify and promote this hierarchical dichotomous ideology. 
Science is valuational and philosophically based (Rollin, 1992). However, the dominant 
scientific position holds that science is value-free, and it is this assumption that has 
important implications for representations of nonhuman animals. At the heart of modem, 
Western thinking is this preoccupation with a masculine-defined rationality which attempts 
to account for all humanity, and, in doing so, excludes and oppresses those groups seen, 
or rather constructed, as non-rational or irrational (Hekman, 1994). This presence or 
absence of rationality provides the arena for a continual struggle amongst people, and 
between people and other animals. It is the benchmark for the hierarchical definition of 
‘human’ in relation to ‘animal’. Consequently, people and other animals suffer in this 
attempt to continually define and legitimise specific definitions of rationality through access 
to the powerful and dominant status of caste, class, nation, religion, sexuality, ethnicity, 
gender and species. This leads to destruction against the ethically, and economically, 
marginalised cultural and natural environments.
Social Hierarchy
Further analysis of the hierarchical concept of identity must include an exploration of the 
antecedents and consequences of such hierarchies. The subservient categories are 
positioned in binary opposition to the ‘given’ status of the powerful (Derrida, 1978). Both 
human and nonhuman animal identity are constructed in hierarchical opposition to each 
other. These dichotomies are dependent on one another, through contrast, for definition, 
function and structure, however, they are perceived as separate, incompatible entities. In 
the value dualisms which comprise these hierarchies, the pairs are oppositional and 
exclusive. The human:animal dualism is constructed as distinct and independent. The 
relative power of the category ‘human’ supersedes the category ‘animal’ so as to render 
invisible the interconnectedness between these constructions. It not only denies the
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biological classification of humans as types of animal, but it further dissociates itself by 
claiming its own superiority at the expense of the animal category (Midgeley, 1978). 
Consequently, humans are constructed as both distinct from, and superior to, all other 
animals.
Social hierarchy is based on numerous fundamental dichotomies. The dominant group 
forms the major part of the dichotomy yet its definition is created through contrast and 
comparison to the minor, suppressed, part of the dichotomy. This part is externalised and 
repressed as the ‘other’. Any desire for this part can only be legitimised through 
sentimentality or romanticism (Adams, 1995). Hierarchy is valued as a means of 
establishing status and control. A further consequence of this is that people are devalued 
through their association with the already devalued status of ‘animal’. In turn, this 
constitutes the ‘logic of domination’ (Plumwood, 1993) which permits the subordination 
of those groups who are on the ‘wrong’ side of the dualism. It further allows suppression 
and exploitation as acts of violence. Here Scott’s (1991) analysis of the structuralist theory 
for feminism is equally pertinent to the case of nonhuman animals. Traditionally, 
‘equality’ and ‘difference’ have been presented as antithetical. Thus, it would be illogical 
to talk of any kind of equality for nonhuman animals considering all the actual and 
supposed differences between them and human animals. However, this is a fundamental, 
and common, misinterpretation of the relationship. The concept of equality necessitates 
accommodating the differences. If there were no differences amongst groups there would 
be no need for the concept of equality because everyone would be the same.
Many nonhuman animal myths are structured on such binary oppositions. Nonhuman 
animals, often constructed as an undifferentiated category, are perceived to be ontologically 
different to humans, therefore, the human concepts of rights are not applied to other 
animals. The difference assigned to the object status means that other animals can be 
subjected to systematic violence. The identity of these animals as objects prescribes this 
violence as natural and, therefore, desirable. Violence is both a consequence and a cause
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of these dichotomies, it is linked to their inherent social control aspects.
The Invisibility of Violence
Relevant to this context, Kappeler (1995) defines institutional violence as:
1. An infringement on or failure to acknowledge another’s inviolability.
2. Treatment and/or physical force that injures or abuses others.
3. Involving a series of denial mechanisms that deflect attention from violence.
4. Targeting of ‘appropriate’ victims.
5. Having detrimental effects on society as a whole.
6. The manipulation of the public (e.g. consumers) into passivity.
Part of this prescription is the naturalisation of violence. Violence may be physical or 
ideological, the two are often intertwined with one determining or legitimising the other. 
Significantly, it is the violence of everyday behaviour which is culturally acceptable, 
indeed, culturally desirable. Such violence is naturalised so that it is reproduced and 
maintained through the status quo. Moreover, it provides an effective framework for the 
production and maintenance of the more visible forms of violence which are not culturally 
accepted (Kappeler, 1995). The main strength of this form of violence is its invisibility, 
so that the victimisation of certain groups of individuals becomes morally acceptable. 
Within this framework, animal abuse in the form of meat eating, hunting and 
experimentation becomes part of discourses which dictate that status of nonhuman animals. 
This invisibility is structured so that its breakdown requires the deconstruction of the 
dominant value hierarchy, and a change in the collective mindset of people, to recognise 
the interdependence amongst humans and other animals at an ethical, instead of a purely 
economical, level.
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Ideological violence gives people the ‘right’ to violate others within that particular ethical 
framework of exploitation. Therefore, the justified exploitation of nonhuman animals not 
only violates their rights, but further legitimises the exploitation of people constructed as 
animal-like. Empirical evidence supports the view that threatened or actual sexual/physical 
violence often involves violence against nonhuman animals (Adams, 1995). For example, 
in domestic situations the threat or actual killing of a pet animal establishes control over 
women and children (Adams, 1995). Sexual exploitation in the form of battering, rape, 
pornography, child sexual abuse, ritual abuse, serial killing and sexual harassment may 
often involve the explicit use of nonhuman animal imagery, if not the actual animals. 
Significantly, the abuse of nonhuman animals has been recognised in DSM-111-R as 
symptoms indicative of a Conduct Disorder (Adams, 1995). Men, women and children 
become victims of this kind of exploitation based partly on their association with other 
animals.
Ideological violence is the collective result of institutionalised violence, that which is 
deliberately, yet clandestinely, used to achieve the submission of society’s members. 
Institutionalised violence goes hand in hand with institutionalised prejudice. These 
constitute systems of mass control in which widespread prejudice legitimises violence in 
relation to certain ‘victimised’ groups. This kind of institutionalised oppression is wholly 
dependent on the perceived existence of an hierarchy which values the status of certain 
identities at the expense of others. Christian divisions between the spirit and the body are 
mirrored by scientific dualism between humans and other animals, and are further repeated 
in cultural representations of rationality versus instinct, and masculinity versus femininity. 
A culture of domination provides numerous other sites for the production and reproduction 
of epistemological and ontological assumptions about human and nonhuman animal 
identities. Such assumptions are inherently violent because they violate the integrity and 
reality of those with less access to knowledge and, therefore, power production. In 
essence, ideological violence denies (or ignores) issues of sentience, agency or subjectivity 
in other animals.
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2.2 The Social Psychology of Identity
Having seen that ideological violence is both the cause and consequence of hierarchical 
definitions of identity, it is important to look at how social psychology has theorised 
identity. Identity is constructed through numerous social psychological processes. 
However, the main approaches to be explored here are social identity theory and the theory 
of social representations.
Social Identity Theory
In order to comprehend social reality, people categorise themselves and other beings. In 
doing so they may strive to categorise themselves within a highly valued group and, 
therefore, devalue other groups. Categorisation, comparison and self esteem form the crux 
of Tajfel’s (1979) Social Identity Theory (SIT), which is essentially a theory of social 
cognition. People categorise others according to salient characteristics and tend to 
exaggerate inter-group differences and intra-group similarities. Categorisation structures 
knowledge, creating both patterns and variances. Prejudice is thought to arise from the 
distortion of reality produced by the process of categorisation. The distorted perception 
of reality would lead, inevitably, to prejudice. In effect, it produces an ‘error and bias’ 
model of human understanding (Henriques et al, 1984) based on the assumption that 
humans are fundamentally rational and unitary individuals.
As Billig (1987) suggests, categorisation can only be one half of human cognition. Its 
fundamental flaw is that it suggests that prejudice is inevitable and, therefore, does not 
theorise the possibility of tolerance. Billig posits that an opposite, yet complementary, 
process of particularisation balances the cognitive system. Categorisation and 
particularisation are inter-related strategies which depend on each other. Specifically, the 
ability to categorise depends on the ability to select criteria for comparison. Consequently, 
the human mind operates through the tension produced by two opposing strategies. Neither 
similarity or difference alone can account for human perception and comprehension of
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social reality. Tajfel overcame the inadequacies of social categorisation in later 
developments of the theory, namely the introduction of issues of status and power, group 
boundaries and legitimacy. Nevertheless, Henriques’ and Billig’s critiques remain valid 
for exposing the individual:social dualism, and demonstrating that supposedly unitary 
concepts, such as categorisation, are, in fact, subject to the theory of binary oppositions.
A further problem with theories of social cognition is that they presuppose a rational, 
objective representation of the world, and rational, unitary individuals who interpret that 
world. Rationalism promotes dualism and denies contradictions. One consequence of this 
is that, because individualistic accounts of prejudice locate the source of the problem in the 
human information processing system, the object of study is not the prejudiced person but 
the object of prejudice (Henriques et al, 1984). This leads to further stigmatisation of the 
‘other’. In doing so, people unconsciously project those denied characteristics onto other 
groups and individuals. Not only does this suggest that people are not fundamentally 
rational, but these projections are naturalised and the actual construction of the ‘other’s’ 
identity becomes mythologised.
Social Representations
Social representations theory provides a framework for describing and conceptualising 
ways of understanding the world and, therefore, it has the potential for understanding 
notions of ‘human’ and ‘animal’. As a meeting place between ideological assumptions and 
discursive practices, social representations theory denies Cartesian individualism and 
expounds instead the view that thinking is social, that is to say, that the nature of thought 
itself is defined by the external world. Social representations comprise each individual’s 
mental and social environment (Moscovici, 1982). They are bound by time and culture 
and, therefore, they change, evolve and, simultaneously, reflect and determine the course 
of history. Through social constructionism all objects are transformed through the process 
of representation.
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The theory of social representations overcomes the individualistic assumptions of theories of 
social cognition. Furthermore, the French theorisation and empirical findings in the field go 
well beyond the rationalism of traditional psychology (e.g. Moscovici, 1984; Jodelet, 1991). 
Recent work by Joffe (1996) has addressed the relationship between social representations 
theory and psychodynamic approaches to human behaviour.
Anchoring and objectification are the twin processes in social representations theory which 
account for the formation of representations. Joffe defines anchoring as the way in which, 
‘Unfamiliar concepts are compared and interpreted in the light of phenomena which are 
already understood’ (Joffe, 1996:198). In this way, social representations theory may provide 
a useful analysis of the way in which the ‘unfamiliar’ nature of nonhuman animals may be 
understood in light of what we know about human animals. The anthropomorphic projections 
onto nonhuman animals may be evidence of this, however, the traditional concept of 
anthropomorphism relies heavily on the ontological distinction between humans and all other 
animals. Therefore, an understanding of this process of rendering the unfamiliar familiar must 
recognise the foundational difference in meaning between the terms ‘human’ and ‘animal’. 
Furthermore, Joffe describes the other major feature of social representations, objectification, 
as:
...a...process [which] transforms the abstract links to past ideas which 
anchoring sets up, into concrete mental content...It is in the process of 
objectification that new referents, new and creative links, may be inserted into 
existing social representations, making this a more dynamic aspect of the 
theory, which allows for theorisation of how thinking changes over time 
(Joffe, 1996: 198).
The way in which the theory of social representations accounts for the historical and cultural 
construction of meaning is evident here. At this point, however, it is vital to recognise that 
this specific theoretical definition of ‘objectification’, as part of the theory of social 
representations, is unrelated to my use of the term. As mentioned previously, I take the term 
‘objectification’ to refer to the process by which subjects are constructed, through 
dehumanisation, as objects.
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Joffe (1996) refers to Moscovici’s (1976) original claim that social representations are used 
to protect people’s identities against threat. Joffe’s integration of psychodynamic theory to 
social representations is influenced by the need to account for the emotional response to 
threat:
It [psychodynamic theory] complements a theory of the process of 
representation formation, adding a further dimension. It provides an 
explanation for the recurrence of certain contents in representations of 
threatening phenomena (Joffe, 1996:199).
To the extent that nonhuman animals pose a literal and symbolic threat to humans, this 
integration of psychodynamic and social representations theories may be useful. Certainly, 
human desire to protect ‘human’ identity against nonhuman ‘animal’ identity is a key concern 
in this thesis. Indeed, Joffe (1994, 1996) identifies social representations of AIDS with 
behavioural characteristics of the ‘other’ that includes the notion of bestiality. Sexual relations 
between humans and other species constitutes one of the biggest moral taboos not least 
because it transgresses the integrity of the ‘human’ body and dehumanises it to the level of the 
‘animal’ body. Social representations theory, here, can address the social construction of the 
‘other’ as bestial in response to threat of AIDS. However, is does not explicitly account for 
the hierarchical nature of the emergence of meaning. In the case of bestiality, it is the 
ontological divide between humans and all other animals, and the subsequent hierarchical 
status of humans as ‘superior’ to all other animals and, therefore, ‘not-animal’, that partly 
informs the taboo on human-animal sexual relations.
Social representations theory is sensitive to the historical and cultural factors which constitute 
identity and, as such, it moves considerably from the social cognition accounts of identity. 
Joffe’s (1996) psychodynamic extension of the theory also moves it beyond the rationalist 
assumptions of the more traditional social psychology of identity. Nevertheless, she does cite 
SIT as being a useful model of inter-group splitting:
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In the process of forming a personal identity, values and ideologies are 
imbibed from the social environment. Certain groups are integrated into the 
‘good’ self and others are construed as the ‘bad’ other (Joffe, 1996:209).
Whilst SIT may provides a good theoretical account of group identity formation at a rational, 
conscious level, its concentration on process results in a neglect of content. To counter this, 
Joffe incorporates Kleinian object relations in order to theorise the unconscious component 
in the way in which social forces impact on individuals. Joffe claims that:
Her [Klein’s] conceptualisation of the unconscious defence termed ‘splitting’ - 
with its projective and introjective components - is an essential aspect of any 
theory of representation of threat (Joffe, 1996:205).
Here, I am in complete agreement. The way in which people handle perceived threats to their 
identity necessarily entails an analysis of the unconscious as well as the conscious processes 
of defence. Joffe’s analysis successfully integrates the process of representation formation 
with the content of those representations:
Social representations theory can be enriched by a psycho-dynamic, 
developmental angle which postulates that fantasises that occur during early 
development account for some of the energy with which people attach 
themselves to particular representations...the Kleinian model is remarkably 
useful in terms of positing the origin of the tendency to represent others in 
polarised terms, as either all ‘good’ or all ‘bad’. As a function of the life force, 
people attempt to protect the ‘good’ facets of themselves and others. This is 
done by splitting the ‘good’ from the ‘bad’ and projecting the ‘bad’ outside of 
the self. However, the ‘other’, who is the target of the projection, is viewed 
as dangerous and powerful (Joffe, 1996:208).
The details of Kleinian theory will be drawn upon in Chapter 4 as described by Joffe but also 
by theorists in the post-structuralist tradition such as Hollway (1989). The use of ‘splitting’ 
as an explanatory framework for both the process and content of belief systems will also 
underpin my theoretical framework and model of dehumanisation. Here, although Klein’s 
work is evidently related to my theoretical research questions, the role of social 
representations theory is less applicable. Starting from the basis of meaning emerging through
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difference, a structuralist concept, my theoretical model requires the explicit conceptualisation 
of difference and hierarchy.
By integrating social representations theory, SIT, Kleinian defence mechanism and also 
cultural theory, Joffe provides an in-depth, non-determinist account of how and why social 
representations emerge, are established and also change. At one level, this synthesis is a useful 
explanation of human relations with other animals. However, the ontological basis of the 
splitting of animals into humans and beasts (on the ‘bad’ side) or animals into humans and pets 
(on the ‘good’ side) requires another level of analysis, one which accounts for the hierarchical 
construction of meaning as well as the subsequent defence of meaningful identities. For this 
purpose, I shall leave social representations theory here, but I shall expand on the relevance 
of Kleinian defence mechanisms in Chapter 4.
At this point, it may be useful to distinguish between the use of the term ‘representation’ in 
social representations theory and my own use of the term in this thesis. I use ‘representations’ 
in the ordinary sense to refer to the re-presentation of reality, here through psychodynamic 
constructions. To this end, I shall explore linguistic representations in terms of metaphors and 
metonymies, and visual representations of the ‘beast’ in the empirical chapter on Wilderness. 
Again, my use of the term ‘discourse’ follows Weedon’s (1987) definition (see page 28). 
Thus, I shall explore representations and discourses throughout this thesis. There is a certain 
degree of overlap between these terms, although broadly speaking discourses are more verbal 
(written and oral) whilst representations are more visual (pictorial or linguistic images). 
Representations and discourses interplay to produce meanings which may reinforce or contest 
dominant meanings. My aim throughout this thesis shall be to explore these constructions 
within a psychodynamic framework, using individual accounts, and media representations, 
both linguistic and visual, to contribute to the social psychological understanding of human 
relations to other animals. To begin that exploration, I now turn to structuralism and identify 
the key tenets from which post-structuralism emerges as a dynamic, non-determinist account 
of the use of nonhuman animals in the psychodynamic constructions of human subjectivity.
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2.3 Structural Linguistics: Signifying Animals
Structuralism is a theoretical framework involving many, often conflicting, theoreticians 
which retains some sense of cohesion by attempting to explain surface beliefs and 
behaviours through deconstruction to reveal underlying systems. Much of structuralist 
thought has emerged from Saussure’s (1915) concept of semiology, the science of signs, 
which investigates the arbitrary relation between the signifier and the signified. The work 
of Saussure contains within it this revolutionary idea that would eventually give rise to the 
post-structuralist critiques of Derrida and Foucault. Although structuralism has been 
placed firmly in modernity, without Saussure’s investigation into linguistic systems and 
language as a semiological system, it is difficult to imagine what form post-modernism 
would have taken. Furthermore, Lacan’s (1977) adoption of Saussure’s notion of the 
structure of language and its application to the structure of the unconscious, led to feminist 
interpretations of discourse and psychoanalysis which allow space for resistance and 
opposition to oppression (Minsky, 1992).
The basic tenets of structuralism are centred on the concept of structured systems. Both 
content and function may vary across times and contexts, but the structural organisation 
of social phenomena remains systematic. Moreover, there is an inextricable link between 
mythology and semiology - the science of signs. Saussure defined semiology as the science 
which studied what constituted a sign and what laws governed signs. Such an aim 
necessarily entails the analysis of language. Saussure stated that the ‘social’ should be 
distinguished from the ‘individual’, as being outside the individual. Furthermore, what is 
‘essential’ must be separated from what is ‘accessory’. Therefore, in language (langue) 
the only essential thing is the ‘union of meaning and sound images’. This is the 
psychological aspect of the sign. Saussure also distinguished La Langue (language system) 
from La Parole (word or usage in speech or writing) in order to identify an object of 
linguistics from within language usages. Structuralists identify and analyse the 
fundamental rules of language in terms of its social nature not its individual use.
-44-
2: The Structuralist Framework
Saussure’s La Parole is based on binary oppositions. The process of signification involves 
the arbitrary relation of the signifier to the signified. Signs are, thus, based on binary 
oppositions. Another opposition involves the paradigmatic versus the syntagmatic. The 
paradigmatic involves linguistic substitution or metaphor, whilst the syntagmatic involves 
combinations in the form of metonymy or synecdoche. Both paradigmatic substitution and 
syntagmatic combination produce extended discourses. These are systems of signs based 
on cultural convention which construct meaning. We shall see how metaphor and 
metonymy conspire to dehumanise people in later chapters. The key concept for now is 
the Saussurean sign and Lacan’s (1977) revision of it.
Saussure defined the sign as binomial: the signifier being the acoustic image and the 
signified being the concept. The relationship between the signifier and the signified is 
arbitrary. However, once they are united as the sign their position within the linguistic 
system is objectified. The Saussurean sign is symmetrical, however, Lacan interpreted the 
concept of the sign with the algorithm: £
s
Here Lacan places the signifier over the signified. It is Lacan’s first revision of the 
Saussurean sign, and it extols the signifier. This asymmetry relates to the endless 
degeneration of the signified into signifiers. All meaning is, thus, derived from the 
signifier, and with any signified thing being the amalgamation of an indeterminate number 
of signifiers, meaning is pluralistic. Reality, truth, everyday experience are all determined 
by such a ‘signifying chain’. For Lacan, symbols were the primary language upon which 
all other languages were based. He believed implicitly that ‘Man speaks.. .but it is because 
the symbol has made him man’ (1977:65). The symbolic order, according to Lacan, is 
defined by exclusions. The notion of exclusion will be pivotal to our understanding of 
subjectivity and prejudice determined through hierarchical opposition. Initially, though, 
let us turn to two areas of structural analysis - structural anthropology and mythology.
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The Meaning of Myth
Nonhuman animal myths are discourses which have altered the concept of what a 
nonhuman animal is into a collection of stereotyped simplicities which are compatible with 
contemporary ideologies such as anthropocentrism and speciesism. There are many 
mythical examples of nonhuman animals. In psychological terms, myth imposes structure 
onto reality through which people comprehend reality. Barthes (1972) stated that myth is 
a language, it resides in discourse and is, essentially, a mode of signification. Myth is also 
a Saussurean semiological sign in the sense that it is the study of signification severed from 
content. In myth there are two semiological systems. One is the linguistic system 
(language-object) whereby myth creates its own system. The other is myth (metalanguage) 
which is a second language in which one speaks about the first. Myth’s dual function is 
to signify something and to impose that signification onto reality. The signifier is 
simultaneously the meaning and the form. The meaning of the signifier is the idea behind 
it. The form does not suppress the meaning but it distances it. This form is not a symbol 
but an image; it is abstract. The mythological concept, however, is imbued with history. 
The concept is an interpretation of reality, it is a particular kind of knowledge. The 
content and the form of such knowledge is wholly dependent on its function. Thus, the 
mythological concept closely corresponds to its function. Barthes (1972) likens the 
signification of myth to the Saussurean sign. He elucidates the function of myth thus:
Myth hides nothing; its function is to distort, not to make disappear. There 
is no latency of the concept in relation to the form: there is no need of an 
unconscious in order to explain myths. (Barthes, 1972:121)
We shall see how Barthes’ dismissal of the unconscious is unjustified. Indeed, the 
relevance of Lacan’s concept of a linguistically structured unconscious and Hollway’s 
theory of investment supports whole-heartedly the idea that the unconscious is central to 
the establishment and maintenance of myths. Nevertheless, at this point we shall elucidate 
the relevance of mythology to our contemporary understanding of the term ‘animal’.
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Many nonhuman animal myths are structured on binary oppositions. As has been shown, 
the meaning of nonhuman animals is defined through reference to humans. Such meanings 
constitute myths which are conveyed in language. People comprehend and order social 
practices through language. There is no intrinsic connection between language and the 
world. The construction of meanings, of myths, occurs in discursive fields. Indeed, 
Foucault (1972) states that ideology emerges from the conflict of such discourses. 
Inherent, also, to Saussure’s structuralist linguistics is the notion that meaning emerges 
from implicit or explicit contrast. Thus, any unitary concept necessarily contains a negated 
argument. Fixed oppositions (animal:human; nature:culture) conceal the extent to which 
entities are interdependent (Scott, 1991).
Structural Anthropology
Semiology is essential for understanding the representation of nonhuman animals in human 
culture, as have been explored through structural anthropology. Many nonhuman animals 
have been assigned special significance. Representations of these nonhuman animals, 
rooted in mythology, signify a range of human qualities and experiences. Perhaps the most 
explicit use of these animals as signifiers is to be found in this field. The symbolic 
construction of the notion of ‘beast’ is itself both the signifier and the signified. ‘Beasts’ 
exist through what they signify, and often the term ‘beast’ is a signification for negative 
human attributes. It is in this area of signification that totemism is particularly salient. A 
totem can be any species of living or inanimate thing that is regarded by a group with 
superstitious respect as an outward symbol of an existing intimate unseen relation.
Structural anthropology also focuses on the concept of binary oppositions through the 
influence of digital binarism. Binary classification produced both social relationships and 
categories that, in turn, constituted totemism. Totems are a method of linking codes in the 
world, mainly between nonhuman nature and human culture through classifications of 
plants, animals, gods, society and kinship (Levi-Strauss, 1973). Totemism is, thus, a 
logical (re)production of society in which the natural world is connected to the human
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(cultural) world. Nonhuman animals figure prominently in totemism. Human are, 
simultaneously, defined as continuous with nature and fundamentally separate from it. The 
‘beast’ within humans both mirrors and signifies nonhuman animals.
Within nonhuman animal symbolism the concept of taboo is central. Leach (1964) has 
proposed that the continual use of nonhuman animal categories in terms of abuse signifies 
the fact that such nonhuman animals are taboo. Leach defines taboo as ‘expression which 
is inhibited’ (Leach 1964:24). It is the social aspects of taboo that Leach is interested in. 
He describes broken taboo as obscenity and divides obscenity into three categories:
(1) dirty words - usually referring to sex and excretion; (2) blasphemy and 
profanity; (3) animal abuse - in which a human being is equated with an 
animal of another category (Leach, 1964:28).
Leach’s focus is on the last category - the relation between animal categories and verbal 
abuse. For Leach, the use of animal names in this way indicates the value attached to the 
animal:
When an animal name is used in this way as an imprecation, it indicates that 
the name itself is credited with potency. It clearly signifies that the animal 
category is in some way taboo (Leach, 1964:29).
Leach uses the concept of taboo to ‘cover all classes of food prohibition, explicit and 
implicit, conscious and unconscious’ (Leach, 1964:30). He submits that this classification 
is ‘a matter of language and culture, not of nature’ (Leach, 1964:31), and, significantly:
Our classification is not only correct, it is morally right and a mark of our 
superiority. The fact that frogs’ legs are a gourmet’s delicacy in France but 
not food at all in England provokes the English to refer to Frenchman as 
Frogs, with implications of withering contempt (Leach, 1964:31).
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Leach’s thesis is based on the structuralist concept of meaning emerging through 
difference. He proposes that naming objects creates discontinuity. Central to Leach’s 
essay is the idea that language and taboo break the continuum between the physical and 
social environment. Language shapes the environment, and taboo signifies the anxieties 
within that environment. Specifically, taboo refers to those categories that are anomalous:
Language gives us the names to distinguish the things; taboo inhibits the 
recognition of those parts of the continuum which separate the things 
(Leach, 1964:35).
Perceiving the environment containing separate things requires that the ‘nonthings’ which 
fill the interstices are suppressed. The suppressed area becomes taboo. Leach posits the 
example of excretions, such as faeces, urine, semen, menstrual blood, hair clippings, nail 
parings, body dirt, spittle and mother’s milk which are all substances which are 
‘ambiguous’. These substances are ‘both me and not me’ (Leach, 1964:38):
So here again it is the ambiguous categories that attract maximum interest 
and the most intense feelings of taboo. The general theory of taboo applies 
to categories which are anomalous with respect to clear-cut category 
oppositions (Leach, 1964:39).
Leach further submitted that the edibility of a species is linked to belief systems. Here, 
he sheds light on the ambiguous nature of human relations with other animals. Leach 
suggests that the strictest taboo applies to those nonhuman animals who are most 
anomalous, for example, snakes are land animals with no legs who lay eggs. Similarly, 
the concept of cruelty is applicable to birds and mammals but not to fish because birds and 
mammals are perceived (constructed) as more similar to humans. The predominance of 
fish-eating vegetarians is testament to this categorisation. Leach’s analysis of animal 
categories and verbal abuse demonstrates how the animate objects are structured in relation 
to the self:
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The implication of all this is that if we arrange the familiar animals in a 
series according to their social distance from the human SELF then we can 
see that the occurrence of taboo, as indicated by different types and 
intensities of killing and eating restrictions, verbal abuse, metaphysical 
associations, ritual performance, the intrusion of euphemism, etc., is not 
just randomly distributed. The varieties of taboo are located at intervals 
across the chart in such a way as to break up the continuum into sections.
Taboo serves to separate the SELF from the world, and the world itself is 
divided into zones of social distance corresponding here to the words farm, 
field and remote (Leach, 1964:53).
With reference to these ‘zones’, Leach (1964) submits that there is an universal inclination 
to associate eating and sexual intercourse. With reference to the male human, Leach posits 
four categories of women in terms of their sexual availability (Leach, 1964:43):
i). Very close ‘true sisters’; strongly incestuous.
ii). Kin, i . e . ‘first cousins’.
iii). Neighbours and friends from which to expect a wife; also potential enemies 
and friends.
iv). Distant strangers; known to exist but there are no social relations.
With reference to humans, Leach also proposes four categories of nonhuman animals in 
terms of their edibility (Leach, 1964:44):
i). ‘Pets’; strongly inedible.
ii). Tame but not close, such as ‘farm animals’; edible if immature or
castrated.
iii). Field animals, ‘game’; potential friendship and hostility; edible when 
sexually intact but killed only in certain seasons.
iv). Remote wild animals; inedible.
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Leach, thus, makes the following pairings:
Incest-----------------------------------------------Inedible
Marriage prohibition Castration &
premarital sex------------------------------------ edibility
Marriage Edible
Alliance--------------------------------------------sexually intact
No sex--------------------------------------------- edible
Leach’s analysis adds to the concept of binary oppositions by positing the mediating 
category of taboo. This intermediate category is, inevitably, anomalous and ambiguous, 
therefore, it is also loaded with taboo. ‘Pet’ nonhuman animals are an example of this 
taboo category; they are neither fully ‘animal’ nor fully ‘human’ (Leach, 1964:45):
...we make binary distinctions and then mediate the distinction by creating 
an ambiguous (and taboo-laden) intermediate category. Thus:
p both p & ~p ~P
man ‘man-animal’ not man
(not animal) (‘pets’) (animal)
TAME GAME WILD
(friendly) (friendly: hostile) (hostile)
Leach details how nonhuman animals are used symbolically for a range of terms such as 
insults (bitch, pig, cow, dog, etc.), affection (lamb, duck, etc.) or obscenity (cock, pussy, 
cunny, ass, etc.). Leach suggests that the long complex names of certain ‘close’ nonhuman 
animals, such as donkey and rabbit results from their substitution for phonetically simple 
words (ass - donkey: coney - rabbit) as the original name has become too deeply identified 
with all meanings of the subject. Hence donkey is an attempt to restrict ass to the category 
‘farm animal’ away from the ‘private’ (sacred) discourse. Thus, donkey is shortened to
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‘ass’. Coney is the etymological derivation from the Latin for rabbit ‘cuniculus’. In the 
fifteenth century it was shortened to ‘coney’ which was pronounced ‘cunny’ and was 
euphemistically used for ‘cunnus’, the Latin word for pudendum. This development lead 
from ‘cunny’ to ‘cunt’. In baby language the rabbit is referred to as ‘bunny’, whereas the 
adult coney remains ‘rabbit’. Leach likens the ‘cunny houses’ of the nineteenth century 
to the modern-day ‘bunny clubs’. The rabbit is so taboo-laden because it occupies an 
intermediate position between the farm and field categories, and between the farm and pet 
categories, it is, therefore, anomalous and ambiguous. Taboo separates the self from the 
world which is divided into areas of social distance corresponding to farm, field and 
remote. Such distances lead to complex identifications.
Table 2.1: Leach’s (1964) Analysis of Animal Categories
-NATURE'
animate 
I___
inanimate
warm -blooded
(meat)
I
LAND CREATURES
cold -b looded  
(not meat)
(ambiguous creatures)
BEASTS BIRDS INSECTS
(sometimes edible)
tame
PETS
I
(inedible)
LIVESTOCK
(ambiguous)
GAME
(edible subject to rules)
HOUSE
I
(inedible)
FARM
I
(edible if castrated)
SELF-d o g '-ca t-h orse
ass
goat
p ig -ox -sh eep
REPTILES
(inedible)
WATER CREATURES
I
FISHI
(edible)
wild
WILD ANIMALS l
(inedible)
OPEN FIELD 
(near) J  (far)
(edible if hunted at 
correct season)
rabb i t-ha re-d eer-fo x 
cony
REMOTE
I
(inedible)
zo o  animals
"The species underlined on the bottom line are those which appear to be specially loaded with taboo values, as indicated by their use 
in obscenity and abuse or by metaphysical associations or by the intrusion of euphem ism .
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Leach concludes that the linguistic approach to these categories reflects their taboo value. 
Lawrence comments on Leach’s system as:
The use of such substances to articulate symbolically certain ideological 
themes makes sense in terms of Leach’s theory about tabooed elements of 
the environment that serve to separate the self from the world external to it 
(Lawrence 1982:212-22).
Leach’s analysis of nonhuman animal categories and verbal abuse is useful as it 
demonstrates how structuralist principles can be applied to the question of human relations 
to other animals. The structure of ‘social distance’ which locates the self and constructs 
meaning through differences amongst categories is a strong starting point in my 
conceptualisation of representations and discourses on the nature of nonhuman animals. 
The content, in terms of types of nonhuman animals, will vary across cultures but the 
symbolic use of nonhuman animals is a universal construct. My concern in the following 
chapters will be to explore Leach’s framework in the British cultural context. In theorising 
a model of dehumanisation, I will attempt to integrate Leach’s insights with the post­
structuralist concept of subjectivity.
Discussion
The relationship between human and animal identities serves to illuminate the relationship 
between dehumanisation and prejudice. The cultural myths about human and nonhuman 
identity are composed of binary oppositions, and meaning is derived from opposition, 
human as norm and animal as ‘other’. In Leach’s (1982:116) words, ‘We are the 
prototype of normality; abnormality is the other’. Consequently, living nonhuman animals 
are only comprehended in terms of their (human) representation. These myths impose 
structure on reality through which people comprehend reality. The political notion of 
equality depends on the acknowledgement of difference, not of equality and difference as 
antithetical. However, those who are dehumanised are seen as different and therefore, in
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opposition to equality. Consequently, dehumanisation leads to prejudice and the denial of 
equality. The implications of this system of dehumanisation correspond to Donovan’s 
analysis:
It is clear that one of the main sources of the continuing atrocious abuse of 
animals by humans is an attitude that allows their reification or 
objectification. That ontology conveniently allows their commodification 
for mass-produced slaughter and their mechanisation for laboratory 
experimentation. In fact, the reduction of animals to ‘its’ is at the root of 
most animal abuse. The attribution of deadness to what is alive, conscious, 
and sensitive involves a psychology of denial that conveniently facilitates 
the interests of the powerful. Such denial unquestionably has allowed the 
great human atrocities of the century to occur, and such denial continues to 
allow unspeakable animal suffering to proceed as a commonplace norm 
(Donovan, 1996:7-8).
Saussure’s structuralism provides the key point about the arbitrary relation between the 
signifier and the signified. The arbitrariness provides a space for resistance to hegemonic 
meanings. As the signified does not determine the signifier, this arbitrariness allows 
changes in meaning. The mythologisation of meaning, the denial of history and culture, 
leading to the naturalisation of discourse, provides a contextual perspective on the 
emergence of ‘commonsense’ ideas. The anthropological use of nonhuman animals as 
means to identify ‘human’ characteristics also produces anomalies and ambiguities which 
can only be addressed through ritual and taboo. These basic tenets of identity as 
structured, relational, historically and culturally constituted provide a decentred account 
of human individuals. These foundations will lead further to Lacan’s interpretation of the 
culturally constituted unconscious, Derrida’s concept of deconstruction and the endless play 
of textual signification, and Hollway’s integration of Lacanian symbolism, Kleinian 
defence mechanisms and Foucauldian discourse as an account of psychodynamic investment 
and the contradictory nature of subjectivity.
This chapter has attempted to show that the strength of ideological violence exists through 
its invisibility. Everyday people unknowingly conspire in everyday ways to maintain the
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social hierarchies which produce violence. Such prejudiced and violent behaviour is 
sanctioned through the process of naturalisation. The cultural myths which arise from this 
process are based on psychodynamically constructed realities and identities. Some of these 
myths, as they have emerged through history and the cultural contexts of Britain will be 
explored in the following chapter. Many social psychological strategies and mechanisms 
are incorporated to maintain this deception. These are strong, historically and culturally 
rooted, forces which do not easily succumb to the theory or practice of liberation, or 
demands for equality. Many forms of prejudice and violence amongst people are both 
latent and explicit expressions of a fundamental relationship. In effect, they are the result 
of the denial of the relationship between nature and culture, and attempts of people to 
punish others for their own inadequacies. Any effectual challenge to this violence must 
attempt to deconstruct the dualisms, internalise the projections and reinstate the invisible 
in an acknowledgement of the human beast.
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The emancipation o f men from cruelty and injustice will bring with it in due 
course the emancipation o f animals also. The two reforms are inseparably 
connected, and neither can be fully realised alone (Salt, 1921)
Overview
The question of ‘animal rights’ has a long past and a relatively short history. Indeed, the 
history of the animal rights movement is one which has been inspired by the other recent social 
liberation movements, notably of the 1960s and 1970s. In this chapter, I provide a British 
historical and cultural context for emerging modern-day representations of nonhuman animals. 
This history of the ‘beast’ examines the impact of the Christian religion on the ontological and 
moral separation between humans and other animals. It explores the dichotomy between 
humans and God, and between humans and nonhuman animals. I examine the effects of 
Cartesian dualism on science in relation to the status of animals, effects which are 
characterised as the mind:body split which chastises the body, thus producing somatophobia, 
the fear and, consequently, the denial of the body to the Self. Nonhuman animals have also 
been the subjects of moral philosophy and social justice from early debates on soul possession 
to recent polemics on the nature of rights. I place Darwinism in relation to this contemporary 
rhetoric on animal rights. In the context of this, I explore anthropomorphism as a scientific 
sin which allows either continuity or discontinuity between humans and other animals, or as 
a scientific heuristic which can, simultaneously, regard humans and other animals as having 
some shared characteristics, whilst maintaining the distinctiveness of all species. Finally, I 
compare and contrast animal welfare and animal rights as currently emergent phenomena, and 
move from the history of the ‘beast’ to modern-day representations and discourses 
incorporating feminist theory and an analysis of social relations.
-56-
3: The Historical Beast
3.1 Animal as the ‘Other’
This chapter begins with a review of historical accounts of the nature of nonhuman versus 
human animal life since the industrial revolution. The growth of animal welfare is set in the 
context of Victorian sentimentality and increasing urbanisation. Throughout this review, the 
threads of animal rights are seen to emerge only to be crushed by both Christian and Cartesian 
appeals to dualism and the subordination of nonhuman animals.
The Industrial and Scientific Revolutions
Noske (1989) has proposed that the change in the status of nonhuman animals emerged from 
the transforming relation between human civilisation and nature, and that this was based on 
subject-object relations:
By drawing a sharp dividing line between human and non-human, a vast gap 
increased between subject (the free acting human agent) and object (the passive 
acted-upon thing). This division is related to the notion that we, as Homo 
sapiens, are unique among the natural species (as if not every species were 
unique in itself!). We perceive ourselves as belonging to a totally different 
order: the realm of culture, while all other beings and inanimate things are only 
nature (Noske, 1989:40).
Noske describes how the Renaissance and the Reformation brought a change from 
contemplating nature to exploiting it for production. The gap increased between science and 
technology. With the new market societies came secularisation as the intellectuals and artists 
began to question the medieval patterns and the omnipotence of the Church. Europe became 
increasingly secular and individualistic. The closed cosmos of tradition was replaced with an 
open, infinite system. Man was no longer at the centre of the universe, however, he 
remained the measure of all things. The new mechanistic philosophy objectified the world 
around man, and, thus, severed him ontologically from women and the feminised natural
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world (Noske, 1989).
Modern science in the seventeenth century found itself struggling amongst scholastic 
Aristotelianism, natural magic and the new mechanical philosophy (Easlea, 1980). The 
organic theory of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries came from the alchemists and natural 
magicians. They believed the world was a living whole, sentient and conscious and humanity 
was, therefore, placed within nature rather than above it, whereas, the androcentric philosophy 
of Bacon devalued nature. For Bacon, it was men who made science, culture and history. 
Women belonged to the realm of nature and the environment. Hollway (1989:110) quotes 
Keller’s assessment of Bacon’s impact of science:
[Francis Bacon] first and most vividly articulated the equation between 
scientific knowledge and power, who identified the aims of science as the 
control and domination of nature (Keller, 1985:33).
Nature was acceptable only as a means to an end. It was devalued so that it could be used 
economically and technically. However, this devaluation could only occur when humanity 
detached itself from nature. There was the simultaneous objectification of nature and 
autonomisation of humanity (Noske, 1989). The increased distance between the human 
observer and the natural observed led to a value-free, removed moral status. The science of 
Galileo, Bacon, Descartes, Boyle and Newton was not concerned with the reason of things but 
with their function. Ultimately, nature had no purpose at all and this loss was replaced by the 
new mechanical science:
During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the conception of nature 
changed from an active, powerful partner (as in alchemy) to something passive, 
determined by mechanical laws (Hollway, 1989:111).
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Post Galileo scientists had to blame the theories underlying their inferences and discoveries 
on ‘natural laws’ rather than own their own constructions in order to gain freedom from 
persecution from the Church. Hence, ‘nature’, not the scientists, was responsible for the 
theories they were promoting as ‘scientific truth’. The aim to discover nature’s laws had 
further in-built prejudices. Scientists wanted to repeat quantitative measures of the processes 
and events in nature. This selected nature was restricted to the part of natural reality that was 
believed to be objective. Such objectivity based on a priori principles of selection singled out 
isolated factors. Nature was bifurcated into the objective part fit to be examined by natural 
science and, therefore, useful, and the subjective part that had no scientific use. Nature was 
itself distorted by investigation and that distortion came to represent all nature (Noske, 1989).
As the psychological distance increased between the scientist and the object of study, there was 
a decrease in the concern for the object’s integrity and an increased desire to dissect it into its 
‘fundamentals’. Indeed, the more there was a hierarchical observer-object relation in science, 
the more respect there was for that science. Scientists were supposed to observe objects and 
this process inevitably displaced the object. The ‘hard’ versus the ‘soft’ sciences were 
dependent on the degree of transformation practiced by the scientist on the object (Noske,
1989). Scientists tried to eliminate their subjectivities from their observations, so that their 
evidence could exist as ‘facts’, in a unitary form, independent of the observer. As science 
sought to be value-free, due to this estranged observer-object relation, it actually engaged in 
a particular value associated with the subjugation of nature.
To the French philosopher Descartes all natural things were mechanistic (Gamer, 1993). They 
were God’s machines and there was no discernible difference between artefacts and nonhuman 
animals. These animals had only bodies, no soul, no feeling and no language. Descartes 
described them as automata whose behaviour was involuntary and unconscious. This 
construction of the nonhuman animal world allowed scientists to rationalise away the cries of
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those ‘objects’ who were subject to experimentation. Their responses were not to pain. They 
were part of the new Cartesian creation. Cartesian dualism has been cited as the origin of 
somatophobia:
Somatophobia refers to the hostility to the body that is a characteristic of 
Western philosophy and its emphasis on reason (Spelman, 1982). Spelman 
explains that somatophobia, a legacy of the soul/body distinction, is often 
enacted in unequal relationships such as men to women, masters to slaves, 
fathers to children, humans to animals. (Donovan, 1996:2).
Descartes did not want to oppose the Church with mechanical philosophy, rather he sought to 
maintain the political and religious status quo with his dualism between matter and mind. By 
stating that there was a qualitative difference between humans and animals, the mind and 
body, value and fact, religion and nature, Descartes was able to defend the Christian religion 
against atheism, vitalism and natural magic (Noske, 1989) In this way, scientists could be 
credibly split as human beings, on the one hand, and ‘scientific observers’ on the other. 
Indeed, scientific progress that increased human mastery and exploitation of nature mirrored 
what was widely perceived to be the divine plan for dominion over nature (Plumwood, 1993).
In the West, the establishment of scientific hierarchies preserved a sense of control and 
collective power. Boundaries were an artefact of this and they legitimised the domination of 
the species in power - humans - over others. Fluidity between boundaries has generally been 
consigned to the realm of the supernatural and mystical. Leach (1964) draws on his notion 
of taboo as the mediator of these boundaries:
To be useful, gods must be near at hand. So religion sets about reconstructing 
a continuum between this world and the other world...The gap between the two 
logically distinct categories, this world/other world, is filled in with tabooed 
ambiguity. The gap is bridged by supernatural beings of a highly ambiguous 
kind - incarnate deities, virgin mothers, supernatural monsters which are half
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man/half beast. These marginal, ambiguous creatures are specifically credited 
with the power of mediating between gods and men. They are the object of the 
most intense taboos, more sacred than the gods themselves (Leach, 1964:39).
Greater fluidity in linguistic constructs characterised peoples who were more integrated with 
the natural world and who created less environmental destruction. It has been proposed that 
softening the boundaries of these constructs and Western reintegration with the natural world 
would produce ecological and animal rights benefits (Greene, 1995).
This history of religious and cultural hegemony has produced a modem conflicting relationship 
between humans and other animals. Since the Biblical description of human dominion over 
other animals was interpreted as having power over nature, Christian humans have continually 
believed that all life on earth is for the benefit of the human species:
Then God said, ‘Let us make man in our image, after our likeness, and let 
them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the birds of the air, and 
over the cattle, and over all the earth, and over every creeping thing that creeps 
upon the earth’ (Genesis 1:26).
Consequently, with divine direction, people have used other animals as resources in food, 
transport, medicine and entertainment. Complementing this Christian notion of dualism and 
hierarchy between humans and other animals, was the Cartesian philosophy that denied that 
nonhuman animals had souls, thoughts or feelings. This objectification of these animals made 
their use in unanaesthetised vivisection seem logical, even desirable and necessary. Merchant 
(1980) argues that the intellectual transformation of the scientific revolution replaced the 
organic world view of nature as alive and sensitive with a mechanistic world view of nature 
as passive, lifeless and devoid of purpose. It was not until the Eighteenth century and the Age 
of Enlightenment that the role of nonhuman animals was redefined.
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Victorian Sentimentality and the Growth of the Humane Movement
The treatment of nonhuman animals formed a significant part of Victorian sentimentality as 
it became an important issue for the respectable middle-classes. Queen Victoria herself 
opposed vivisection, and her association with animal welfare increasing legitimised this 
concern for the upper and middle social classes. People projected their beliefs about nature, 
hierarchy, social organisation, language, rationality and moral behaviour onto other animals. 
Nonhuman animals were romanticised as good and innocent and pure, but they also came to 
represent what was the best and the worst of human nature. Victorian attitudes to other 
animals thrived on sentimental anthropomorphism. Nonhuman animals that were very familiar 
yet utterly alien were comprehended through anthropomorphic projections which broke down 
the boundaries that humans perceived. Representations of these nonhuman animals were, 
consequently, polarised between the intimate, familiar, emotional attachment and the 
instrumental exploitation of them as resources.
The ‘civilisation’ of the middle classes brought with it concern for the feelings of others and 
the strengthening of the bourgeois notion of family and emotional life. By 1840 the RSPCA 
had become the favourite charity of the middle classes. New representations of the family, 
home and children set a precedent for new ideas about other animals. The increased intimacy 
and privacy of the nuclear home brought with it the notion of the vulnerability of children and 
of childhood as a special stage of life. Sensitivity to all vulnerable creatures became a 
legitimate and desired focus of moral concern. Both the family home and the family pet 
became idealised. Urbanised nature was romanticised and domesticated, reduced to a few 
tame, symbolic replicas in the form of pets. During the nineteenth century, Britain and the 
United States became increasingly obsessed with pets as human society simultaneously became 
increasingly divorced from the natural world. The most common pets, dogs and cats, 
incorporated the ideal characteristics for successful sentimental anthropomorphism. Their 
capacity to express pain and suffering, their physical features, complex mental states, fur,
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large eyes head, in relation to the body, compared well with the sentimental feelings induced 
by human children. Indeed, in accordance with Leach’s framework, Fiddes (1991:133) has 
observed that:
We exclude pets from our food resources due to their social proximity to 
ourselves as humans.
This new moral sensibility soon spread from the middle classes to the aristocracy and 
eventually to the working classes. However, before the nineteenth century only a few 
individuals had expressed concern for nonhuman animals. The democratic revolutions 
increased the respect and dignity for the rights of individuals and brought with it new attention 
to the treatment of nonhuman animals. Jeremy Bentham’s moral philosophy attacked 
rationalism with the oft-quoted question in reference to animals:
The day may come when the rest of the animal creation may acquire those 
rights which never could have been withholden from them but by the hand of 
tyranny...It may one day come to be recognised that the number of legs, the 
villosity of the skin or the termination of the os sacrum, are 
reasons...insufficient for abandoning a sensitive being to the same fate. What 
else is it that should trace the insuperable line? Is it the faculty of reason, or 
perhaps the faculty of discourse? But a full-grown horse or dog is beyond 
comparison a more rational, as well as a more conversable animal than an 
infant of a day, or a week, or even a month, old. But suppose the case were 
otherwise, what would it avail? The question is not, Can they reason: nor Can 
they talW but, Can they suffef! (Bentham, 1789:847).
During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, science began to blur the traditional boundaries 
between humans and other animals. The nineteenth century Romantics who attacked the 
pursuit of progress as the destruction of nature provided the discourse for the 
anti-instrumentalist rhetoric of the protests of the 1960s.
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3.2 From Animal Welfare to Animal Rights
Victorian Britain had set the scene for the growth of the welfare movement based in 
sentimentality and hierarchy. The place of Darwin in this context brings a scientific account 
of the relation between humans and other animals which centres on the concept of adaptation, 
not hierarchical dualism. Darwinism provides the intellectual backdrop to the growth of 
animal welfare into animal rights. Here, this account leads to a review of the modem 
philosophy of animal rights.
Darwinism
Sentimental and regal credibility was replaced by intellectual fervour in the form of the 
evolutionary theory of Comte de Buffon in the eighteenth century and Charles Darwin’s The 
Origin o f Species (1859). Challenging long held views on the nature of humanity, Darwin 
proposed that humans were not created by God and, thus, placed at the top of the hierarchy 
but that they had evolved from other animal species. The differences in the mental power and 
moral senses of animals and humans was of degree not kind, as Darwin demonstrated in The 
Expression o f Emotions in Man and Animals (1872). Not surprisingly, the moral edifice did 
not collapse immediately and the conservative influence over moral ideas strengthened in 
response to this attack. Victorian culture would absorb Darwinian ideas but the Church was 
not ready for such revolutionary ideas and emerged from the controversy increasingly 
traditionalist and persisted in contributing to humans’ fundamental contradictions about their 
relationship to other animals.
Darwin’s theory was based on Malthus’ Essay on Population (1817) in which Malthus 
described population growth as a Hobbesian war. Darwin used this metaphor in nature. More 
individuals were bom than could survive so that the struggle for survival was both intraspecies 
and interspecies. The survival of the fittest was a metaphorical and contextual phrase that has
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often been used out of context in absolutist terms in recent sociobiological writings. Darwin 
knew that cooperation could be as important as competition to species’ survival. Indeed, 
Darwin’s The Descent o f Man (1871) focuses on the importance of socially acquired 
characteristics.
In the wake of Darwin’s discovery of natural selection and the evolution of species, debates 
became focused on science and the way it had demonstrated the similarities amongst animals. 
Modem social science has found itself in the awkward position of denying any biological 
influence on human behaviour because hegemonic discourses maintain that humans are not 
animals and, simultaneously, objectifies nonhuman animals so that they have no ‘human’ 
qualities, in order that we may own them, experiment on them and feel justified in doing so. 
If there is one example of the inherently contradictory disposition of human behaviour, it is 
in our relationship to other animals because, within those relationships, we are deeply 
exploring our own condition.
One of the most interesting recent developments in evolutionary theory is the realisation that 
the question as to how far biology (nature) affects human behaviour, leads to the question as 
to how far does socialisation (culture) affect nonhuman animal behaviour. It seems that there 
are numerous reasons why modem evolutionary theory has been completely rejected as an 
explanation for modem human behaviour, not least the political agendas involved in ‘race’ and 
‘sex’ differences. However, there also seem to be more fundamental issues at stake. As 
Degler (1991) proposed, the way forward is a rejection of the simplistic dualisms: 
animalrhuman; irrational:rational; nature:culture; and innate:acquired. These dualisms serve 
to maintain hierarchy and exploitation in the name of what is ‘natural’. As Degler has pointed 
out, the rise of the animal rights movement and of evolutionary theories of behaviour have no 
immediate connection. But their respective intellectual positions mirror each other. The 
concepts of agency, subjectivity and consciousness have centre stage in both nonhuman animal
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and human ethology. The notion of civil rights may no longer be the guardian of Homo 
sapiens alone, and animal rights may come to mean much more than the rights of those 
without a language we understand. As Darwin himself commented (quoted in Barrett, 
1974:187):
Animals whom we have made our slaves, we do not like to consider our
equals.
Humans are biologically classified as animals yet we refer to all other species of animal with 
the self-imposed distinction that creates not only mineral, plant or animal, but also a separate 
category of human. This is not problematic if we are talking about human distinctiveness, of 
course there are many differences between humans and other animals. Indeed, it is 
tautological to say that there are species differences, that is self-evident through definition. 
The problem lies in the elevation of humans to a superior status based on spurious grounds, 
resulting in prejudice and discrimination, against other animals and against humans who are 
represented as animalistic. This process is a powerful concomitant to Darwin’s implications 
that nonhuman animals, too, had the capacity to suffer and that should be taken into account 
when interacting with them. This meant that humans would have to find other ways of 
justifying the way they treated animals. Darwin’s ideas about animal suffering were directly 
related to his concept of evolutionary continuity amongst species. He was, however, subject 
to the same speciesist assumptions as all other humans and his personal conflict over the 
vivisection debate was never resolved. Nevertheless, the legacy of Darwinism to the animal 
rights movement should not be underestimated.
Social control is evident as the motivating factor in the misuse of Darwinian theory (Rachels,
1990). Defence of the status quo is easily made by appeals to what is natural and, 
consequently, right and the dismantling of this requires the reconceptualisation of the status 
of humans in relation to other animals, as originally intended by Darwin himself. Darwin’s
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awareness of the human tendency to claim god-like status was evident:
Man in his arrogance thinks himself a great work worthy the interposition of 
a deity. More humble and I think truer to consider him created from animals.
Darwin (Notebooks, quoted in Barrett et al, 1987:300).
The problem with the emergence of Darwin’s theory was that it could be used as a double- 
edged sword. On the one hand, it eliminates the ‘interposition of a deity’ through recognising 
that humans are animals who have evolved, as all animals have, through natural selection. On 
the other hand, the tendency to use anthropocentric knowledge about other animals to direct 
our interpretations of human life is a double distortion. Establishing that humans are animals 
does not mean negating the enormous differences that there are between humans and other 
animals. The mechanisms of adaptation may be the same, but the content of those adaptations 
and the extent to which they can be applied to modem human life, where cultural adaptation 
is the most flexible amongst species, is to be guarded. The distinctiveness about human 
evolution is its flexibility due, mainly, to language. This does not mean that moral judgements 
should be made on this characteristic but, rather, there should be an understanding of the way 
biology expresses itself through culture and vice versa. In species, in our case only humans, 
where culture is defined by great flexibility, the extent of biological influence will not be as 
significant compared to other animals. Leach makes the point perfectly:
It is perfectly true that, as members of a common species Homo sapiens, we 
are all predisposed to behave in certain fixed ways which reflect our 
biochemical constitutions. But this in itself does not tell us very much. We are 
all naturally endowed with a capacity for speech and all spoken languages have 
certain features in common - e.g. they convey meaning by means of an 
alternation of vowels and consonants - but these constraints set no limit on what 
we say. Likewise, the physical gestures of Homo are limited in kind by the 
fact that the actor is a man not a goose. But what we express by these gestures 
is not limited at all. Thus any belief that our customs are somehow
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predetermined in the same way as the mating rituals of birds is an illusion 
(Leach, 1968:72).
There is an interesting and telling connection between the desired objectivity of scientific 
enquiry and the ‘sin’ of anthropomorphism. Anthropomorphism is commonly believed to be 
the utmost of scientific errors. It means the endowment of humans characteristics to other 
animals. This is interesting on a number of points. Firstly, humans are animals. We evolved 
in the same way that all life evolved. We are primates, closely related to other primates such 
as gorillas and chimpanzees. As we are biologically evolved beings, we would expect to share 
some characteristics with our relatives. Not all human activities are exclusively human. This 
presents us with the problem of deciding not only which behaviours are exclusively human but 
which behaviours are species-specific for all species. Secondly, anthropomorphism is viewed 
as a lack of objectivity, of being emotionally involved with the subject of enquiry. This has 
two related aspects: i) modem social science has shown that the objective study is an 
impossible task; and ii) the stereotypical association of emotionality with femininity and, 
therefore, with girls and women has both feminised and devalued nonhuman animal issues. 
If the objective study of humans is impossible then it seems even more implausible that the 
objective study of animal behaviour is possible, given the lack of inter-species communication. 
Our own insight will provide an heuristic, not a sin, for understanding the behaviour of other 
animals with emotional and intelligent lives. This notion was evident in Darwin’s The 
Expression o f the Emotions in Man and Animal (1872), yet is conspicuous, through its 
absence, in the contemporary debates on evolution. Again, however, this endeavour is to be 
conducted with caution as the human aspects of human behaviour, although animalistic by 
virtue of humans being animals, are the discontinuous defining characteristics of the human 
species. Once again, Leach makes the point incisively:
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The argument is in some respects circular. The ethologists interpret particular 
animal behaviour as aggressive, amicable, dominant, submissive etc., and they 
use such terms because of what they know intuitively about themselves. That 
being so, it is quite illogical to reverse the process and pretend that we might 
understand human aggression better because of its analogic similarity to ‘animal 
aggression’ (Leach, 1968:72).
There are good evolutionary reasons for rejecting the discourse determinism of some current 
social scientific theories on human nature. The view of the human tabula rasa has been 
thoroughly discredited and replaced with, amongst other concepts, the evolutionary concept 
of humans as appetitive animals with evolved, inherent capacities and needs (Robinson and 
Tiger, 1991). Nonetheless, these features of human animals are complicated by other ‘human’ 
characteristics as Montagu suggests:
That heredity plays a part in all human behaviour is patently false, but that 
heredity plays a role in some human behaviour can scarcely be doubted; but 
this is a very different thing from saying that any form of human behaviour is 
determined by heredity (Montagu, 1968:xiii).
Darwinism has dispensed with the need for God but human desire to be unique and distinct 
from all other animals provides an ubiquitous motivation for the persistence of a divine 
hierarchy (Rachels, 1990). If we are created in the image of the divine God and we have 
souls, then we must do as much as possible to separate ourselves from those creatures that we 
can actually see doing what we do - eating and having sex. Jesus Christ, as the son of God, 
could not have been created in such a ‘carnal’ way, hence the need for the Virgin Birth. 
Likewise, the guilt associated with the doctrine of Original Sin is a fundamental chain on our 
way of thinking. Sex is dirty, animalistic, and sinful. Sex is what animals do. As Leach 
comments:
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Sex and sin do somehow go together and this seems to tie in with the 
distinction...between the scientific view that man differs from other animals 
only in degree and the religious view that there is an essential difference in 
kind. Sex is an animal quality which must somehow be pushed on to the other 
side of the great divide (Leach, 1982:116).
The ontological and moral separation between humans and animals is paralleled in the 
dichotomy between humans and God. Leach (1964:38) describes this relation between humans 
and gods as:
Logically, life is simply the binary antithesis of death; the two concepts are the 
opposite sides of the same penny; we cannot have either without the other. But 
religion always tries to separate the two. To do this it creates a hypothetical 
‘other world’ which is the antithesis of ‘this world’. In this world life and 
death are inseparable; in the other world they are separate. This world is 
inhabited by imperfect mortal men; the other world is inhabited by immortal 
nonmen (gods). This category god is thus constructed as the binary antithesis 
of man.
The maintenance of guilt through reference to the doctrine of Original Sin is the prerequisite 
to the conflict produced in terms of evolutionary continuity and rights for animals. Creation 
science is a contemporary attempt to situate Darwinism within God’s greater design, a 
contradiction in meaning that has, nevertheless, proven popular with modern-day Christians.
The Growth of Animal Welfare into Animal Rights
During the 1960s a new kind of animal welfare movement emerged. The animal rights 
movement challenged the most fundamental forms of animal exploitation such as meat-eating. 
Tension grew in the 1970s with an increasing frustration with the conservatism of the 
‘humane’ tradition and an increasing awareness of individual rights. The compassion for 
nonhuman animals became an essential ingredient of the emerging rhetoric of animal rights 
(Francione, 1996).
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The radicalisation of the animal protection movement followed the changing images of 
nonhuman animals from the objects of charity to beings with interests and then to autonomous 
individuals with the right to their own lives. The anti-instrumentalist rhetoric of the 1960s and 
1970s restated the holism of nature and launched critiques on the emerging social and 
commercial institutions. The civil rights movement, the women’s movement and various other 
campaigns demanded rights to full economic and political participation. In the 1980s the 
critique of instrumentalism drew on the New Age philosophies which were themselves derived 
from Eastern mystical religions. The interdependence of the human and the natural world was 
stressed, and individual consumer choice was advocated as a strategy to defeat exploitation by 
industry and governments (Jasper and Nelkin, 1993).
The animal rights movement rests on a simple moral position, which is that nonhuman animals 
are similar enough to humans to deserve serious moral consideration. The crux of it is that 
animals should be seen as ends in themselves and not merely means for the instrumental uses 
of humans. The moral vision of animal rights has been explicitly derived from feminism and 
environmentalism. These movements also engage in a critique of instrumentalism, challenging 
the constructions and representations of nature and women as things, objects devoid of agency. 
The change from animal welfare to animal rights came with the shift in emphasis from 
individual behaviour to institutional practices. Indeed, although the animal rights movement 
is centrally about the treatment of animals, it is fundamentally concerned with human 
definitions and notions of individualism and moral society. For the activists of the 1970s, 
ecosystems had inherent worth. Environmentalists linked the exploitation of nature to 
capitalism, Western science and Judaeo-Christian religious traditions. Ecofeminists linked 
exploitation to male domination (Gaard, 1993). Thus, the critique of instrumentalism 
developed within the environmental and feminist movements.
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The animal protection groups vary widely in their aims from radicalism to reformist issues. 
The welfare tradition focuses on public education and minimising the pain and suffering of 
animals whilst maintaining that humans and animals are distinct, if not dichotomous. The 
pragmatists believe that certain species deserve moral consideration because of their 
similarities to humans. The fundamentalists demand an immediate abolition of all forms of 
animal exploitation. The animal rights movement emphasises the cognitive and emotional 
lives of animals, whilst the animal welfare groups emphasise pain and suffering of animals. 
The pragmatists and the fundamentalists form the radical side of the movement. They question 
the boundaries between humans and animals and, consequently, extend the rights of humans 
to other species. In doing so they are changing the human relationship to the natural world 
(Jasper and Nelkin, 1992).
In 1975 Peter Singer’s Animal Liberation was published and soon became the key text for the 
animal rights movement. His philosophy was grounded in Jeremy Bentham’s (1789) 
utilitarianism which called for the greatest amount of happiness for the greatest number. 
Singer’s thesis proclaimed that the capacity to feel both pleasure and pain brings nonhuman 
animals into the moral sphere of concern. Singer’s argument steers clear of the absolutist 
rhetoric of rights, it is the potential for suffering rather than the actual instrumental use of 
nonhuman animals that is the problem. Pragmatists find Singer’s work appealing for this 
compromise, however, more fundamentalist animal rights campaigners ultimately reject 
utilitarianism. It was left to Tom Regan to articulate the concerns of the fundamentalists in 
his The Case fo r Animal Rights (1983). In a more radical position than Singer’s, Regan 
proposed that nonhuman animals have inherent worth and should never be used as food, 
experimental objects or other exploitative functions. It was this absolutist position which 
broke with the utilitarian tradition. Regan claims that instrumental consideration can never 
justify immoral practices. Furthermore, he denies the potential conflict between individual 
rights and species survival. Although Regan is far less widely read than Animal Liberation
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and although Regan’s ideas are often attributed to Singer, it is Regan’s radicalism which 
provides an argument for the animal rights movement based primarily on rationalism and 
individualism, assumptions which are criticised by feminists advocating nonhuman animal 
liberation.
The Philosophy of Animal Rights
Habitual discrimination by one group against another results in the formation of an ideology, 
based in language, which attempts to justify such discrimination (Shapiro, 1990). Prejudice 
assumes an hierarchy, often based on arbitrary features such as intelligence, race or gender. 
Racist and sexist ideologies discriminate against members of a presumably ‘inferior’ group. 
However, speciesist ideology, discriminating on grounds of species membership (Ryder,
1989), extends this with categories of species of which the individual is not a member. When 
referring to nonhuman animals there is a tendency to refer to the species rather than to the 
individual. Individual members of a particular species are semantically subsumed under the 
class name. This abstract class is substituted for the concrete individual members of the class. 
Such a reversal in referents is speciesist.
Ethics are measures of human imperfection from representations of the ‘ideal’. Ideals are 
necessary in order to progress beyond the status quo. Traditional and much of contemporary 
ethical considerations of nonhuman animals adhere to an ethic to ‘love animals’ and not to be 
‘cruel’ to them. Many writers have suggested (Singer, 1975; Ryder, 1989; Rollin, 1992) this 
ethical position is fundamentally inadequate. It assumes that nonhuman animals are only 
subjected to intentional cruelty, moreover, it fails to take into account the positive obligation 
that humans have to other species. Similarly, the term ‘animal-lover’ assumes that the proper 
treatment of nonhuman animals is a question of love when, Gamer (1993) argues, it is a 
question of justice. Issues pertaining to nonhuman animals are typically referred to through 
terms of ‘kindness’ and ‘cruelty’, however, such sentimental simplification leaves an ethical
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void in which nonhuman animal users are stereotyped as sadists and nonhuman animal 
advocates are labelled emotional or puerile. Rollin (1992) has argued, following Plato, that 
ethical theory helps people to ‘recollect’ implicit moral beliefs that have not been previously 
realised. Rollin further suggests that the success of the civil rights movement and the women’s 
movement was due to such implicit moral theory and not to revolutionary principles. The 
issue of the ethical consideration and, therefore, ethical treatment of nonhuman animals boils 
down to the question - Are there any reasonable arguments for not protecting the essential 
interests of nonhuman animals in the way that we defend and protect the central interests of 
humans?
People have tried to claim that there are. It is commonly believed that it is morally justifiable 
to kill a nonhuman animal, but not a human, as long as it is done ‘humanely’. These claims 
have often involved the belief that nonhuman animals do not have souls. However, whether 
or not they have souls is morally irrelevant to a modem, scientific understanding of the 
evolution of life. The relevant differences between humans and nonhuman animals must be 
morally relevant and, if they are not, then humans must extend the sphere of moral concern 
to nonhuman animals. Neither possession of a soul, human dominion or intelligence provide 
morally relevant differences. These attributes translate into possession of power, but if power 
was a morally relevant criterion for moral consideration then there would be no concept of 
morality (Rollin, 1992). Since the philosophy of Kant, there has been an assumption that 
although nonhuman animals are not themselves direct objects of moral concern, there are, 
nevertheless, things that should not be done to them because immoral treatment of nonhuman 
animals would lead to the immoral treatment of humans.
The traditional Cartesian view is that only humans are rational because only humans possess 
language and, therefore, only humans can be objects of moral concern. However, the 
argument of rationality is, again, not relevant to the inclusion/exclusion of nonhuman animals
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in moral consideration because there are many cases of ‘marginal’ humans (babies, senile 
people, severely mentally disabled, etc.) who are not rational yet are included in the sphere 
of moral concern. Indeed, rationality can only be a part of what makes something an object 
of moral concern. Moreover, language is often irrelevant to the making of an agreement, and 
nonhuman animals often behave in ways that would constitute an agreement (Rollin, 1992). 
Rollin further suggests that the crux of the matter lies in the vague distinction between the 
concepts of nature and culture. Moreover, he claims that all social contracts necessarily 
involve both natural and cultural aspects.
Rollin (1992) has suggested that the arguments for and against including nonhuman animals 
as objects of moral concern delineate between the philosophies of Hume and Kant. Hume 
claimed that all knowledge is gained through sensory perception and is, therefore, subject to 
conditioning. Thus, nonhuman animals could reason as well as humans. On the other hand, 
Kant’s Theory of Reason claimed that only humans possess a priori knowledge. It is this 
knowledge that allows universal judgements to be made because it is not subject to particular 
times and places. For Kant this is the essential meaning of rationality, therefore, nonhuman 
animals are not rational because their judgements are dependent on stimulus and response 
reactions. Such rational functioning is an end in itself and, consequently, has intrinsic value. 
Nonhuman animals do not function rationally and, therefore, they are of instrumental value 
only, they are the means to an end. Reasoning which depends on universal concepts depends 
on language. Language allows humans to have generalised concepts and abstract notions. 
Herein lies the difference - according to Kant, whereas humans deal in universal symbols, 
nonhuman animals only comprehend signs.
Kant and many other philosophers insist that reason be equated with the possession of language 
and, therefore, they can justify not including nonhuman animals, who they suppose do not 
have linguistic ability, as objects of moral concern. However, Rollin (1992) argues that there
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are instances of rationality that do not involve references to the universal. The ability to 
generalise is only one aspect of rationality. This is reflected in the psychological research into 
the learning behaviour of nonhuman animals which is based on the assumption that human 
cognition is, in some aspects, analogous to nonhuman cognition. Thus, the Kantian concept 
of rationality may not be exclusive to humans. If nonhuman animals are capable of learning 
then they must also be capable of holding general notions or concepts. Furthermore, the idea 
that it is necessary to possess language in order to memorise and, therefore, apply concepts 
is unfounded. As Rollin (1992) concludes, humans must be able to remember without 
language otherwise they would never learn to speak. In spite of all the arguments against 
including nonhuman animals in the sphere of moral concern, even if rationality and language 
were morally relevant, they still would not exclude nonhuman animals because of those 
nonrational, nonlinguistic humans who are included.
However, the major inadequacy of Kantian moral theory is the fact that most moral concern 
for people has nothing to do with rationality or language. Here enters Bentham’s utilitarianism 
that states the rightness or wrongness (morality) of actions depends on whether or not such 
actions produce the greatest amount of pleasure for the greatest number. This view seems to 
agree more with moral intuition than Kantian moral theory. Moreover, utilitarianism 
necessarily includes nonhuman animals. However, the utilitarian view of pain and pleasure 
does not account for those aspects of life that are not based on pain or pleasure but which are 
still subject to morality, notably concepts such as freedom, truth and self-fulfilment. Rollin
(1992) contends that something becomes the object of moral concern because of the presence 
of interests which it has and which can be affected by some other moral agent. Essentially, 
it is the fact that rationality and feeling pain/pleasure are interests for that being that makes 
it an object of moral concern. Like truth or freedom, Rollin (1992) argues, rationality and 
feeling pain or pleasure are examples of interests.
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These interests define the nature and function of a being, and it is these intrinsic qualities that 
Aristotle referred to as telos. Rollin (1992) asserts that it is the telos of a being that qualifies 
it for moral consideration. The interests of a being suggest that the needs of the being ‘matter’ 
to it and this, in turn, indicates some sort of conscious awareness. Thus, nonhuman animals 
have a fundamental right. This is the right to be considered as objects of moral concern by 
humans who hold moral principles, whatever they might be. Rollin (1992) states that this is 
the only absolute right. Extending from this is the notion that nonhuman animals have the 
right to life, although, as with humans, this right is not absolute. Nevertheless, killing 
nonhuman animals for food is morally unjustifiable because it is not necessary. However, 
respecting the rights of nonhuman animals does not necessarily entail subordinating one’s own 
interests, in the same way that respecting human rights does not mean letting other people take 
advantage. What it does entail, nonetheless, is taking the interests of nonhuman animals into 
consideration. Conscious life with associated interests and needs makes something an object 
of moral concern and, thus, gives intrinsic value.
3.3 The Modern Animal Rights Movement
Animal rights constitutes one of the major social movements in modem Britain. Regan, 
Singer and Rollin have been criticised for being rationalistic and individualistic (Donovan,
1990). It has been suggested that in their quest for criteria they reproduce the reason remotion 
dichotomy. Feminists, like ecologists, have emphasised the importance of community, not 
what constitutes rights. Recent feminist theorising on the nature of animal rights provide 
intellectually rigorous defences for the improvement of the status of nonhuman animals.
Feminism and Animal Rights
The alliance between some feminists and the animal liberation movement is an obvious one 
given the common history of objectification and exclusion. However, the interpretation of
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‘rights’ as described above has been the focus of feminist criticism, as demonstrated by Birke 
(1994:135):
The primary problem for feminist critics has been the reliance in the animal 
rights literature on rationality and a justice conception of rights. This is clearly 
enunciated in, for instance, Singer (1975), Regan (1983) and Rollin (1992).
Rights that depend on rationality are tricky for feminists, for how often have 
women been denied rights on the grounds of their alleged irrationality?
Birke’s position is that ‘rationality’ as a concept for rights is flawed because of the difficulty 
in, firstly, defining rationality and, secondly, deciding which nonhuman animals are rational 
and which are not. The anthropocentric (and androcentric) construction of rationality or self- 
consciousness is such that it would exclude most other animals. This kind of moral reasoning 
makes nonhuman animals ‘honorary humans’. Birke also criticises the utilitarian position of 
Singer (1975) which is also ‘locked into rationalist decision-making’ (Birke, 1994:138). 
Again, the problem rests with who is to decide the costs/benefits calculation? As Birke states:
If it is not the animals who decide, neither is it most humans. In general, the 
decision-making of this kind of practical utilitarianism is done by men, and by 
men from privileged class and race backgrounds; deciding the ‘greater good’ 
in the design of a scientific experiment is not a democratic process open to all.
So whose ‘good’ is it likely to be? (Birke, 1994:138).
Birke quotes Donovan’s (1990) critique of Regan and Singer’s concept of animal rights. She 
highlights their ‘need to avoid sentimentality and emotionality in advocating rights for 
animals’. Through Regan and Singer’s prioritisation of their concept of rationality, they 
denigrate the place of empathy as being too emotional. Echoing this thought, Plumwood 
claims:
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Regan’s difficulty here stems in part, it seems, from natural rights theory, 
which privileges rationalism and individualism, but it may also reflect his own 
determined exclusion of sentiment from ‘serious’ intellectual inquiry 
(Plumwood, 1993:170).
Here, the reason:emotion hierarchical dualism is invoked, the very dualism which undermines 
the interdependence of the terms ‘human’ and ‘animal’, and ‘masculinity’ and ‘femininity’. 
In reproducing these dualistic assumptions, these animal rights advocators undermine their 
claims of rights for nonhuman animals:
Recognising compassion and an unwillingness to harm as normal human 
responses to animals undermines each element of the patriarchal approach. The 
subordination of emotions to reason is justified by describing sympathies for 
animals as undependable. In fact, sympathies for animals are so dependable 
that every institution of animal exploitation develops some means of 
undercutting them. So rather than focusing exclusively on logic and 
consideration of formal consistency, we might better remember our feeling 
connection to animals, while challenging ourselves and others to overthrow the 
unnatural obstacles to the further development of these feelings (Luke, 1996:
312).
The notion of empathy is relevant to the object:subject opposition in science. Empathy is 
interpreted, and denigrated, as subjectivity, whilst dispassionate objectivity is considered the 
best scientific method. The fact that this objectivity is a form of subjectivity eludes those who 
practice it. These issues are fundamentally gendered, Birke (1994:139) expresses the problem 
as:
In suggesting that empathy and respect for nature may have overtones of 
gender, I am saying that these are qualities that have become stereotyped in 
western culture as feminine. That is not to say, however, that they are the 
prerogative of women. I think these are qualities that contribute to being a 
good scientist, whatever the sex of the practitioner, contributing to a ‘feeling 
for the organism’ as Evelyn Fox Keller put it in her biography of Barbara 
McClintock (Keller 1983).
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These issues of empathy, individualism and rationality are also criticised in the work of Benton
(1993) who reformulates the notion of animal rights from the rationalist position to one of 
anti-dualist continuity.
The Issue of Social Relations
Benton (1993) focuses on the relations between the socialist critique of rights and the case for 
nonhuman animal rights. He emphasises the commonalities between human and nonhuman 
animals by placing animals within the context of human social relations and devising a human- 
animal continuities framework. Benton revises both animal theory and socialism within this 
naturalistic context. Benton provides details on an infamous exchange between animal rights 
protagonist, Jenkins, and animal rights antagonist, Rose. In a sustained critique of animal 
rights, Steven Rose (1991) has questioned the boundary between those animals with rights and 
those without. He claims that only humans can decide who has rights because only humans 
are ‘subjects of history’. Furthermore, duties to nonhuman animals are overridden by duties 
to humans, and he states that it is offensive to equate speciesism with racism and sexism. In 
reply to Rose, Jenkins (1991) has proposed that the lack of a clear, non-arbitrary line between 
the extensions of two concepts does not mark no distinction. Furthermore, the fact that only 
humans assign rights does not mean that those rights cannot be assigned to non-human 
animals. Jenkins asserts that many people have rights independently of whether or not they 
claim them so, he asks, why should it be different for other animals. ‘Species’ loyalty is on 
a par with ‘race-loyalty’, therefore, Jenkins asks, how can the first be justified without 
justifying the second.
Aristotle, Aquinas, Descartes and Kant all denied that people have moral duties to animals. 
Nevertheless, Rose and Jenkins agree that animals are proper objects of moral concern, what 
they fundamentally differ on is the question of rights and cross-species egalitarianism. Benton 
maintains that humans may not be logically required by the consensual uses of the term
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‘rights’ either to confine it to human moral agents, or to extend it to non-human animals with 
morally relevant similarities to humans. However, neither is the decision about where to draw 
the dividing line an ‘arbitrary’ one. Jenkins insists that justice requires humans to assign equal 
importance to the suffering of animals but when it is a matter of killing or saving a life, a 
sense of self, place in a social network or capacity to plan are features that distinguish humans 
from other animals.
When Singer referred to equality of consideration, he did not mean that all animals should be 
treated the same. However, Benton suggests that if there are profound qualitative differences 
between humans and other animals then equality of consideration may be discriminatory. Both 
Singer and Jenkins claim that humans and other animals are sufficiently alike for it to be 
appropriate to argue for better treatment of nonhuman animals on the same terms as used by 
human liberation groups. Rose’s insistence upon the political and moral priority of the 
struggles of oppressed groups of humans forms a polemical opposition to the animal rights 
cause. Francis and Norman (1978) have argued that Singer and others who consider the moral 
relevance of characteristics which differentiate humans and other animals base their case on 
non-relational features such as rationality and sentience. They propose that the focus be on 
the moral significance of social relations among humans, and between humans and other 
animals. In stating that humans have a range of social relations that other animals do not 
have, Francis and Norman argue for the moral privileging of humans. The particular human 
social relations that they expound are communicative, economic, political and familial. 
Consequently, they attach greater weight to the interests of humans because of their social 
relations. This seems to appeal to widespread moral intuitions.
As Benton claims, humans respond to fellow humans in distress by saving them rather than 
other animals, out of a feeling that emerges from Francis and Norman’s social relation 
framework (Benton, 1993) and he applauds the use of social relations, instead of ‘rationality’.
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However, Benton argues that just as parents are more likely to save their own children rather 
than another’s, this fact does not imply justice. Nothing in this shows that humans and other 
animals do not have equal rights to life. The point Benton makes is that just because humans 
will in some circumstances save the being with whom they most closely identify does not 
relate to the issue of rights and justice. Social relational, communicative, cultural and other 
bonds may lead a person to identify with a person of their own ethnicity more than someone 
of another ethnicity. In such a case greater weight is attached to one rather than the other. 
However, this is not morally defensible. Benton’s argument is that like ethnicity, species 
difference is also not morally relevant.
In Benton’s analysis, Francis and Norman’s argument is vulnerable to the response that if our 
social relations produce morally justifiable preference for the interests of humans, why should 
similarly produced racial sentiments not be likewise justified. If the actual primacy of 
human-to-human relations generates human privileging of human interests, and this is 
justified, then a case for racism could easily be made on the same ground. Moreover, if the 
distinguishing feature between humans and animals is no longer sentience, rationality or 
language but complex sociality, then the moral privileging of this feature reasserts the moral 
priority of the non-relational human capacities which are themselves embedded in the 
human:animal opposition. Elevating human social relations prevents exploration of the 
common ground between humans and other animals. Furthermore, Benton points out that the 
supposedly distinctive features of human sociality are not realised in all human relations, even 
when they are realised, they do not cover every possibility and, therefore, they neglect all the 
moral consequences. Francis and Norman judge the moral status of animals within the context 
of human social relations. However, they avoid the explicit statement of what is implied in 
their framework, that being that the traditional human:animal opposition is reinstated.
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Discussion
The instrumental use of nonhuman animals has served throughout history to benefit humans. 
The objectification of nonhuman animals, through religious or scientific means, has been the 
precursor to the subordination and exploitation of nonhuman animal species. In this chapter, 
I have attempted to trace the development of the modem animal rights movement. Its origins 
in the scientific discoveries of Darwin have often been conspicuous through their absence, but 
the moral implications of Darwinism has a direct effect on how we construct the notion of 
‘human’ in relation to ‘animal’. Other animals have moved with people from the rural country 
to the denaturalised cities. The appropriation of nature and the reinvention of the natural 
world within the artificial confines of urban Britain have produced the modem proliferation 
of pets and the dominance of animal welfare ideology. The domestication, artificial breeding 
and selection of nonhuman animals in agriculture and in the home have produced a gross 
replica of Darwinist theory. These ‘manmade’ animals are the legacy of Christian and 
Cartesian dualism. The animal welfare movement has served as a double-edged sword, 
simultaneously promoting the health and habitat welfare of nonhuman animals and providing 
ways of giving humans better quality products.
The status of humans as human animals involves the understanding of two related aspects. 
One is that, in Darwin’s words, there is no qualitative difference between humans and other 
animals. Here we can elaborate on what that actually means. For Darwin, it meant that 
humans were not created by God in His image, rather all animals evolved through natural (not 
supernatural) selection. We can extend that to mean that humans are not in any way more or 
less ‘special’, valued or meaningful than any other species. We exist, not because we reflect 
some divine purpose, but because our ancestors evolved characteristics which meant that the 
human species would evolve to dominate the world. The moral elevation of humans, based 
on the notion of divine supremacy, here is invalidated. The way humans ontologically divide
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themselves from all other animals is also discredited. Nonetheless, and here I reach the 
second point, these realisations do not mean that we should not take what is unique about 
humans seriously. The very fact that I am writing about these issues is indicative of the 
evolution of humans as powerful animals. It is difference, linguistic and technological, which 
has brought us to this point. The evolution of language has given humans complex 
subjectivities which make understanding human behaviour a complex task. The content of 
those subjectivities is discursively constituted. Montagu makes the point characteristically 
well:
Humans are neither naked apes or fallen angels riven by that original sin, that 
great power of blackness, which Calvinistic commentators and their modem 
compeers have declared activate us. Neither are humans reducible to the 
category of animals, for we are the human animals, a humanity which adds to 
being a dimension lacking in all other animals, creatures of immense and 
extraordinary educability, capable of being molded into virtually every and any 
desired shape and form. Humans are not bom tabulae rasae, blank tablets, 
without any predisposition whatever. They are bom with many 
predispositions, to talk, to think, to engage in sexual behaviour, to love, to be 
aggressive, and the like, but they will achieve none of these behaviours unless 
they are exposed to the external stimuli necessary for the development of those 
potentialities into abilities (Montagu, 1976:316).
Our understanding of the mental lives of other animals is woefully inadequate, hindered by 
anthropocentrism, naive anthropomorphism and exploitative agendas. We are not yet in a 
position to comment on what we might call ‘subjectivity’ in other animals. Certainly, their 
lack of human language would make it very difficult indeed to come to an accurate picture of 
their lives. Nonetheless, what we do have insight to is nonhuman animal identity, the way 
humans construct, represent and treat other animals. Representations of nonhuman animal 
identities form some of the numerous discourses which constitute human subjectivities. The 
remainder of this thesis will attempt to map out the ways in which nonhuman animal identity 
is used to construct human subjectivity. In the following chapter, I shall explore the texture
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of this cultural tapestry through an investigation of post-structuralist accounts of subjectivity. 
I shall use some well established concepts from a variety of disciplines to expand on the notion 
of subjectivity and apply it to human relations with other animals. The conceptual model of 
dehumanisation will be your guide to the empirical procedures and the deconstruction of texts.
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The distinctive peculiarity o f animals is that, being at once close to man and 
strange to him, both akin to him and unalterably not-man, they are able to 
alternate, as objects o f human thought, between the contiguity o f the 
metonymic mode and the distanced, analogical mode o f the metaphor 
(Willis, 1974:128).
Overview
The theoretical focus to this thesis centres on two issues of knowledge and its relation to 
power. The first is the question of objectivity, the truthful nature of knowledge. Feminist 
theory has described objectivity as male subjectivity. Here the relevance and strength of 
this definition seems equally pertinent to the relations between ‘human' and ‘animal’, 
culture and nature, the domestic and the wild. Hence, objective knowledge of the natural 
world is assumed to be based on an androcentric and anthropocentric dualism. Objectivity 
is not only male subjectivity, it is human subjectivity. Secondly, the modem notion of 
rationality and the rational human subject, which forms the basis of traditional psychology, 
is under question. This chapter addresses the issue of ‘human’ versus ‘animal’ definition, 
through disentangling the equation of rational-human-subject. The use of nonhuman 
animals to construct representations of humans which legitimise sexist and racist discourses 
is examined. This chapter builds on the structuralist framework established in Chapter 2. 
Here, I use Derrida’s deconstruction, Foucault’s power/knowledge relation, Lacan’s 
psychoanalytic modelling, Klein’s unconscious defence mechanisms and Hollway’s feminist 
interpretation of the production of, and resistance to, power to illustrate the psychodynamic 
system of dehumanisation. I explore the metaphorical and metonymic structure of 
language and the unconscious, and their relation to anthropomorphism and zoomorphism. 
This conceptual model will demonstrate how human subjectivity and prejudice are 
fundamentally connected and dependent on the subjugation of the nonhuman animal world.
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4.1 The Symbiotic Foundations of Prejudice
Through the concept of myth, the symbolic representations of nonhuman animals have 
implicitly served to justify and reinforce the discrimination and oppression of humans. 
Spiegel (1988) recalls how Darwin’s (1871) evolutionary theory was misinterpreted by the 
so-called social Darwinists to claim that white male humans were evolutionarily superior 
to all other life forms (see also Chapter 3). This anthropocentric (as well as racist and 
sexist) world-view rendered the qualities possessed by humans as those by which all other 
species would be measured. Historically, the disqualification of nonhuman animals from 
the sphere of moral concern also included black people who were believed to be 
phylogenetically inferior to Caucasians. Spiegel (1988) comments that only speciesists 
would find the comparison of nonhuman and black/women’s suffering offensive.
The Speciesist Structure of Prejudice
In accordance with our notion of mythology and exclusion, Thomas (1983) posits that once 
people were perceived as ‘beasts’ they could be treated accordingly. The removal of 
nonhuman animals from the sphere of concern legitimised the ill-treatment of humans who 
were supposedly ‘animalistic’. Birke comments that:
...a great many of the injustices that humans perpetuate against animals are 
themselves deeply embedded in the very same systems of domination that 
leads to injustices against humans (Birke, 1994:134).
Indeed, racist propaganda against black people often compared them to negative stereotypes 
of nonhuman animals. The representation of nonhuman animals had already been 
naturalised through mythology and metaphor. When a nonhuman animal is subservient and 
obedient, the representation is ‘good’, when independent it is ‘bestial’. Spiegel (1988) has 
further proposed that the slavery-related sufferings of black people are parallel to the 
institutionalised oppression of nonhuman animals. The psychological rationalisation is 
buttressed by speciesist metaphors and the belief that black people, like nonhuman animals,
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were grateful for being rescued from ‘savagery’.
Adams (1990) has commented that people manipulate nature in order to project onto the 
‘other’ those attributes that they fear. This projection of one’s own self onto nature (the 
ideological antithesis of culture) confirms the irrationality, the ‘beastliness’, of nature. 
Midgeley (1979) has proposed that the notion of ‘animal’ serves two descriptive functions. 
It refers inclusively to a wide range of organisms and, in contrast, it separates the human 
species from other organisms. In the latter description, ‘animal’ defines humanity through 
its symbolic reference to the ‘inhuman’, to what is described as ‘animalistic’ in human 
experience. These ‘natural’ beings now come to represent something of which the 
oppressor is afraid, and/or cannot understand, and/or wants to deny in themselves. 
Through violent action against the symbol (nonhuman animal, blacks, women), the 
oppressor unconsciously tries to destroy those elements in themselves which they find so 
threatening. The representation of these symbols render the oppressed as ‘other’ and, 
consequently, outside the scope of moral concern. Through this symbolisation, humans 
recognise in nonhuman animals those elements of which they are afraid and ignorant 
(Berger, 1980).
Kappeler (1986) has appropriated Berger’s (1980) analysis of human-nonhuman animal 
interaction and interpreted it in terms of gender. She asserts that ‘what distinguishes men 
from women (like humans from nonhumans) is access to cultural symbolisation, the power 
of naming’ (Kappeler, 1986:68). Through naming, men use women and nonhuman 
animals as symbols, objects for representation. Kappeler further equates the domestication 
of nonhuman animals with the domestication of women, thus, the domestic animal and the 
domestic housewife live lives of parallel marginalisation. Housewifery is akin to farm 
animals to the extent that women and nonhuman animals are ‘beasts of burden’, they have 
an obligation to work without pay. The ‘pet’ is the ‘kept woman’, a plaything for the 
male. Berger’s (1980:14) comments on nonhuman animals applies equally well to women:
-88-
4: The Psychodynamics o f Dehumanisation
...animals are always the observed. The fact that they can observe us has 
lost all significance. They are the objects of our ever-extending knowledge.
What we know about them is an index of our power, and thus an index of 
what separates us from them. The more we know, the further away they 
are.
Historically, women have been given the same status as nonhuman animals (Kappeler, 
1986). Women are equated with nature and, in existential dualism, they are both revered 
and denigrated. Both the ‘pet’ and the ‘wife’ fulfil the needs of the master/husband. The 
modern-day zoo, the institution of polygamy, or pornographic peep-shows, similarly 
mirror each other. The construction of ‘woman’ and ‘animal’ has depicted them as 
objects. These constructions are implicitly dichotomous. The domestication of woman has 
rendered her desexualised, pure and Madonna-like on the one hand, and, on the other, she 
is construed as a wild, sexual beast - ‘animalistic’. Both categories of women and 
nonhuman animals have been recategorised in relation to the given male identity (Kappeler, 
1986).
‘Disneyfication’
Baker (1993) has proposed that nonhuman animal imagery is a salient referent used to 
judge human identity. Here, constructions of nonhuman animals play an important role 
in the symbolic construction of human identity. Cultural representations of nonhuman 
animals are typically banal and stereotypical. The process of naturalisation embeds the 
symbolic and rhetorical uses of nonhuman animals in the collective mind. In relation to 
Foucault, Martin (1992:279) describes this process of naturalisation as:
All categories of the natural or the normal, as well as the unnatural or 
abnormal, are exposed as social constructs rather than distinctions given at 
the level of the body or individual psyche, categories that have been 
produced discursively and which function as mutually determining 
oppositions to normalise and to discipline.
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Myth renders these representations ahistorical and presents certain ideologies as 
self-evident. The historical and cultural are made invisible.
The ‘reduction’ of the nonhuman animal (Berger, 1980) is related to the loss of symbolic 
power which has been replaced with an ‘inferior literacy’ in the form of toys and zoos. 
The nonhuman animal has been subsumed into human society. Berger (1980) claims that 
nineteenth century middle-class attitudes towards nonhuman animals have been 
homogenised through the mass media. As we have seen, such representations are the result 
of Cartesian dualism, social Darwinism and increasing urbanisation. Today, nonhuman 
animal discourses are the result of the symbolic use of nonhuman animals in popular 
culture - Baker (1993) refers to this as ‘our Walt Disney conscious’. These representations 
of nonhuman animals serve to maintain the illusion of human superiority. The meanings 
of these representations operate independently of the living animal.
Baker (1993) calls this naturalisation of images of nonhuman animals ‘disneyfication’. 
He recalls Ingold’s (1988) description of nonhuman animals as meaningful entities only 
when they exemplify a human ideal. The living nonhuman animal represents human 
meaning and identity. ‘Disneyfication’ has rendered nonhuman animals as meaningful only 
when they are represented as something else. Nonhuman animals cannot and do not 
represent themselves to humans. Humans define and represent them and these 
representations significantly reflect human agendas. The inconsistencies of nonhuman 
animal representations are naturalised so that they permeate popular culture unnoticed. The 
media anthropomorphise the benevolent actions of nonhuman animals, whereas they 
typically ‘animalise’ the malevolent actions of humans (Baker, 1993). Thus, the media 
perpetuate stereotypical images of nonhuman animals. These representations monopolise 
reality. Most nonhuman animal symbols are traditional, they are salient in everyday 
mythology and the collective memory (Rowland, 1974). Indeed, it is the ubiquity of these 
contradictory representations which trivialises nonhuman animals and reinforces negative 
stereotypes of them. These dualisms, oppositions and reflections which are structured
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systematically are naturalised through myth and so enter our collective unconscious, 
require deconstructing to reveal what has been excluded - to make the invisible visible.
4.2 Deconstruction and the Critique of Logocentrism
Inherent to post-structuralism is Saussure’s original proposal that meaning is derived from 
implicit and explicit difference (see Chapter 2). Consequently, any concept will contain 
repressed ideas. Analysis of the meaning of ‘animal’ or ‘human’ requires the exploration 
of negated ideas within those concepts. Meanings of ‘animal’ are tied to symbolic 
representations. These representations provide the basis for the organisation and 
comprehension of animal-human relations. The way humans and all other animals are 
represented as fixed opposites conceals the extent to which species are interdependent. 
Animality, like gender, derives its meaning from socially defined contrast rather than 
inherent antithesis.
Binary Oppositions
Derrida (1978) proposes that interdependence is hierarchical; one term dominates the other 
and derives its meaning through contrast with the other. Western philosophical tradition 
rests on such binary oppositions. Analysis of binary oppositions illuminates the 
construction of meaning. Such analyses cannot take binary oppositions at face value but 
must deconstruct them in order to reveal their interdependence. Binary differences are 
illusions created by the operation of difference. Difference emerges through the repression 
of characteristics within supposedly unitary entities.
For Derrida, all meaning is textual, derived from an infinite differentiating play of signs. 
Derrida’s concept of deconstruction and ‘differance’ is based on his critique of 
logocentrism. Logocentrism, with its insistence on a rational and objective language 
through which to describe a rational and objective world, was indifferent to, indeed 
ignorant of, the ‘other’. He describes this as the ‘metaphysics of presence’:
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...the historical determination of the meaning of being in general as 
presence, with all the subdeterminations which depend on this generic form 
and which organize within their system and their historical sequence 
(Derrida, 1967:12).
Derrida proposed that structures of meaning should include in their definition the observers 
of those structures. Derrida’s concept of differance is derived, in part, from Saussure’s 
notion of meaning emerging through differentiation. The concept of ‘differance’ includes 
the simultaneous processes of difference, in which identity is constructed in opposition to 
the ‘other’, and deferral, through which the ‘other’ is constantly projected or denied. 
Differance is the process through which any semiological system is historically constituted, 
therefore, it is ‘open’ as opposed to the ‘closed’ system of the ‘metaphysics of presence’:
Differance will be the playing moment that ‘produces’ - by means of 
something that is not simply an activity - these differences, these effects of 
difference (Derrida, 1968:11).
Deconstructing Animals
Through deconstruction of texts, both meaning and identity are seen to be provisional and 
relative. The deconstruction of a binary opposition is, however, not aimed at the 
annihilation of differences, rather it is an attempt to explore the subtle and powerful effects 
of difference at work within the illusion of binary oppositions. The meaning of ‘animal’, 
in Derridean terms, is always contested within discourses. Meaning is, however, managed 
through systems of binary oppositions which make possible:
The relatively unitary and atomic structures that are called names, the 
chains of substitution of names in which, for example, the nominal effect 
differance is itself enmeshed, carried off, reinscribed, just as a false entry 
or a false exit is still part of the game, a function of the system 
(Derrida, 1968:26-7).
As introduced in Chapter 2, Scott (1991) has proposed that the alliance of feminist and 
post-structuralist theory can be used to analyse a variety of social phenomena.
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Post-structuralist theory attempts to analyse the construction of meaning and the 
relationship of power to meaning. The construction of meaning, and the resulting power 
relations, arise from language, discourse, difference and subjectivities. People use 
language to assign meaning to life, and they simultaneously use language to represent and 
understand the world. Analysis of language shows how social relations are organised and 
comprehended. Post-structuralism assumes that words and texts have no intrinsic meaning, 
therefore, meanings may change through time.
Scott claims that the binary opposition of equality:difference that has been historically 
presented to feminists as their only choice, is, in fact, an impossible choice. The apparent 
antithesis of the terms hides their interdependence. Such a dichotomous pairing is a 
misrepresentation of their meaning and relationship. Equality necessarily requires ignoring 
(not eliminating) differences. Thus, the true concept of equality includes and depends on 
the acknowledgement of difference. If there was no such thing as difference then there 
would not be a need for equality because all individuals would be identical. Zimmerman 
(1994:140-1) has summarised the impact of deconstruction as:
In disclosing the instability of power structures, deconstruction opens a 
space for those who are marginalised because they are perceived as other 
than the dominant pole.
However, Ledekis points out that the Derridean notion of deconstruction is limited in its 
application to the social:
Although Derrida does indicate how through a reading of a text the 
intrusion by the ‘outside’ (what is not said or written) into the inside (what 
is said or written) can be discerned....it cannot specify the source and the 
origin of these assumptions within the wider social context (1995:99).
Social context is to be explored, here, through psychodynamics, the integration of Lacan’s 
theory of the unconscious, Foucault’s discourse theory and Kleinian defence mechanisms.
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4.3 Psychodynamic Modelling: The Structure of the Unconscious
As seen in Chapter 2, structuralism assumes that meaning is made possible by the existence 
of underlying systems of convention which enable elements to function individually as 
signs. Psychodynamic constructionism is based partly in structuralism. The social world 
is not random but subject to cultural conventions and unconscious positioning in cultural 
contexts. The tension between structuralism and social constructionism is centred on 
‘finding’ versus ‘creating’. The social constructionist paradigm assumes that the social 
world is socially created, whilst the structuralist position focuses on identifying and 
exploring the social world as it is. The ideal position posited by Eco (1984) and Leach 
(1964) is ‘sitting on the fence’ because restrictions can not be made on significations. 
What this means is that the social world is constructed through signification but the infinite 
process of signification means that a complete account of the generation of meaning is 
implausible, whilst the identification of patterns of meaning is possible. Systems of 
meaning are both structured and dynamic. Like bridges, structures do not move, however, 
the bridge is part of a system with movement in the form of travelling vehicles. The 
system will always be structured, functional and dynamic.
The Lacanian Subject
Lacan promotes the notion of discursive knowledge:
...there is no knowledge without discourse. For what would such 
knowledge be: the unconscious one imagines is refuted by the unconscious 
as it is a knowledge put in place of truth; this can be conceived only within 
a structure of discourse (Lacan, 1977:viii).
For Lacan (1977), signs can only be known through signifiers and perpetual substitution. 
The signified is a chain of signifiers, an activity which imposes structure. Wherever you 
explore the emergence of meaning, you will reach a point where you recognise something 
because of the way meaning is constituted within a labyrinth. The concept of labyrinth is
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an Eco (1984) idea which delves beyond signifying chains to structure which neither 
dissolves into movement, thus lacking stability, nor is a restrictive imposition of order. 
By using meaning as a labyrinth, there is structure but one avoids that fallacy that reality 
can be observed from outside meaning. The labyrinth is not random because certain things 
have to connect to produce a structure, however, it allows movement in defining 
capabilities and processes.
For Lacan, the T  or inherent self, is fictional, ‘an impossible mirage in linguistic forms’ 
(Lacan, 1977:73). These fictions are as important as the ‘real’ because they are the 
products of communication, they constitute systems of meaning and have effects. The 
unconscious emerges through the estrangement of the Other to the ‘se lf . Lacan proposed 
that the unconscious mind is structured like language. As a formal system of differences 
requiring discontinuity, language precedes the unconscious. Lemaire (1977) describes this 
relationship as:
He [Lacan] proposes an understanding of the subject in terms of a schema 
composed of layers of structures. These correspond to Freud’s 
topographical distinction between conscious, preconscious and unconscious.
The unconscious is composed of signifiers and is itself structured in the 
sense that, although distinctive and summable, its elements are still 
articulated in categories and sub-sets in accordance with certain precise laws 
of arrangement. In this sense the structure of the unconscious is identical 
with that of language in its synchronic dimension, the dimension in which 
it is layered within a single class of element (Lemaire, 1977:3).
The unconscious develops around three organising principles namely, the imaginary, the 
symbolic and the real. The resistance between the signifier and the signified, which 
comprise the Saussurean sign, produces linguistic chains of meaning. In Saussurean 
semiology, in the life of signs in society, the only essential sign is the link between the 
signifier and the signified. Lacan extrapolated this idea to the realm of the unconscious. 
The initial imaginary stage aims to end discontinuity between the infant and the world. At 
this ‘mirror phase’, the infant’s ideal ego develops through identification with the ‘other’.
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The coherence of the ideal ego precedes the discontinuity of language, and the resulting 
identity is a misrecognition with the ideal ego. In this phase, the ego is always only a 
reference object, not a controller. This became a metaphor for the ‘self. In this realm 
of the signified, the ideal ego serves to conceal the lack of unity between the infant and the 
outside world. Once the signified is structured by language, the infant’s identification 
becomes increasingly alienated.
The plane of the symbolic (representations) prioritises the signifier whereas the plane of 
the real is never represented as real because it is only accessed through the symbolic. 
Parker (1994:455) describes the Lacanian symbolic order as:
...the source point for the unconscious in each individual, and the infant 
only becomes a speaking subject with an unconscious when it enters the 
Symbolic Order and is, at the same moment, entered by it (Lacan, 1977).
What is actual, as the truth of the subject which is revealed in the subject’s 
unconscious, is now seen as lying not underneath or outside language but 
contained in it.
The plane of the ‘real’ is excluded from knowable reality, it is the unknown, the 
unsymbolised and the unexplored area of the labyrinth. To Lacan, the ‘symbolic’ 
represents what may be explored along signifying chains. The links in the Lacanian 
signifying chain are attribution (metonymic) links to other signifiers. Symbolic meaning 
is not centralised on a denotative focus, but is referential and substantiated with different 
values, as Clement describes:
In the hollow spaces, emptied of lost rituals, the idea of the individual takes 
shape as a desaturated, indeed disorganised, collective; one that it is 
vulnerable to the caving in of the imago, vulnerable to a syncope that is 
capable of nullifying, through subsidence, the foundational syncope of 
subjective identity (Clement, 1994:123).
Here the ideal ego is substituted by the ego ideal, the ‘I’ which is determined by language, 
culture, gender and, I propose, the psychodynamic construction of the human species as
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not-animal.
The Lacanian structures of meaning give equal priority to ‘is’ and ‘have’, linkages which 
explore the symbolic construction of the ‘other’. The Lacanian concept of sexuality is one 
that operates in the language system and centres on the two fundamental irregular verbs: 
‘to have’ and ‘to be’. These verbs do not describe actions or transactions, rather they show 
how the world is structured. Such a world is fundamentally structured by gender 
association and linguistic semantics. Men lay claim to ‘having’, whilst women are 
reserved for ‘being’. These different structures rest on gender identity and stereotypes, but 
they are based on the possession of the symbolic phallus. Thus, there is the prioritisation 
of ‘having’. This language submits to ‘The Law of the Father’, Lacan’s abstract concept 
of patriarchy. This is a privileged symbolic function through which the linguistic 
representation of the signifier gives rise to the symbolic identification with the signifying 
element, the phallus. It is this structure of language into which we are inserted, given a 
gender-specific role, and where men are prioritised over women.
Lacan’s theory of the culturally constituted unconscious has been criticised for being static 
and universalising. Urwin describes its limitations as:
...instead of prioritising the symbolic order with its universalist and timeless 
implications, we might prioritize instead the discursive order or particular 
discourses, viewed in their historical specificity. Following the post- 
structuralist emphasis on production of modem subject forms through social 
apparatuses, here we are focusing on the ways in which language is 
implicated in the production of particular regimes of truth, associated with 
the regulation of specific social practices... (Urwin, 1984:279-80).
The main problem with Lacanian modelling is that it only explores passive experiences 
even though there are active, dynamic relations between culture and the unconscious. The 
Lacanian view, thus, accounts for reflection, however, it says nothing about how people 
learn anything in the first place. Hollway (1989:59) has criticised Lacan’s account of the 
subject by drawing attention to his synchronic structure:
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Although the Lacanian subject is fundamentally split, the splits bear no 
relation to the content of meaning nor the incompatibility between positions 
in different discourses. For Lacan, the symbolic is a monolithic system. 
Similarly, although Lacan recognizes that subjectivity is achieved in the 
context of the other, this other is also an abstract, timeless concept, not 
located in specific discourses and power relations.
This inadequacy is compensated for by Hollway’s (1989) theory of investment which 
integrates Lacan’s psychoanalytic framework with Foucault’s theory of discourse and 
Kleinian defence mechanisms.
The Discursive Subject
With reference to the integration of psychoanalysis and discourse analysis, Parker 
(1994:532) has commented that:
Both hermeneutic interpretation of psychoanalysis and structuralist readings, 
in turn, reflect a growing concern with language in Western academic life.
In social psychology, this interest in language has been articulated through discourse 
analysis, which has been described by two of its protagonists as:
All forms of spoken interaction, formal and informal, and written texts of 
all kinds (Potter and Wetherell, 1987:7).
Discourse analysts have concerned themselves with contradictions which emerge through 
communication and the organisation of meanings. The concept of discourse is itself the 
amalgamation of several interrelated disciplines. From symbolic interactionism, discourse 
gains its sense of the way social identity is constructed through interactions at the symbolic 
level. From sociolinguistics, the issue of power becomes central, with different social 
groups engaging in different discourses. Speech act theory expands the philosophy of 
language to account for talk as action, so that we do not just say things with words, we do 
things. Critical linguistics links discourse to the concept of ideology, whereas, 
ethnomethodology introduces the rules of talk and the processes of negotiation through
-98-
4: The Psychodynamics o f Dehumanisation
talk. The notion of ‘crisis’ in social psychology (Harre and Secord, 1972) is seen as the 
birthplace of the study of the relationship amongst power, method and language, and the 
emergence of discourse analysis.
Many social psychological papers on discourse have been submitted by Potter and 
Wetherell. Their prime concern is language. However, they endeavour to limit criticism 
of being ‘fashionable’ and transitory, with cautious disclaimers. Action is separated from 
language and discourse, but not divorced from it because language is itself active:
Talk has the property of being both about actions, events and situations, and
at the same time part of those things (Potter and Wetherell, 1987:182).
Potter and Wetherell’s critique of traditional social psychology has centred on the 
attribution of attitudes to individual properties. For example, explaining racism through 
appeals to the information processing systems of individuals is challenged for being too 
simplistic, individualistic and positivist. Indeed, Wetherell and Potter (1991) credit 
Adorno et aT s Authoritarian Personality theory with greater explanatory scope than 
theories of social cognition or social identity. Nevertheless, personality theory, although 
attempting to combine the social environment with emotional and motivational individual 
aspects, suffers from its insistence on stable traits and assumptions of rational unitary 
subjects.
Discourse analysis reinstates the social aspects of behaviour through concentrating on the 
most social of behaviours, language. The major theoretical principle of discourse analysis 
is, therefore, the deconstruction of language, of talk and texts. Language constitutes the 
building blocks through which experience is constructed, presented and represented. 
Discourse analysis seeks to identify those linguistic tools involved, and understand why 
some representations of reality prevail over others. From this standpoint, language is no 
longer seen as the neutral reflection of reality and so discourse, rather than the individual, 
becomes the unit of analysis. Wetherell and Potter suggest ‘interpretative repertoires’ as
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the socially available filters that make sense of the world.
However, this form of discourse analysis is restrictive and verges on behaviourism. 
Discourse can, nonetheless, be used in a more dynamic way to account for the emergence 
of meaning and the establishment of hegemony. Ideology emerges from hegemonic 
discourses and the confusion between what is social and what is natural. The equation of 
what is morally right with what is natural is an ideological mechanism which prescribes 
the ubiquity of certain discourses and, likewise, the marginalisation or invisibility of 
others. The function of ideology is to naturalise and mythologise social inequalities. They 
form systems of justification which conceal the hierarchical basis of society. This concept 
of discourse is based on a Foucauldian account of subjects as the product of discursive 
power relations.
Theorising content is a matter of historical and cultural location. Post-structuralist analysis 
of discourse relates to the social structure of beliefs. Foucault (1972) has proposed that 
analysis of meaning requires the parallel analysis of conflict and power that produce 
meanings. Various discourses compete with each other in an attempt to legitimise their 
authority in any given organisation or institution. The power of the discourses on prejudice 
resides in the way that they perpetuate themselves as myths. Foucault claims that these 
mechanisms provide the shared assumptions of apparently different ideologies. It is for 
this reason that Foucault stressed the importance of re-thinking the social construction of 
meanings. For Foucault, power is constructed through the relations amongst practices, 
pleasures, knowledge and power. Foucault argues that Western culture has actually 
produced and dispersed sexuality. Representations and discourses are acts of power 
because they present themselves as knowledge. The analysis of culture requires the 
deconstruction and interpretation of semiotic systems, structural language and discourses.
This imposition of Foucauldian (1981) disciplinary power, with cultural supervision, is a 
psychodynamic construction. Foucault conceptualises power as operating through
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discourses. Power, therefore, is a way of experiencing oneself as a subject, as historically 
and culturally constituted. The construction of subjectivity, thus, involves the operation 
of power. Compared to the juridico-discursive model, Foucault describes his concept of 
‘disciplinary power’ as:
...power is not an institution, and not a structure, neither is it a certain 
strength we are endowed with; it is the name that one attributes to a 
complex strategical situation in a particular society (Foucault, 1981:93).
Power, therefore, is not possessed but is exercised and, as it is exercised, it is also 
productive:
If I tell the truth about myself, as I am now doing, it is in part that I am 
constituted as a subject across a number of power relations which are 
exerted over me and which I exert over others (Foucault, 1994a: 129).
For Foucault, ‘truth’ is not a fundamental concept, rather it exists within ‘discourses of 
truth’, a particularly coercive form of discourse. Competing discourses with differential 
power forces produce meaning and knowledge. Meaning is relational and power is 
intrinsically productive. Those subjects who are positioned within the dominant discourse 
will be empowered because they conform to a certain idea of ‘truth’. Conforming to 
hegemonic beliefs is a successful way of satisfying desire, to affirm the individual’s sense 
of identity. As power itself regulates desire, so society becomes increasingly consensual. 
Consequently, both desire to affirm one’s identity, and hegemony, as an emergent 
structural form, marginalise alternative subjectivities. Factual knowledge, within 
‘discourses of truth’, emerges from social relations which are accepted as ‘true’, and, as 
discourses are shared, they structure the world in order to exclude alternatives. Moreover, 
both power and knowledge revolve around social conventions. Psychodynamic discourse 
analysis is a challenge to these exclusionary practices.
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Psychodynamics theorises both process and content. Deconstructing the psychodynamics 
of a given phenomenon will provide access to the process by which the phenomenon 
emerged but not the whole truth because only the latent (unaccessible) content contains the 
absolute truth. Indeed, ‘truth’ is a matter of Foucauldian discourses and the emergence of 
knowledge presented as truth through power relations. Where Lacan may be criticised for 
psychoanalytic reductionism, Hollway (1989) criticises Foucault for discourse determinism:
If the concept of discourses is just a replacement for the notion of ideology, 
then we are left with one of two possibilities. Either the account sees 
discourses as mechanically repeating themselves or - and this is the 
tendency of materialist theory of ideology - changes in ideology follow 
from changes in material conditions. According to such a use of discourse 
theory people are the victims of certain systems of ideas which are outside 
them. Discourse determinism comes up against the old problem of agency 
typical of all sorts of social determinisms (Hollway, 1992:248-9).
Hollway’s thesis is that people unconsciously invest in those discourses which affirm their 
gender. Through identifying with that subject position, people reproduce or construct both 
their identity and unconscious desire. Moreover, herein lies the possibility to challenge 
that identity and create alternative discourses to mediate unconscious desire. This change 
in identity is the transformation of discursive subjectification. In applying the concept of 
gender difference to the production of subjectivity, Hollway (1989) centres her argument 
on three basic tenets, which are of direct relevance to the construction of non-human 
animals in dominant, Western discourses: that women are negatively defined (unchanged 
signifiers); the notion of equality produces contradictions (person = man, therefore, 
woman as person = woman as not woman); and subjectivity is reproduced through 
discourses and practices.
Psychodynamic Investment
Discourses position people in relation to their status as object or subject. Traditional 
discourses on sexuality are gender-differentiated as the subject and object positions are not 
equally available to men and women. Those positions are specified for the category of
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‘man’ or ‘woman’ through the history of those practices and meanings. The subject’s 
investments and available positions are offered by multiple discourses. Those discourses 
are socially constituted and constitutive of subjectivity, therefore, they are not 
deterministic. However, discourse presents itself with the problem of lack of agency. In 
not theorising the subject, these ideas are prone to the critique of discourse determinism:
He [Foucault] still does not account for how people are constituted as a 
result of certain truths being current rather than others. The advantage of 
the idea that current at any one time are competing, potentially 
contradictory discourses (concerning for example sexuality) rather than a 
single patriarchal ideology, is that we can pose the question, how is it that 
people take up positions in one discourse rather than another?...These 
questions require that attention is paid to the histories of individuals in order 
to see the recursive positioning in certain positions in discourses. It also 
requires a question concerning the investment in that position. (Hollway, 
1992:249).
Hollway, following Foucault, states that there is a mutually constitutive relationship 
between power and knowledge. Power and knowledge are emergent concepts and their 
meanings and values are not inherently positive or negative. The question remains as to 
why there are certain ‘discourses of truth’ and not others. Hollway proposes the notion 
of ‘investment’ to account for individuals positioning themselves in certain discourses and 
not others:
By claiming that people have investments (in this case gender-specific) in 
taking up certain positions in discourses, and consequently in relation to 
each other, I mean that there will be some satisfaction or pay-off or reward 
(these terms involve the same problem) for that person. The satisfaction 
may well be in contradiction with other resultant feelings. It is not 
necessarily conscious or rational (Hollway, 1992:249-50).
The effects and meanings of these positions will vary over time and context, so that the 
unique nature of individual subjectivity may be accounted for without sacrificing the social 
elements of discursive practices. Human subjectivity is a conglomerate of multiple 
positions in multiple discourses. As Hollway (1989:72) comments:
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If we cease to view individuals as determining the boundaries around 
beliefs, positions or meanings and if we understand defence mechanisms as 
relational rather than intrapsychic, then it is possible to understand that 
multiple, potentially contradictory positions in discourses can be divided 
between people in a way which brings one or both of them advantages.
Positioning within certain discourses requires the simultaneous expression and suppression 
of signification. Availability and hegemony of discourses will partially determine the 
positioning of the self. Suppression of alternative positions is essential in order to maintain 
the power of the expressed position. Hollway incorporates Klein’s (1960) psychic defence 
mechanisms of splitting (projection, introjection and projective identification) with Lacan’s 
concept of the culturally constituted unconscious and Foucault’s notion of discursive 
knowledge/power. Hollway (1989:71) quotes Mitchell’s (1986) definition of Kleinian 
defence mechanisms:
Splitting - the ego can stop the bad part of the object contaminating the 
good part, by dividing it, or it can split off and disown a part of itself. In 
fact, each kind of splitting always entails the other. In projection the ego 
fills the object with some of its own split feelings and experiences; in 
introjection it takes into itself what it perceives or experiences of the object.
In [projective identification] the ego projects its feelings into the object 
which it then identifies with, becoming like the object which it has already 
imaginatively filled with itself. (1986:20)
The splitting of a given object is motivated, in Kleinian terms, by anxiety, a natural human 
state. Hollway favours Klein’s notion of anxiety to Lacan’s Freudian-based concept of 
desire, with the proviso that anxiety is culturally constituted, not ‘natural’:
The defence mechanisms of introjection and projection - the means through 
which they are expressed in displaced ways - are interpsychic, that is they 
are relational. This means that they are dependent on the participation of 
another. This other represents needs which are opposite, rather than just 
different. The opposition is a product of the principle that positive and 
negative value is imbricated in the meanings. What is projected onto 
another person represents the material which is unacceptable because of 
contradictions in the one who is doing the projecting. What is repressed is
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not just material whose repressed status is isolated from subjectivity. Freud 
maintained that repression was always related to a desire and vice versa, so 
that there is a principle of opposition. Repression of contradiction is thus 
a highly complementary mechanism to the principle of opposition which is 
fundamental to gender difference (Hollway, 1992:269).
Introjecting the identity-affirming aspects of a characteristic and projecting the negative 
aspects, which undermine an individual discursive subject position, onto the Other, provide 
an inter subjective means of allaying anxiety. In her psychodynamic extension of social 
representations theory, Joffe (1996:206) elucidates the roles of these defence mechanisms 
in relation to perceived threat:
It [projective identification] is a highly relevant construct for social 
psychological theories concerned with the location of threat within the 
‘other’: parts of the self which one does not want to own are projected into 
external objects and these external objects are then seen to be possessed by, 
controlled by and identified with the projected parts. The aim is not only 
to get rid of the ‘bad’ parts of the self, but, crucially, to be able to control 
the source of danger. While control is sought by the mechanism, and is 
accomplished to a certain degree, the object onto which the person has 
projected his or her own aggression becomes feared as a source of 
aggression (Moses, 1989).
Klein’s theory of projection, introjection and projective identification is based on the 
premise that infants experience anxiety from the time they are bom. This anxiety stems 
from the relationship the infant has to the primary object, usually the mother. The infant 
needs to develop through a number of interpsychic processes in order to protect herself 
against anxiety. Joffe (1996:205) describes the durability of these processes as:
From the earliest stages of infancy mental operations which reduce anxiety, 
thereby producing a sense of safety and security, are utilised. Traces of 
these early defensive mechanisms remain with individuals throughout life.
They are drawn upon when changes in the social environment make for 
insecurity, which exacerbates unresolved early conflicts.
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The infant experiences the primary object as a source of both fulfilment and frustration. 
The inability of the mother to satisfy all the infant’s needs lead the infant to experience the 
primary object as ‘persecutory’. The infant’s inability to separate her sense of ‘self from 
the primary object further leads to the experience of the self as also persecutory. Joffe 
elucidates this blurring of boundaries and experiences of persecution and pleasure as:
Since the boundary between the individual’s ‘self and the primary object 
is highly volatile at this stage, the infant also experiences itself as 
persecutory. Similarly, when its needs are fulfilled it experiences both its 
primary object and itself as satisfying and loving. So outside objects are 
easily seen as possessing qualities which belong to the self, and self is easily 
seen as possessing qualities which belong to others (Joffe, 1996:205).
This early interaction with the primary object is the initial ‘paranoid-schizoid’ position 
through which the interaction is simultaneously defined as ‘good’ and ‘bad’. Also during 
the first months of a child’s life, the early ‘cognitive-emotional’ development means that 
the infant experiences objects as part-objects. Joffe provides a clear exposition of this 
development:
The part objects are viewed in polarised terms: there are ‘bad’, persecutory 
objects and ‘good’, loving objects. When the infant experiences persecution 
from an object, such as when the mother’s breast does not provide
sustenance, feelings of aggression, hate and destruction are evoked.
Destructive feelings are accompanied by feelings of extreme anxiety. The 
infant is paranoid that destructive forces within or outside of itself are 
motivated to harm it. In order to maintain its experience of nurturance, 
satisfaction, safety and security with its primary object and, therefore, with 
itself, it must find a way of warding off this anxiety (Joffe, 1996:206).
The unconscious processes of projection, introjection and projective identification are the 
ways in which infants and, in later life, adults ward off anxiety. Kleinian theory permits,
indeed, insists on the potential for change and, therefore, has a strong potential for
resistence to prejudice and discrimination which arises from unconscious splitting. The 
development of the infant away from the paranoid-schizoid position into the ‘depressive 
position’ brings with it the ability to tolerate ambivalence (Klein, 1952). Joffe (1996:212-
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213) recognises the implicit process of change involved in Klein’s theory:
Within the depressive position the infant realises that both ‘good’ and ‘bad’, 
nourishment and deprivation, satisfaction and persecution, derive from the 
same primary object. It needs to reconcile the polarisation between ‘good’ 
and ‘bad’ objects, which had been established in the earlier stage of 
development. It enters the depressive position when it begins to mourn the 
loss of the purely ‘good’ self and the ‘purely good’ primary object, realising 
that ‘bad’ is contained within both. If mourning takes place the infant 
acquires an ability to tolerate ambivalence. Toleration of ambivalence is 
central to a non-split way of viewing the world.
Hollway’s (1989:66) concept of investment ties in to the nature of contradictory positions 
in a variety of discourses and meanings which emerge from and are made salient through 
those discourses:
These meanings depend on discourses, but also they must pass through the 
psyche before they are reproduced. Certain meanings confer strength and 
thus protection, so that these will be likely to be reproduced.
Meanings that protect the self from psychic pain emerge from splitting. Countering the 
effects of splitting requires the tolerance of ambivalence, the notion that there is good and 
bad in everything. Joffe (1996) cites ‘reflexivity’ as key to the project of change:
Reflexivity, which grows as the mass media and academia produce 
explanations and commentaries related to the multiple facets of social life, 
contributes to the modification of the ideas which have persisted from a less 
reflexive past (Joffe, 1996:213).
The potential for resistance to the effects of splitting has obvious social and political 
consequences. This thesis aims to contribute to that ‘reflexivity’ which enables people to 
reintegrate their defences against the threat of being dehumanised. The possibility of 
transformation of these representations and discourses on the nature of animals, both 
human and nonhuman, will be addressed in the concluding chapter.
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Hollway’s analysis of gender-differentiated investment and positioning is pertinent to this 
concept of bestial-differentiated positioning. That is to say, the human aspect of people’s 
subjective positioning in discourse is determined by the ideological assumptions of human 
as not-animal. Humans do not include other animals in subject positions within discourses, 
however, they do use animal/bestial expressions in discourse to undermine (or seduce) the 
Other’s (in the discourse) occupancy of a particular subject position. There is an important 
difference between Hollway’s approach to gendered investment and my application of the 
theory to human relations with nonhuman animals. As far as we know, humans are the 
only animals to engage in unconscious intersubjectivity. That is to say, only human 
animals construct the Other as a means of defending against anxiety. Nonhuman animals 
do not project, introject and projectively identify in the ways that humans do.
A significant part of this asymmetry is that there is a clear difference between humans and 
all other animals in their ability to construct the symbolic. This has several effects. First, 
the unconscious intersubjectivity at work between women and men, as identified in 
Hollway’s (1989) analysis, is retained in my application. I am not suggesting that 
nonhuman animals participate in the construction of ‘human’ versus ‘animal’ identities in 
an active way. Humans use their anthropocentric knowledge of other animals as a resource 
for the splitting of the ‘animal’ into the ‘good’, pets, and the ‘bad’, beasts. Second, as far 
as my theoretical framework is concerned, the psychodynamic construction of ‘animal’ 
may refer to humans and/or nonhuman animals. If it refers to humans, then those humans 
may contribute, through unconscious intersubjectivity, to the construction of human 
identity as not-animal. However, if it refers to nonhuman animals, those animals, because 
of their relative lack of symbolic construction, will not participate themselves as subjects. 
Their status as objects is the symbolic resource for human splitting. Third, because 
nonhuman animals do not have human language, the potential for them to empower 
themselves is very different to that of humans. Within the gender approach to 
intersubjective investment, humans have access to a voice through which to counter the 
effects of splitting. For nonhuman animals, it is inevitable that humans must provide that
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voice for resistence and change. The significance and associated difficulties of humans 
having to be the linguistic representatives of non-human animals will be addressed in the 
final chapter.
Leach (1964) provides the means by which to introduce the place of nonhuman animals in 
Hollway’s concept of investment. Leach’s analysis of nonhuman animal categories and 
verbal abuse is based on the binary opposition of human:animal. Leach articulates the 
Derridean interdependence of binary oppositions with ‘taboo’. Taboo, as established in 
Chapter 2, signifies the anomalies in life, the ambiguities which defy binary categorisation. 
The Darwinian concept of the human animal means that human relations to other animals 
require taboo significations. The legacies of Christian and Cartesian dualism make this a 
prerequisite. The construction of the human self is based on the perception of social 
distance from categories of nonhuman animals. The use of these animals as food or pets 
or referents will establish the meaning of the animal in relation to humans. Therefore, the 
construction of human subjectivity will be significantly dependent on the nonhuman animal 
content of the discourses which constitute subjectivity. Human constructions of nonhuman 
animal identity are part of the play of expressed and suppressed significations through 
which psychodynamic investments in discourses affirm human’s sense of ‘humanity’.
In Homey’s (1946) concept, our desire to know the Other and our equally strong repulsion 
of the Other can only be resolved through the construction of an ‘ideal self which resolves 
this conflict through fantasy. The nature of that self is dependent on a number of 
ideological elements and available discourses. Although Homey’s conceptualisation of the 
self is pre-Lacan and pre-Foucault, here it is still useful to extend Homey’s resolution of 
this neurotic conflict to the conscious establishment of that ideal, namely the institution of 
animal welfare. In this sanitised arena, the ‘beast’ is tamed, even in need of our help and 
protection, and we too are absolved of our sins of exploitation through this liberal 
humanitarian act of care. It is my intention to integrate those fields of discourse and 
psyche in order to explicate those human constructions of ‘animal’, designed to resolve
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inner conflicts and practised to maintain ideological structures of domination and 
subordination.
4.4 Animal Metaphors and Metonymies
Lacan (1977), divided the signifier into its rhetorical components: metaphor and 
metonymy. For Lacan, these dispositions form the sub-text of the mind - the unconscious. 
Consequently, the mind can be described in terms of the intersections between one 
signifying order and another. Metaphor and metonymy are forms of bonding in the 
signifying chain. Their structure contrasts implicitly with that of the signified:
Lacan incorporates this theory [condensation and displacement] by using the 
idea of the signifier ‘falling to the level of the signified’, which in effect is 
synonymous with the suppression, or repression, of the signified (Hollway, 
1989:52).
Condensation and Displacement
Lacan linked the psychoanalytic concept of condensation with the linguistic device, 
metaphor - whereby many meanings are contained in one image. Likewise, he associated 
displacement with metonymy - whereby a single aspect of an idea is extracted and 
repositioned:
The mechanisms described by Freud as those of the primary process in 
which the unconscious assumes its rule, correspond exactly to the functions 
that this school believes determine the most radical effects of language, 
namely metaphor and metonymy, in other words, the signifiers effects of 
substitution and combination on the respectively synchronic and diachronic 
dimensions in which they appear in discourse (Lacan, 1977:27).
Lemaire (1977) describes the Lacanian division between metaphor and metonymy as:
The diachrony of discourse owes this relative autonomy from the global 
signification to two major stylistic effects: metaphor and metonymy. These 
two stylistic figures authorise substitutions of signifiers which make the
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meaning appear to ‘float’ somewhere without being literally contained in 
any one element of the sentence. Metaphor and metonymy follow precise 
and distinct linguistic laws: similarity of meaning between a signifier and 
its substitute in metaphor and displacement of meaning in metonymy 
(1977:4).
A recontextualised Lacanian perspective provides the links between discourse and 
subjectivity. Hollway describes this relation as:
On the metonymic axis, signification may reproduce language or discourse 
which is normal for the (sub)culture...But on the metaphoric axis, 
signification is unique to each person, because at every point in their 
history, meanings have been invested by desire. Desire does not follow 
generalizable routes, and its logic is not that of the rational subject, because 
unconscious processes work through displacement and condensation. 
(Hollway, 1989:84).
Metaphors are conceptual systems which define everyday reality (Lakoff and Johnson, 
1980). Consequently, thought and behaviour are tied to metaphor. Communication is 
based on the same conceptual system used in thinking and action, and language itself is 
evidence of this system. Nonhuman animal metaphors are a form of ontological metaphor, 
they provide a way of viewing emotions, activities and ideas. Nonhuman animal 
metaphors are used to comprehend a range of human motivations, characteristics and 
actions. Furthermore, the metaphor constructs a way of thinking about the nonhuman 
animal which may be used to justify certain behaviour towards the animal.
Anthropomorphism and Zoomorphism
Nonhuman animal metaphors and metonymies express more than anthropocentrism. As 
Thomas (1983:41) comments:
It was as a comment on human nature that the concept of ‘animality’ was 
devised.
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By which is meant that sentiments about nonhuman animals are usually projections which 
manifest in the use of metaphors and metonymies. Metaphors complete and conceal the 
process of distinction and opposition:
...in each constructed world of nature, the contrast between man and 
not-man provides an analogy for the contrast between the member of the 
human community and the outsider. (Douglas, 1975:289)
Nonhuman animal metaphors are anthropomorphic because they enable human motives to 
be attributed to nonhuman animals (Baker, 1993). In such metaphorical and metonymic 
discourses nonhuman animals are signified as moral agents. In mythology, nonhuman 
animals are either idealised as models for human morality or constructed as ‘other’, the 
‘beast’, the model of immorality. They may also be used to bridge the gap between the 
sentient and the naturalised world, through mythology, whereby they have both human and 
animal characteristics, such as the minotaur. Either way such representations are 
demeaning and objectifying. Such binary oppositions are rife in the construction of 
animality.
The term ‘animal’ is connotative of immoral behaviour, often in terms of violence and 
sexuality (Baker, 1993). Such contemptuous attitudes to nonhuman animals through 
metaphor serve to define human identity. It is part of the hegemonic discourse based on 
cultural assumptions about the object-status of nonhuman animals. The use of metaphor 
constructs the notion of nonhuman animals as strange and different.
Zoomorphism, the projection or attribution of ‘animal’ characteristics to non-animals 
(including humans), involves either theriomorphism or therianthropism. The 
theriomorphic image is one in which someone or something is displayed with the form of 
a ‘beast’, whereas the therianthropic image is one that combines the forms of ‘man’ and 
‘beast’ Baker (1993:108) explains these terms as:
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A theriomorphic image would be one in which someone or something (in 
the words of the OED definition) was presented as ‘having the form of a 
beast’. Therianthropic images, in contrast, would be those ‘combining the 
form of a beast with that of a man’.
Theriomorphism and therianthropism are forms of zoomorphism. Baker (1993:108) makes 
the following connections between these terms and metonymy and metaphor:
Where animal imagery is used to make statements about human identity, 
metonymic representations of selfhood will typically take theriomorphic 
form, whereas metaphoric representations of otherness will typically take 
therianthropic form. In other words we tend to represent ourselves as 
wholly animal, but our others as only half-animal.
Metonymic representation in theriomorphic form usually refers to human identity, whereas 
metaphoric representation in therianthropic form typically refers to ‘otherness’. 
Therianthropism is more anomalous and, therefore, disturbing, than theriomorphism. 
Consequently, therianthropism is usually incorporated to represent others. Douglas’s 
(1969) analysis of pollution and taboo is relevant here:
The idea of holiness was given an external physical expression in the 
wholeness of the body seen as the perfect container...holiness is exemplified 
by completeness. Holiness requires that individuals shall conform to the 
class to which they belong. And holiness requires that different classes of 
things shall not be confused. (Douglas, 1969:51-52)
Prejudice against nonhuman animals renders them as ‘other’. Those who are associated, 
through metaphor, with nonhuman animals are, therefore, also rendered ‘other’.
Discussion
This section is an annotation of the conceptual model of dehumanisation (see Figure 4.1). 
The model is a conceptual construct - a way of looking at, describing and analysing an 
overall system of meaning, a process through which some meanings are denigrated through
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dehumanisation. The central tenet of the model is the Derridean hierarchical dualistic 
opposition animal:human. Surrounding these constructs are a series of social psychological 
processes. These processes are inherently dynamic, subject to change across contexts and 
over time. However, there is a fundamental systematic process of dehumanisation which 
characterises these processes, therefore, this ‘freezeframe’ representation of a complex 
social phenomenon serves some function in conveying the relational and interactive nature 
of dehumanisation.
The ‘Other’ here, constructed as ‘animal’, is not the nonhuman animal but the human 
animal capable of engaging in unconscious intersubjective processes. The diagram 
illustrates the content of the primary split - human versus animal - and the processes which 
construct that split: projection into the external object, the Other, and introjection to the 
Self. Dehumanisation occurs because of the desire to protect the Self from the threat of 
being objectified as an animal (dehumanised). The ‘other’ human is constructed as 
animalistic, either positively or negatively, in order to protect the human elements either 
within the Self or outside in the Other. These processes require the primary ontological 
divide between humans and nonhuman animals. What is to be protected as ‘good’ is either 
the ‘human’ (in opposition to the animal) within the Self resulting with the ‘animal’ being 
projected into the Other (human); or what is to be expelled as ‘bad’ relies on the further 
split of ‘animal’ into pet (‘good’) or beast (‘bad’). Humans can be either symbolically 
sentimentalised as ‘pets’ or dehumanised as ‘beasts’. However, not only are nonhuman 
animals symbolically constructed as ‘good’ pets or ‘bad’ beasts, they are physically 
(literally) constructed as pets or beasts. Nonhuman animals do not project and introject in 
order to protect their sense of Self, through the psychodynamic construction of the Other, 
but they do suffer the consequences of this peculiarly human activity.
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Figure 4.1: The Psychodynamics of Dehumanisation: A Conceptual Model
HegeinonicDiscourse
(Psychodynamically Structured)
human - 'Self',TABOO
Unconscious Mind
(Linguistically Structured)
To the extent that dehumanisation is naturalised, the social meanings produced in relation 
to ‘human’ or ‘animal’ identities are value-laden. W hat is said to be natural, and what is 
invariably conflated to be what is morally right, is established through the ‘dominance 
of...immediate presence’ (Derrida, 1978:130). Discourse is fundamentally connected to 
both ideological effects of animal-human relations, and the ideology associated with 
presence itself. Ideology here functions as the coerciveness of meaning (Parker, 1989). 
The extent to which alternative discourses are muted or marginalised is an expression of 
the power of hegemonic discourse. Indeed, ideology, and the conflict which arises from 
competing discourses, is the result of the relation between established power and places of 
resistance in discourse and texts. Ideology is not an object but an effect (Parker, 1989). 
Consequently, in this system of dehumanisation, the overarching form o f hegemonic
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discourses produces ideologies related to animality, humanity and the bestial. Discourses 
provide the content for the psychodynamic construction of the ‘beast’ or ‘pet’ (see Figure 
4.1). This reproduction, through texts and subject positions in discourses, is a continual 
legitimisation of the effect - the power of discourse through investment.
Between the ideological effects of the dominant speciesist discourses and the unconscious 
strategies of splitting are a series of symbolic representations relating to specific concepts 
of nonhuman animal identity. In a wide range of discriminatory practices, these animals 
are exploited for human gain. The representations of these various forms of exploitation 
depend on the perceived degree of necessity and hierarchy amongst species. The 
commonsense beliefs about the role of nonhuman animals in human life are held in the 
discourses of those specific animal-human interactions. These representations are a 
reflection of the Leachian system of social distance which construct the self. Examining 
the content of these discourses against a psychodynamic background will constitute an 
exploration of prejudice and violence in relation to the psychodynamic construction of the 
‘human’ versus ‘animal’
The apparently strange behaviour of nonhuman animals can only be understood in human 
terms. We compare ‘animal’ and ‘human’ behaviour and interpret the similarities and 
differences in line with speciesist discourse. From this set of inferences we reproduce 
anthropocentrism. Perceived similarity is used, differentially, to maintain the hierarchy 
between human and nonhuman animals. Essentially, we categorise other animals in 
relation to humans as a pre-existing given. As humanity is the measure of all things, 
similarity to, or difference from, can be used as measures of deviancy or abnormality. 
When people do not conform to the established parameters of normal human behaviour, 
they are systematically dehumanised, in relation to the objectified status of nonhuman 
animals. ‘Beast’ is such a psychodynamically constructed category that serves as a 
reference point. Its religious overtones ensure its mythological status. In a fundamental 
way, our understanding of other animals is severely limited by our understanding of
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ourselves - rarely does the animal exist as a socially understandable reality, s/he is too 
often subsumed under the status of the mythological beast.
Individual unconscious minds complete the process. Following Lacan, the unconscious 
may be considered as constructed linguistically. The linguistic substitution devices of 
metaphor and metonymy are informed by therianthropic and theriomorphic images. 
Meaning is arbitrary and, therefore, symbolic. It is the symbolic associations at the 
unconscious level which play a role in the personal investments people make in different 
discourses. Following Hollway (1989), people position themselves in discourses in order 
to reproduce their subjectivity which affirms their gender and sexuality, or, in this case, 
reproduces their species stereotypical characteristics. Leach’s (1964) concept of taboo 
constructs the boundaries between what is ‘human’ and what is ‘animal’ (see Figure 4.1). 
Taboo signifies the areas of anxiety within the social environment, and, as has been seen, 
the area of animal-human relations is ridden with anxiety and, therefore, taboo. Taboo 
separates the categories of ‘human’ from ‘animal’. It is a resource of ambiguity and 
anomaly which threatens the ontological status of humans as not-animal and, as such, it is 
inhibited in order to maintain the integrity of the boundaries which distinguish humans 
from animalistic humans and nonhuman animals.
These parts of the process of dehumanisation are interactive, dynamic and, therefore, 
subject to change. The discursive and psychic investments continually interrupt each other. 
At each point meaning is contested but the dominance of speciesist ideologies ensure the 
relative stability of these processes and the contents of the investments. It is only through 
deconstructing the process into its complementary and opposing parts that dehumanisation 
is revealed as a process of naturalised psychodynamic construction and signification. This 
model (Figure 4.1), and its theoretical bases, are used in this thesis to identify and explore 
the content of representations, to identify discourses and their effects in terms of ideology.
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This thesis aims to explore the representations and discourses which characterise animal- 
human relations and, consequently, define ‘human’ versus nonhuman ‘animal’ identities. 
It starts from the position that meaning is produced, and power simultaneously reproduced, 
through subject positioning in discourses. The ideologies which emerge from these 
discursive subjective investments are the result of the naturalisation of conflict, the denial 
of fragmentation and the dominance of the rational and the objective. The study of the 
language content of ‘animal’ discourses which are legitimised through speciesist rhetoric, 
aims to illuminate the dominant ideologies which emerge from hegemonic discourses. 
Myths are the social and historical mechanisms through which ideologies are transferred. 
These myths are concealed, and naturalised, through commonsense beliefs which are 
circulated in representations and discourses. The human unconscious mediates the effects 
of hegemonic discourse and the reproduction of ideology. Analysing the discourses which 
construct representations of nonhuman animals will give rise to the underlying 
inconsistencies which are suppressed through appeals to consensus. The analysis of those 
discourses will help to demythologise the ‘beast’ to reveal the psychodynamic construction 
of humans and other animals. This thesis aims to contribute to that demythologisation, the 
deconstruction of the ‘beast’ in order to reveal ideological violence as a naturalised system 
of dehumanisation which oppresses all animals.
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PART TWO: DECONSTRUCTING THE BEAST
In Part Two, Deconstructing the Beast, I explore the contradictions in real transactions with 
nonhuman animals and their transformation into family (pets), food (meat) and fantasy 
(‘beasts’). Beginning with an account of the methods employed in the empirical design, I 
examine the relation between the theoretical perspective presented in Part One and the methods 
utilised in Part Two. The analysis begins with a thematic discourse analysis of a series of 
semi-structured interviews with British vegetarians and meat eaters. The analysis reveals the 
form, structure and function of the participants’ representations of nonhuman animals. These 
representations constitute the main discourses: the Object discourse, the Referent discourse and 
the Utensil discourse. One of the findings from this textual analysis is the psychodynamic 
construction of the ‘beast’. Following this, I turn to a contemporary, semiological, content 
analysis of ‘beast’ metaphors in the British press. The analysis maps out the range of ‘beast’ 
definitions and meanings in relation to Human, Animal and Object domains. The findings 
support the concepts of anthropomorphism and zoomorphism. Within zoomorphism, the 
strategies of therianthropism and theriomorphism are explored and support is found for the 
relation between the Referent Discourse and the Object Discourse. This analysis of 
representations of the ‘beast’ leads to a case study of a popular myth, the werewolf. A 
contemporary novel and its derived television drama are semiotically analysed for their 
narrative continuities and discontinuities. This modem lycanthropic myth articulates key 
themes concerning human-animal relations and meanings including, issues of transformation, 
sexuality, rationality and freedom. The dialectics of Self and Other in constructing 
subjectivities which constitute domination and, therefore, prejudice are investigated throughout 
these analyses. Anthropocentrism, anthropomorphism and zoomorphism are explored as 
strategies which enable people to interpret these representations. The model of 
dehumanisation is developed throughout the analyses.
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5: SYNTHESISING THEORY AND METHODS: 
THE EMPIRICAL DESIGN
Overview
This chapter explores the synthesis of theory and method. It sets the scene for the 
empirical procedures and analyses. Beginning with a review of research methodology, 
scientific knowledge and its relation to psychological empiricism, this chapter explores the 
social constructionist perspective in relation to qualitative methods. The concepts of 
triangulation and reflexivity are established as qualitative research strategies for conceptual 
coherence and accountability. The chapter explores the psychodynamic playground 
through the integration of discourse analytical concepts and psychoanalytical strategies. 
This integration is based on defensive splitting, discursive positioning and the symbolic 
construction of the Other. Here, I describe the procedure for conducting semi-structured 
interviews with vegetarians and meat eaters. Framework analysis is utilised as a thematic 
form of discourse analysis. The media are discussed as forms of discourse in which texts 
can be analysed in order to deconstruct representations of nonhuman animals. A 
semiological content analysis is introduced as a method which goes beyond denotation and 
its role in the analysis of nonhuman animal metaphors in the media is established. The 
procedure details the range of newspapers used, the way in which the coding frame was 
constructed and provides a justification for the semiological use of content analysis. The 
structuralist analysis of semiological systems is articulated through exploring levels of 
signification and semiosis as applied to a narrative analysis. Here, I describe narrative 
analysis in relation to the novel, Wilderness, and its derived television drama. The method 
for analysing the themes and level of semiosis across these media are discussed. The 
relation between the design of the empirical studies and the questions of the thesis provides 
justification for the mix of methods employed.
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5.1 Research Methodology and Scientific Knowledge
This section begins with a review of the development of psychological inquiry. It explores 
the philosophy of knowledge from experimental positivism, through the social construction 
of psychological knowledge, to the experimental alternatives. It reviews the criticisms of 
experimentalism and surveys the calls for a more qualitative research paradigm. 
Qualitative research is evaluated with reference to the issues of triangulation and 
reflexivity.
Psychological Empiricism
Experimentation in psychology has long been criticised for its artificiality. Harre and 
Secord (1972) are key protagonists in the debate on scientific method. They argue that the 
experimental set-up is manipulative and restrictive. Researchers are apt to construct 
knowledge rather than to merely observe it. Furthermore, empirical concepts are often 
impoverished in terms of their ability to appreciate the complexity of social situations. The 
critique of experimentation extends to the analogy between human characteristics and the 
variables or parameters of physical science. This analogy often leads to the exposition of 
the superficial nature of experimental results. Furthermore, the psychological laboratory 
has confounding difficulties of forced compliance and the experimenter effects of both 
verbal and nonverbal interaction. The formal character of experiments affects the results 
through the limitation of information and the inhibition of natural forms of response. 
Consequently, there is disparity between the concepts under investigation and the natural 
situations. The problems associated with generalising from the laboratory to real life are 
associated with the mechanical paradigms involved. Nevertheless, these logical and 
strategic limitations continue to be the accepted method of psychology.
The proposition that psychological experiments are social events in themselves has been 
held for decades. Both Ome’s (1965) concept of demand characteristics and Rosenthal’s 
(1966) notion of experimenter bias have informed the modern-day critique of the 
experimental method. Harre and Secord (1972) proposed the ethnogenic approach which
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centred on an anthropomorphic theory of humans in which the participants should be 
viewed as following rules and conventions as social actors. They suggested that social 
behaviour should be explained through the collection and analysis of participant’s accounts, 
which would construct a conceptual system for analysis of the participant as an agent acting 
according to rules.
However, experimental psychology has not been the only methodological form to 
misconceptualise the role of inter-subjective relations and the complex nature of human 
thought and behaviour. This tradition seeped into a methodological framework designed 
to access people’s belief systems. It assumes that questions are understood in a consistent 
way and the rating process is a reflection of an underlying attitude. The assumption is that 
rating scales can access internal psychological variables, called attitudes, that a person 
holds about a particular object. They were designed to test hypotheses which were 
believed to be objective reflections of research questions. ‘Independent’ and ‘dependent’ 
variables were isolated and measured, whilst ‘confounding’ variables such as researcher 
‘bias’ were to be minimised, preferably eliminated, through the concepts of reliability and 
validity. A key part of the quantitative paradigm was statistical sampling and the 
generalisability of results. This statistical generalisability is analytically deductive and aims 
to lead towards causal inference. Quantitative research is often said to fall within logical 
positivism. Positivism consists of:
Methods that take the external world as extant and reproducible through
scientific or logical means. (Manning and Cullum-Swan, 1994:463).
However, logical positivism had long been rejected as a research method (Meehl, 1986). 
As Shadish (1995) has commented, positivism these days is more likely to be used as a 
rhetorical device to widen the perceived epistemological gap between quantitative and 
qualitative methodologies. The differences between these methodologies have been 
exaggerated whilst the similarities underplayed (Hedges, 1987).
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Qualitative methods, including interviews, ethnography and semiotics, are motivated by 
research questions aimed at exploring human experience, therefore requiring verbal or 
textual, interaction and interpretation. Here, hypotheses tend to emerge from the data. 
Sampling, in contrast to statistical sampling, is purposive or theoretical, aimed at 
maximising or minimising differences. In qualitative research, the researcher herself is an 
instrument for data collection. The data are analysed for theoretical transferability and the 
analytical approach is inductive, rather than deductive. Data are selected to fit the research 
questions; however, the theoretical assumptions which guide the formulation of the 
research questions are continually assessed through the dynamic relation between the 
researcher and the data. The methodological qualitative paradigm is influenced by the 
theoretical social constructionist paradigm.
Social Construction and Psychological Knowledge
Social constructionism is rooted in the sociology of knowledge (Berger and Luckmann,
1966). Shadish’s (1995a) analysis of social constructionism is relevant to my concerns 
here. He defines constructionists as ‘monists’ and ‘dualists’. Dualist constructionists 
distinguish between actual states and representations of those states. Consequently, dualist 
constructionists separate the objective features of a phenomenon with an individual’s 
representation of those features. Conversely, monist constructionists claim there are no 
objective features, that all reality is representational and, therefore, relative. Shadish 
argues that whilst monism is feasible in theory it is impossible in the practice of theory, 
methodology. In accordance with this, Pollner (1993:203-4) claims that monist 
constructionists:
Bring analysts’ as well as members’ practices under the purview of the 
constructionist mandate. Constructionism is no longer confined to the 
specification of the topic of constructionist studies. It is understood to 
characterise the studies and their methods as well.
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However, Shadish maintains that monists invariably conduct dualist research based on the 
normative constraints on language. Linguistic constructions are the crux of social 
constructionist research. However, those monists who claim there is no reality against 
which to evaluate representations, paradoxically, use their empirical findings based on 
dualist assumptions to support their relativist ideas. To engage in scientific research is to 
gather, empirically, knowledge about the object of inquiry. The motivation for research 
must be a lack of understanding of a given issue, if everything is clarified, why do the 
research in the first place? Therefore, the criteria for assessing research, whether it is 
‘good’ research or fiction, will be implicit to research protocols. Research is conducted 
because it can be evaluated and because if it is positively evaluated it will have contributed 
to the existing body of knowledge. The rules and regulations on gaining a PhD are 
testament to this.
To proclaim that there is no reality, no way of assessing or judging knowledge, that 
representation is everything, is to make a dubious claim. Between the contradictions of 
monists and the hegemony of realists is a level playing field, succinctly described by 
Brown (1977:93) as:
The dichotomy between the view of perception as the passive observation 
of objects which are whatever they appear to be and perception as the 
creation of perceptual objects out of nothing is by no means exhaustive. A 
third possibility is that we shape our percepts out of an already structured 
but still malleable material. This perceptual material, whatever it may be, 
will serve to limit the class of possible constructs without dictating a unique 
percept.
The objects of my study are the representations and discourses on the nature of animals. 
I use the word ‘nature’ advisedly and with some sense of irony and, of course, I include 
humans as animals. But at the heart of my motivations for studying these phenomena is 
the conviction that there is a knowable reality. Here, I am as sure that humans are animals 
as I am sure that women are human, and the parallels of these facts have informed and
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motivated numerous feminist analyses into the subjugation of women. My deconstruction 
of these representations and discourses only makes sense in relation to my motivations. 
Evaluation is inherent to this research process. I evaluated the state of psychological 
knowledge about ‘animals’ and decided it was incomplete, hence this research. Whilst 
enjoying the insights of social constructionism, I am not blinded by its dogmatic refusal 
to engage with reality. Indeed, it is the pain (emotional and physical) resulting from 
ideological and institutionalised violence which propels me to do this research. Birke’s 
analysis of the limitations of postmodern thinking are relevant here:
But postmodernist thinking seems to me to fail adequately to address issues 
of pain and suffering, of human cruelties towards animals (or those of men 
towards women). If the world is collapsed into a set of narratives, what 
happens to the lived experiences of non-humans? (Birke, 1994:145).
Social constructionism is a set of general assumptions about the nature of social 
psychological theory and reality. The crux of these assumptions is that psychological 
reality is socially constructed. These approaches are:
...those which argue that our representations of the self and mental 
processes are wholly culturally produced rather than reflecting underlying 
universal truths about human beings...(Parker, 1994:451).
The implied dichotomy between ‘universal truth’ and ‘cultural representations’ 
oversimplifies the status of humans as complex social animals. This definition implicitly 
denies the fact that humans are animals. This thesis is not about universal truths, indeed, 
it is about the historically, culturally and unconsciously constituted discourses on 
nonhuman animals. However, the motivation for this research is embedded in a universal 
truth - that humans are animals. Of course, social life is shaped by social processes which 
are ultimately sociocultural products (Gergen, 1985). Consequently, cultural structures 
will determine behaviour whilst the rules, or conventions, are continually being negotiated 
and renegotiated by the participants.
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Qualitative Research
The type of qualitative methods utilised in this research falls under the rubric of 
‘naturalistic’ or ‘interpretative’ approaches. As has already been mentioned, it is grounded 
in a constructivist epistemology that seeks to describe social phenomena. It is a generative 
process which grows through the analysis of representations of reality. This research does 
not aim at the truth itself, but rather at why some truths prevail and others do not. The 
existence of reality is not contested, however, the ways in which reality is represented are 
to be explored. Concepts emerge from the critical exposure of contradictions and 
fragmentations found in the structure of subjectivities. The thesis focuses on social texts 
and ideological discourse in order to reveal dimensions of those constructions of reality, 
and to determine why and how some constructions are privileged to the detriment of 
others. As previously mentioned, qualitative analysis requires verbal data. Documents 
(transcripts, articles, scripts) are cultural products. Through analysis, these documents are 
converted into ‘texts’ to be read and interpreted. These texts constitute the data, 
representations that are themselves to be deconstructed and re-represented. Deconstruction 
of the texts explores the relation between the texts as social constructs and the meanings 
which they reflect and affect. In this Derridean (1967) sense, the texts are not so much 
objects as they are interplays of multiple significations. Deconstruction is part of 
constructionism (Culler, 1982). Deconstruction of these significations illuminates the 
means by which their meanings are conveyed. Here, deconstruction operates through 
reference to the model of dehumanisation. This framework does not determine the 
research process, rather, in this qualitative paradigm, the exploration of the data will 
contribute to the theory. Consequently, the contexts of this theory building, rather than 
hypothesis testing, are fully examined in order to justify the relationship between the theory 
and the analysis.
More specifically, this research enters the tradition of grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss,
1967) both in the research process and the analysis of textual data. Grounded theory is 
theory that is generated through the analysis of data. The systematic open-ended
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classification of the data gives rise to concepts which propel the analysis. The multilayered 
process of abstraction of data may simultaneously explore old concepts and generate new 
ones. Glaser and Strauss have stressed the importance of the fit of the index classification 
and description to the data. The analysis proceeds from low-level descriptions to in-depth 
exploration which, at every level, are referenced by other categories from the analysis. 
This allows a continual comparative analysis which ensures a conceptually rich theoretical 
account of the data. Henwood and Pidgeon (1992) have countered criticisms of ‘inductivist 
positivism’ (Stanley and Wise, 1983:152) by proposing a ‘constant interplay between data 
and conceptualisation’ (Henwood and Pidgeon, 1992:104). They suggest that the initial 
ambiguity between data and theory should be accepted and explored when constructing a 
category system in order to prevent premature closure of the theory. Moreover, they insist 
that, through analysis, data are ordered so that the conceptual framework becomes 
continually more focused. The result, they maintain, is a ‘rich, deep and well-integrated 
conceptual system, organised at various levels of theoretical abstraction all of which in 
some way articulate the data’ (Henwood and Pidgeon, 1992:104).
Evaluating Qualitative Research
One of the main causes of concern in qualitative research is the notion of evaluation. How 
is it that we can determine what kind of naturalistic or interpretative study is worthwhile, 
intellectually rigorous and, in some sense, meaningful? The traditional method of 
evaluation is derived from the quantitative paradigm and centres on the concepts of 
reliability and validity. These concepts serve as a justification for the analytical approach, 
a rule of thumb for measures of objectivity, scientific detachment and analysis. The 
quantitative paradigm makes appeals to internal and external validity and under the 
auspices of strict empiricism, makes claims on error and truth. These are the implicit 
indicators of quantitative quality. Quantitative methods assumes that the measurement of 
people’s ‘attitudes’ is indicative of a direct relation between the subject and the stimuli 
under investigation. This hypothesis testing model is inappropriate to the post-structuralist 
theory of subjectivity, the psychodynamic construction of identity and the production and
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negotiation of meaning through difference. These issues can only be explored through 
qualitative methods which address the relations between the unconscious and the conscious, 
the individual and the social, and the relation between power and knowledge.
As Henwood and Pidgeon (1992) have stated, the benefits gained through qualitative 
design and procedure may be undermined by the limitations of quantitative approaches to 
methodology (Marshall, 1985). Henwood and Pidgeon (1992) suggest a number of 
practices to ensure the generation of good, relevant theory. These include the importance 
of the fit of the data to the theory; the integration of theory at diverse levels of abstraction; 
reflexivity; documentation and theoretical sampling. Indeed, qualitative researchers have 
defined their own indicators of quality rather than merely borrow those of a fundamentally 
different paradigm:
Terms such as credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability 
replace the usual positivist criteria of internal and external validity, 
reliability and objectivity. (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994:14)
These terms are derived from Lincoln and Guba’s (1985) criteria for qualitative evaluation. 
Credibility refers to the accuracy with which the object of study is identified and described. 
Transferability is about the theoretical parameters of the research and the extent to which 
the data collection and analyses are guided by concepts and models. Triangulation fits here 
as a means of elaborating research. Dependability accounts for the dynamic nature of the 
social world, the notion that as conditions change so too will the object under study. 
Confirmability refers to whether the findings could be confirmed by another researcher, 
whether the data confirm the findings independent of the original researcher. This is not 
meant to imply that qualitative research is replicable because, by its very nature, it is not. 
However, these data quality controls mean that the research process can be inspected for 
and assessed as to the legitimacy of its claims (Marshall and Rossman, 1995).
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Instead of accounting for, and then excluding experimenter bias, it is essential to make 
visible, not only what is theoretically invisible but, also, what is rendered methodologically 
invisible. It is important to make explicit the assumptions of quantitative analysis and 
evaluation. Where ‘bias’ has been considered a confounding variable in quantitative 
research, the redefined concept of ‘subjectivity’ is the key issue involved in qualitative 
research. An account of subjectivity is a key concern in the qualitative strategy of 
‘reflexivity’ to be discussed after triangulation.
Triangulation
The concept of triangulation has become central to qualitative research methods as a 
strategy for gaining insight to complex social phenomena. This method of collecting data 
reflects the dynamic nature of the phenomena under study and the depth and range of 
potential analytical interpretations of the data. Triangulation has developed from a multiple 
reference system for testing research hypotheses based on validation to a method of 
building interpretations (Flick, 1992). Fielding and Fielding (1986) claimed that 
triangulation could add range and depth but not accuracy because of the theoretical 
differences between methods. Triangulation became an alternative to validation rather than 
a strategy for it. It increases the breadth and depth of analysis through increasing 
analytical perspectives. There are many forms of triangulation available to the researcher 
as strategies for theory construction and I have utilised some of them in this research. 
These include:
Theoretical Triangulation: I have integrated well established theories from psychoanalysis, 
discourse analysis, structural linguistics, structural anthropology and mythology to produce 
a rich hybrid theory to guide the empirical research. The conceptual model of 
dehumanisation draws on a range of disciplinary, as well as theoretical, perspectives.
Data Triangulation: I have collected data from a range of sources reflecting different 
domains relevant to the research questions. These sources include interviews with
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vegetarians and non vegetarians; ‘beast’ metaphors gleaned from a wide range of tabloid 
and broadsheets; and two different media representations of a ‘beast’ myth, a book of 
fiction and the television adaptation of the story into a three part drama series.
Analytical Triangulation: To reflect the range of theoretical perspectives involved in my 
interpretation of the data, I have employed three different, yet complementary, analytical 
methods - framework discourse analysis, contemporary content analysis and semiotic 
narrative analysis. The aim of all these analyses has been to define the concepts, map the 
range and nature of the phenomena and find patterns of association and disassociation. The 
type of analysis is chosen to reflect the methodological perspective and data collection 
particular to each study.
Levels of Triangulation: Through exploring representations and discourses about ‘animals’ 
and ‘beasts’, I have engaged with different levels of knowledge production. Drawing on 
a historical, cultural and psychodynamic levels of analysis and interpretation has given me 
a rich picture of the phenomena in question. The empirical design is presented in the 
following table:
Table 5.1: The Empirical Design
PERSPECTIVE TYPE QUANTITY ANALYSIS OBJECTIVES
STUDY 1 Individuals Interviews 20
Framework
Analysis
To explore 
representations of 
animals and identify 
key discourses
STUDY 2 Media
Newspaper
Articles 950
Content
Analysis
To examine the use 
of'beast' metaphors 
and identify 
anthropomorphism 
and zoomorphism
STUDY 3 Media
Fiction:Book/TV
Drama 1
Semiotic
Analysis
To explore the 
'beast' through the 
lycanthropic myth 
and level of semiosis 
across media
-129-
5: Synthesising Theory and Methods: The Empirical Design
Reflexivity
Reflexivity is a key concept is qualitative research as it is an attempt to make the 
researcher’s subjective interests in the research transparent and, therefore, accountable. 
Reflexivity is the continual, complex interaction between the researcher and the data. 
Usually this interaction is absent from research reports and, therefore, assumed to be 
unimportant. However, this relationship produces the final text and its effects on the 
presentation, linearity and conclusions of the text are undeniable. Given that ideological 
discourse is under question, there is no escaping that any researcher researching 
phenomena from within the given culture will also have had their subjectivity constituted 
within that culture and by those ideological discourses under question. With reference to 
this, Banister et al (1994:13) have suggested:
Subjectivity is a resource, not a problem, for a theoretically and 
pragmatically sufficient explanation. When researchers, whether 
quantitative or qualitative, believe that they are being most objective by 
keeping a distance between themselves and their objects of study, they are 
actually producing a subjective account, for a position of distance is still a 
position and it is all the more powerful if it refuses to acknowledge itself to 
be such.
Refusal to acknowledge the researcher’s subjective position towards the data is one of the 
main criticisms of quantitative methods in relation to social phenomena. Here, I shall 
attempt to clarify my position, in relation to the research questions, which I have 
constructed through an overview of the empirical procedures.
My aim in relation to these methods has been to design the empirical work to reflect my 
theoretical perspective in order to produce a corpus of data which would illustrate, 
illuminate and develop my conceptual model of dehumanisation. My concern here has not 
been to test hypotheses but rather to explore the construction of knowledge from a 
psychodynamic perspective. It is not compatible with my theoretical perspective to prove 
the model or to try and establish it as a concrete referent, rather its purpose and its use is
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as a guide, to provide some theorised direction for my analysis of the texts. In this way, 
the theoretical perspective presented in Part One is a clear account of my subjective 
positioning in relation to the data I have collected and interpreted. It has not been my 
intent to escape discourse but rather the opposite, to address the hegemony and 
naturalisation of certain discourses and present, in comparison, the marginalisation of 
alternative discourses. This thesis is, after all, another representation, legitimised through 
academia and intellectual resources, however I am consciously positioning this research 
within the realms of the opposing, resistant discourse, still ideological, still imbued with 
inescapable power relations, but constructed, negotiated and reproduced here as a site of 
resistance to violence against nonhuman animals and humans who are psychodynamically 
constructed as animalistic. The possibility of resistance is perhaps the only alternative to 
the pessimism of deconstruction, and the empirical work presented here is constructed with 
such resistance in mind.
The three empirical studies designed to elicit ‘animal’ representations and discourses are 
described in the remainder of the chapter. Beginning with the psychodynamic analytical 
framework, I discuss the methodological issues of my discourse analysis, content analysis 
and semiotic analysis. After each of these discussions, I explain the procedures and 
analyses.
5.2 Discourse and Psycho Analysis: The Psychodynamic Playground
The kind of theoretical assumptions that Potter and Wetherell make have been criticised 
for discourse determinism (Hollway, 1989). The way forward, Hollway argues, and I 
expand in this research, is to integrate discourse and psychoanalysis to account for 
subjectivity and resistance. Hollway’s gender analysis is part of this structure as 
representations of masculinity and femininity differentially correspond to the ‘humanity’ 
and the ‘animality’. Androcentrism is a key element which sustains and legitimises 
anthropocentrism.
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Bestial discourse is that text and talk which centres on the psychodynamic construction of 
‘animal’ versus ‘human’. It relies on material circumstance and metaphorical projection 
to create a consistent world of animal-human relations. Exploring the model of 
dehumanisation requires a deep analysis of the way people psychodynamically construct 
their understanding of other animals and their perception of themselves in relation to other 
animals, to legitimise their actions. The contradictions and fragmentations which maintain 
that gulf between thought and action have not been previously extended to the issue of 
animal-human relations in social psychology. Indeed, it is not my intention merely to 
extend this concept to the representations of the animal world, but rather to propose that 
this relation, when applied to social psychological areas of research into violence and 
prejudice, is fundamental to theory building and practical application. Where ‘humanity 
is the measure of all things’ as it is in the Christian and Cartesian dualisms of modem 
Britain, it is essential that the concept of animality is fully exposed.
Procedure
The aim of the interviews was to elicit representations that people had about animals. My 
reading of these texts aimed to identify the psychodynamic positioning of the participants 
in ideological discourses. There were two main points of comparison and one of these 
emerged through the process of interviewing rather than at the stage of the topic guide. 
The first of these points was the question of vegetarianism. In gaining insight to the 
hegemonic discourses which constructed representations of nonhuman animals, I thought 
it would be necessary to talk to those people who had made conscious decisions about their 
relationship to other animals. As the use of nonhuman animals for meat production is the 
dominant form of human relation to and oppression of them, I decided that it would be 
important to speak to those people who had made a decision to stop eating meat. As eating 
meat is the dominant relation that humans have with other animals, it would appear that 
meat eating is a major representation of particular nonhuman animals. The reasons why 
people stopped eating meat would be important to an interpretation of how alternative 
discourses emerge from hegemonic discourses. The extent to which these discourses were
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mutually exclusive was also a motivating factor. I was keen to explore how vegetarians 
constructed their meanings about other animals and how these representations would 
compare to non vegetarians. Here, the concepts of animal welfare and animal rights were 
key. I wanted to know if there was a clear delineation between these two groups of people 
reflected in their respective support of one or other of these positions.
The second point of reference, and one which emerged through the course of the 
interviews, was religion. I had decided that, as well as recruiting people who were 
vegetarian and people who ate meat, to make the analysis manageable, and for no other 
reason, I would restrict the ethnic, religious, cultural, class and region of the participants. 
These factors are important areas to explore, however, they did not fit the protocol of this 
research. Therefore, I decided to select British, atheist, agnostic or Christian participants. 
I was interested in religion, given the legacy of Christian dualism, however, the religious 
belief systems of people of not so easily categorised as whether they eat meat or not and 
so I allowed this point of comparison to emerge throughout the interviews. As it emerged 
from interviewee biographies, I talked to a range of people with atheist, agnostic and 
Christian beliefs, who were vegetarians and meat eaters. To avoid the introduction of 
other religions and to retain some cultural coherence I selected British participants only. 
Also, to avoid the effects of rural relations with nonhuman animals which are dominated 
by agriculture, I ensured that all the participants grew up and lived in urban Britain. In 
terms of culture and belief systems, I also aimed to interview a single generation of people 
and, therefore, restricted the age of the participants from 19 years to 36 years.
Much has been written about how to conduct qualitative interviews and the legacy of 
quantitative methods saturates many of these writings. The insistence on detached, 
objective questioning, guarded phrases and distancing oneself from the interviewee are 
remnants of positivist epistemology. The production of meaning is as much a relational 
process between interviewer and interviewee as anything else. Acknowledging that does 
not mean eliminating the interviewer subjectivity nor does it mean allowing undirected
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conversation which runs the risk of ignoring the research questions. Indeed, the whole 
terminology of ‘interview’ implies a questioner asking questions and seeking answers. 
Certainly questions were asked, based loosely on an interview guide which was piloted for 
clarification, however, answers were not sought. The purpose of these, perhaps 
‘dialogues’ is a more appropriate term, was to produce texts, representations held 
predominantly by the participants, which would yield, upon analysis, insight to the subject 
positioning of those individuals in the discourses available on this topic in Britain. The 
piloting of the interview guide clarified points about terminology, ordering of questions 
and the length of the dialogue.
The guide itself (see Appendix I) was based on my notion that the dominant areas of British 
contact, and therefore representations of, with nonhuman animals would be through ‘meat’, 
‘pets’ and ‘images’. Other, equally important areas of human relations to other animal 
such as experimentation, zoos and endangered species, were allowed to emerge through 
the course of the discussions. The aim, however, was to look at the accepted, common 
sense, naturalised issues and not the contested domains of human exploitation of other 
animals. There were some important issues about ordering and sensitivity to people’s 
beliefs and behaviour that require further explanation. Firstly, to create a kind of rapport, 
and to establish biographical details of the participants, the discussions began with the 
participants’ backgrounds, where they had lived, and what they did for a living. This 
usually served to put the participant at ease and reassure them that this was not an 
‘interview’ in the usual sense. All the participants were unknown to me and were recruited 
through friends of friends and advertising at LSE. The interview guide was designed to 
draw the participants into thinking about issues that are so naturalised that they are difficult 
to access. I devised a simple initial question to set the tone by asking what animal the 
participant would like to be. This part of the dialogue was not used in the analysis, 
although, suffice to say the stereotypes associated with the chosen animals reflected human 
ideals.
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Out of the three main areas of meat, pets and images to be explored, I decided that ‘pets’ 
would be a useful way of proceeding as people often have close relations to their pets 
especially when they were children and this would give further insight to their 
backgrounds. All the participants talked freely about their pets and at this stage all the 
discussions proceeded fluidly. Differences between the discussions with vegetarians and 
meat eaters emerged, somewhat obviously, as the talk turned to meat, and the juxtaposition 
of pets and meat was a difficult one for some participants. As talk of meat turned to 
animal welfare and its relation to ‘animal rights’, it emerged that the origins of life and, 
therefore, how humans related to other animals, was an important factor in the 
representations of nonhuman animals that atheists, agnostics and Christians held 
respectively. So, before discussing animal images, I introduced, or expanded on, the 
question of origins of life which became another important factor alongside the three main 
other themes. My interest in representations of ‘beasts’ and their meaning led into a 
discussion of animal imagery in general and the use of animals to represent humans. The 
discussions concluded with the participants being asked by me if they had anything to add 
or clarify.
Twenty semi-structured interviews were conducted. There were ten men and ten women. 
Five of each of these groups were vegetarian and the other five were meat eaters. Pilot 
interviews analysis resulted in the final interview guide. The participants were aged 19 to 
36 years. They had lived the majority of their lives in urban Britain. They were either 
atheist, agnostic or Christian. A standard ethics protocol (see Appendix II) was devised 
which advised participants of their rights including confidentiality and anonymity. 
Opportunities were given for participants to request a copy of the final report. Interviews 
were tape-recorded and transcribed. The average length of the interview was 60 minutes. 
Biographical details of the interviewees may be found in Appendix III. The interviews 
were analysed using a framework technique developed by the independent research body, 
Social and Community Planning Research. This thematic form of discourse analysis was 
adapted from Ritchie and Spencer (1994). The analysis avoids the linguistic behaviourism
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of traditional discourse analyses and the fracturing of ‘cut and paste’ forms of analysis. 
This method is both flexible and systematic and encourages maximum use of the data.
Framework Analysis
This analysis involved four stages of familiarisation, indexing and annotating, charting and, 
finally, mapping and interpretation (Ritchie and Spencer, 1994:178).
Familiarisation
I made notes on important themes after each interview. The interviews were transcribed 
and the transcripts read several times. I took notes as I read and reread the transcripts. 
This process of familiarisation facilitated the sorting of the data. I gained an overview of 
the material involved and, at this stage, issues began to emerge as important themes. All 
the transcripts were reviewed as I searched for key ideas and recurrent themes. Notes were 
made on these ideas.
Indexing and Annotating
Having grasped a sense of the range and depth of the data, I began the process of 
abstraction and conceptualisation. At this stage, I reviewed my research notes and 
extracted recurrent themes and issues identified by the respondents. Here, a thematic 
framework, the theme index, was constructed. The purpose of the theme index is to sift 
and sort the data. At this stage of identifying and constructing the index, I began to draw 
on a priori issues from the original research aims (introduced into the interviews via the 
topic guide), together with emergent issues and analytical themes from the recurrence of 
particular views or experiences. The theme index underwent several refinements as it was 
applied to a few transcripts. The index categories became more sensitive to emergent and 
analytical themes. The index was constructed to account for the diversity of experiences, 
beliefs and behaviours. This process of refinement involved logical and intuitive thinking. 
Subjective judgements were made about meaning, the importance of issues and the validity 
of associations between ideas. Some of the index categories were identical to original
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questions on the topic guide. Others were defined from emergent themes. The full index 
contained a total of 42 categories within 11 major subject headings.
The index is a mechanism for labelling data in manageable chunks for retrieval and 
exploration. The index was systematically applied to the data in its textual form. All the 
data were reread and annotated according to the theme index. Again, I made judgements 
on the meaning and significance of the data. Single passages often required multiple 
indexing as patterns began to emerge. This system of annotating the textual data makes 
the process of analysis visible and accessible to others. Once labelled, I was able to access 
each reference and identify patterns and the contexts in which they emerged. The theme 
index was as follows:
1. Animals as Family Members
This theme was significant because all the participants characterised their particular pets 
as ‘one of the family’. These pets, usually cats or dogs, provided reciprocal relationships 
with the participants and these relationships were characterised by the following sub-theme:
1.1 Relationships characterised by unconditional love, reciprocity, communication,
affection
1.2 Identity - individual pet personalities and characteristics
1.3 Responsibility - duty of owner towards pet, care and protection
1.4 Utility - function of pet, therapeutic, entertainment, health
2. Naturalisation o f Food Choice
With reference to the use of nonhuman animals for food, this theme emerged
predominantly to account for why people ate meat and why they did not. It included the
following disparate reasons:
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2.1 Evolution - humans as omnivores, adapted to eat meat, natural as morally right
2.2 Food Chain - natural order of carnivores, omnivores & herbivores
2.3 God Given - God gave humans animals as natural resources
2.4 Existence - if people did not eat meat, those animals they need for eating would
not exist
3. Health as a Factor in Food Choice
In justifying why the participants chose not to eat meat, to eat less meat or to eat meat, 
health was a common factor. It was used in both arguments for vegetarianism and against 
it in the following ways:
3.1 Meat Protein - necessary source of protein especially for children
3.2 Cholesterol - abstain from meat because of health risks
3.3 BSE - increased awareness of contamination
3.4 Food Scares - general awareness of lack hygiene, chemicals, artificial breeding
4. Concept o f Choice as Deciding Factor in Food Preference
Throughout the discussions on the issue of human relations to other animals and 
particularly on food choice, the participants cited ‘choice’ as a key factor which placed the 
behaviour within the untouchable realms of:
4.1 Personal - being vegetarian or not is personal choice, not legal or socially 
stigmatised
4.2 Cultural - what other countries chose to eat is culturally relative to UK and 
morally acceptable
5. Humane Behaviour
A common concept across vegetarians and meat eaters alike was the concept of being 
‘humane’, its definition is an important part in the deconstruction of human representations 
of nonhuman animals. It included the following references:
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5.1 Killing - animals should be killed humanely, therefore, no need for vegetarianism
5.2 Quick and Painless - suffering should be minimised
5.3 No Right to Life - animals are inferior to humans and have no right to life like
humans
5.4 Civilised Violence - humane killing is a sign of civilised country
6. Taboo
Food taboos were common, contradictory and informative to the way the participants 
constructed the notion of edibility and inedibility. In accordance with Leach (1964), these 
were defined as:
6.1 Pets - taboo on eating pets, emotionally associated as not-animal but family 
members
6.2 Organs - associated with waste, and digestive process, unclean
6.3 Whole Animal - reminds people that meat is a dead animal
6.4 Humans - on no account should humans be eaten, unknown reasons, group
(human) membership
7. Extreme Groups
Representations of the human Other were as salient as representations of other animals and 
the two were often intertwined. Here the Other was categorised as:
7.1 Animal Lovers - overly sentimental, obsessive, prefer animals to humans
7.2 Vegans - take things too far, marginalised by vegetarians although still aspire to 
ideals
7.3 Activists - animal rights groups perceived as terrorists, troublemakers, violent
8. Ethics
Ethical frameworks supported the participants representations of other animals and how 
they should be treated. The basic tenets of these frameworks were identified as:
8.1 Anti-Cruelty - avoid all unnecessary cruelty
8.2 Humanity - treating animals well makes people more human, humane
8.3 Superior Humans - human life and welfare is prioritised over animals
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9. Origins
The origins of life emerged as a topic through discussing how, and sometimes if, humans 
were related to other animals, and indeed whether humans were animals at all. 
Creationism and evolution found a meeting point in the following ways:
9.1 Christian God - man is made in the image of God, Creationism
9.2 Evolution - species evolved through natural selection and adaptation
9.3 Compatibility - God chose evolution as part of creation
9.4 Alternatives - evolution as just a theory, other possible (unknown) explanations
10. Beast
The ‘beast’ as an archetypal animal representation was discussed for the associations the 
word produced in the minds of the participants. These associations were characterised as:
10.1 Mythical - fictional animal like Beauty & Beast, werewolves, Loch Ness monster
10.2 Inhuman - nonhuman other, untamed, wild
10.3 Violent - aggressive, ferocious, wanton destruction, control through violence
10. 4 Devil - the number of the beast: 666
11. Images
General images of nonhuman animals used to represent humans were discussed, and the 
predominant ones were categorised as follows:
11.1 Female - images associated with women e.g. ‘cow’, ‘bitch’, ‘dog’
11.2 Male - images associated with men eg ‘ox’, ‘bull’, ‘bear’
11.3 Dehumanising - bad images of animals and devalued humans by association with 
animals
11.4 Harmless - standard, accepted use of language, worse insults
11.5 Negative - images reflecting negative human characteristics
11.6 Positive - images reflecting positive human characteristics
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Charting
Having annotated the texts, I began to chart the data. This involved building up a picture 
of the data as a whole. I took data from their original context and rearranged according 
to the appropriate thematic reference. The charts were devised with headings and sub­
headings which reflected the major subjects and categories from the theme index. As a 
thematic approach was adopted, I devised charts for each key subject area and entries were 
made for each respondent. The charts were ordered and grouped according to the four 
groups of analysis: male meat eaters, male vegetarians, female meat eaters and female 
vegetarians. The cases were always kept in the same order for each subject chart so that 
within-case and across-case analysis could occur simultaneously. A typical chart is 
presented in Appendix IV.
The benefit of this method of analysis is that charting involves abstraction and synthesis. 
Other qualitative methods rely on a ‘cut and paste’ approach by simply regrouping 
verbatim text chunks according to an index reference, resulting in a loss of context. Here, 
each passage of text, annotated with a particular reference, is distilled into a summary 
which is entered on the chart. The original text is referenced so that the source can be 
traced and the process of abstraction can be examined by other researchers.
Mapping and Interpretation
Having charted the core themes, I began to map and interpret the data as a whole, a 
process of theory building. I reviewed the charts and research notes, compared and 
contrasted accounts and experiences, searched for patterns and sought explanations. All 
this required that I evaluate the dynamics of the issues involved and search for an 
underlying structure. Identifying the key discourses which defined the object of study, the 
‘animal’, directed the interpretation of the analysis. This involved identifying definitions, 
exploring the range and structure of the phenomenon, finding association and providing 
explanations. These aims constituted the form, the structure and the function of the 
phenomenon in question. Given the nature of the sampling and method of data collection,
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the findings could not be generalised to a wider population on the basis of statistical 
representativeness. However, they can be generalised (using an inductive process) on the 
basis of the internal structure of the evidence (i.e. the strength, depth and detail of the 
explanations) to appropriate populations. The discovery of these themes led to the 
documentation of the thematic analysis and the final report of the findings presented in 
Chapter Six. Quotations are identified as being from male meat-eaters (mm), female meat- 
eaters (fm), male vegetarians (mv) and female vegetarians (fv). The numbers correspond 
to the interview and its charts.
5.3 Content Analysis: Beyond the Denotative Dimension
This section describes the development of media analysis and the transition from the 
predominant quantitative content analysis (Holsti, 1969) to semiological qualitative content 
analysis (Burgelin, 1972). Having established the definitions, range and structure of the 
‘beast’ through the Framework analysis, I explored ‘beast’ metaphors further using a 
semiological form of content analysis.
Communication Theories
The media have become the focus of much social psychological research. Their effects as 
powerful dictators of beliefs and behaviour have been contested between the traditional 
models which supports audience homogeneity and passivity with the linear transmission of 
knowledge and the contemporary models which presuppose a heterogenous range of 
audience interpretations of media messages and propose discursive space and shared 
symbolic rituals as the circular relation between audience and the mass media. The 
long-term gradual effects of the mass media are difficult to measure because they can not 
be studied in an experimental setting. There needs to be an assessment of the indirect 
learning of social roles, the formulation of opinion and the effects, meaning and 
connotation of ideology disseminated in the media. The problems associated with treating 
the audience as an homogenous group are based on the assumptions that meanings are
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interpreted in a homogenous way. However, audiences (readers) do not analyse texts in 
the same way that an analyst would (Livingstone, 1990). Consequently, the assumption 
of a straight-forward relationship is problematic.
Social Control
The cultivation theory of Gerbner (1969) and his associates points out that the mass media 
have replaced religion with its own narrative. Here, the assumption is that the mass media 
are homogenous and homogenising, that is to say, they attempt to override difference and 
to promote the mainstream. This suggests that the media are inherently conservative and 
pro-status quo. Indeed, increasingly the newspapers have become monopolised. They are 
basically concerned with selling rather than enlightening. They have taken over the role 
of describing the world symbolically. However, it is difficult to show the effects of the 
media because there are no control groups, no specific independent variables to manipulate 
and no specific exposure periods. Nevertheless, it is generally assumed that the mass 
media keep people believing in the status quo. The agenda-setting theory (McCombs and 
Shaw, 1972) states that the media do not tell us how to think but tell us what to think 
about. The newspapers, and other forms of communication, select topics and give them 
salience. The political hegemonic agenda is closely correlated with that of the media. The 
opposing theory is that of the spiral of silence (Noelle-Neumann, 1984). This is concerned 
with the way the media remove certain topics. It holds that public opinion is not private 
belief but that which can be expressed without risk of isolation. Moreover, people look 
to the media for the prevailing definition of reality, hence they express the views held by 
the majority. The spiral of silence can be broken by an external event that causes sudden 
change.
The Symbolic World
The North American approach to the mass media has been one of discovering the 
transmission of meanings that lead to social control. This compares with the European 
model that tries to identify what kind of symbolic world we live in because of the mass
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media. It is essentially concerned with the rituals and the establishment of practice and 
expectation. The North American administrative approach centres on persuasion and 
cause-effect relationships within the social order. This contrasts with the European critical 
approach that seeks an interpretation outside the social order. The administrative approach 
is more quantitative and centres on the audience, the target of social control. Conversely, 
the critical approach, as illustrated in this study, centres on the production of meaning. 
The critical school developed out of the Marxist attempt to deal with the mass media. This 
was prompted by the fear of the dissemination of fascist ideology through the mass media. 
Based in Frankfurt in the 1930s, this approach attempted to see how the mass media 
developed and how society changed as a consequence. It centred on an economic analysis 
of who owned the mass media and, therefore, determined production of messages.
However, culture can not be reduced to economics alone. Culture has its own autonomy. 
Adorno and Horkheimer (1972) have suggested that technology has power over society. 
Following Marx, they posit that the audience has been alienated and isolated through the 
demise of art and the increase of popular culture. Essentially they perceive the messages 
of the mass media in terms of propaganda. The mass media have an important role in the 
construction and definition of acceptable identities. It has further been suggested that 
society is politically apathetic and, therefore, does not notice the mass influence of the 
media. The mass media have contributed to the commodification and standardisation of 
culture resulting in the negation of images and ideas. The bottom-up interpretation 
suggests that ideological discourses determine the way people think about life. The 
top-down interpretation posits that lived practices generate culture and that, in a Marxist 
sense, such practices are imposed by the powerful onto the unpowerful.
Communication is about the cultural assumptions that the communicators share with their 
audiences (de Fleur, 1970). This ‘mirror’ theory assumes communicators reflect social and 
cultural phenomena. It opposes the view that media affect attitude and behaviour through 
socialisation and the coding and construction of reality (Gerbner, 1969). A pragmatic
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approach states that communicators both affect and reflect social and cultural phenomena. 
Analysis of communication, therefore, examines the way cultural formations are mediated 
in society. Moreover, the media’s manifest portrayals of reality influence the audience’s 
perceptions of society (McCombs and Shaw, 1972).
The media are presupposed to affect people through the transmission of hegemonic ideas 
and the implicit moral support of certain systems to the detriment of others. The pragmatic 
view that the media both affect and reflect social phenomena supports the notion of 
ideological discourse which is both created by the media and imbues the creators of the 
media. The audience contests the message of the media but the extent to which they will 
be able to construct alternative discourses will be partly determined by the access they have 
to alternative sources of information. A culture in which nonhuman animals are bifurcated 
into positive and negative representations of humans, evident through the dichotomous 
treatment of pets versus agricultural animals, will find those representations reflected in 
the media and supported by media discourses. Alternatives to this dichotomy, either eating 
pets or not eating agricultural animals, will not find a discursive space because of what 
these alternatives imply. Eating a member of one’s family, regardless of species is not to 
be entertained as a serious thought, and stopping the mass slaughter of agricultural animals 
for food is marginalised as economically, ideologically, morally and naturally abhorrent. 
What remains is the stereotypical representations of nonhuman animals as contradictory 
images of human projections and introjections. The media, and particularly the written 
media, with their emphasis on parsimonious images to convey complex meanings make 
ample use of nonhuman animal imagery to express human thought and feelings. 
Simultaneously, the media support anthropocentric and speciesist ideologies through their 
representations of nonhuman animals as either family or food.
Newspapers, as the dominant form of the written media, rely on linguistic images in the 
form of metaphors to convey their messages. My interest in cultural nonhuman animal 
surrogates and the use of metaphor leads me to examine how the metaphor ‘beast’ is used
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as a linguistic device in the British press. Because it is impractical to interview all the 
authors of all the individual stories which make use of this metaphor to decipher its 
meaning, I have decided to employ what, at the superficial level, appears to be a 
quantitative method. As I could not access the subject positions of the authors through 
dialogue, I used semiological principles to describe the metaphorical use of ‘beast’. 
Content analysis has long been held to be a method of enumeration which aims to make 
comparisons based on the presence or absence of a coded unit. Obviously, this level of 
analysis is inadequate for my purposes of defining the meaning of ‘beast’. However, the 
method is partially useful for gaining a sense of the range and diversity of the use of the 
metaphor. It is for this purpose, because I am dealing with pre-existing texts, newspaper 
articles, that I have decided to employ this quantitative method and upgrade it to a 
semiological level of analysis.
Content Analysis
Content analysis is most commonly used in cultural studies and mass communication 
research (Manning and Cullum-Swan, 1994). Content analysis has been described as ‘the 
objective, systematic, and quantitative description of the manifest content of 
communication (Berelson, 1952). Essentially content analysis is used to analyse the 
meaning of messages. Such meanings are patterns among sets of variable categories. The 
analysis is theory-driven because the categories are based on hypotheses about the nature 
of the meaning. However, it is a quantitatively orientated method through which 
inferences are derived from the counts of frequency. The coding categories used in 
quantitative content analysis define what associations emerge aimed at reducing participant 
bias. The problem with traditional, quantitative content analysis is that it deals primarily 
with the manifest meaning of text, the denotative order of signification and, therefore, fails 
to account for the context of the coded pieces of text. The increasing use of semiological 
principles to analyse the results of content analysis has brought this method of media 
analysis into the qualitative paradigm.
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Traditional Content Analysis
Content analysis of mass communication has been traditionally limited to the investigation 
of professional communicators, i.e. those people encoding the messages (Kerlinger, 1964). 
However, this approach has been criticised for assuming that encoding is an intra- 
individual process, i.e. that communicators exist within a vacuum (Krippendorf, 1969). 
Consequently, the referents of the encoders, the system of denotation, extend from the 
media organisation to the social structure. Content analysis of communication provides a 
way of deriving inferences about the communicators and about cultural assumptions that 
the communicators share with their audiences (de Fleur, 1970) However, Burgelin (1972) 
has argued that content analysis is only concerned with the manifest content, whereas 
structuralists are concerned with different levels of meaning in communication.
Contemporary Content Analysis
Moving away from traditional content analysis to semiological content analysis, there is 
an increasing awareness of the subjective factor in psychological methods. The coding 
frame is derived from categories which emerge from theoretically driven concepts. These 
categories ultimately influence the analysis. The coding categories used will define the 
results of the analysis. Communications both affect and reflect social and cultural 
phenomena. The analysis of these texts examines the means by which cultural formations 
are mediated in society, observing the interaction between communicators and their 
audience within the same cultural universe.
The denotative level of analysis is the manifest description of frequencies of the object of 
study. The connotative level of analysis explores the latent messages signified at the 
denotative level. Exploring the expressive meanings of media messages is a means of 
understanding the ideological and cultural frame of reference which underpin the messages 
(Burgelin, 1972) Content analysis studies examine interrelationships within texts as well 
as between texts. Content analysis is usually enumerative whereas structuralist analysis is 
rarely so. Denotations appear to efface the ideological process and portray an objectified
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and naturalised world. However, content analysis is also concerned with the latent 
meaning of communications, the way in which it reflects or mediates cultural and 
ideological formations and the way in which messages are adapted and understood by 
audiences. Analysis of stylistic devices in content analysis is related to its context in order 
to understand the inflection given to a text, to examine the use of rhetorical devices as a 
way of organising material and to examine the ideological processes which underlie it.
Quantitative and structuralist methods have converged and moved away from claims of 
objectivity. Content analysts’ new interests are increasingly in the cultural and ideological 
formations (or structures) expressed in the media. Structuralists’ new interests focus on 
the inspection procedures used in content analysis. These approaches are inextricably 
linked (Curran, 1976). The generation of quantifiable codes in a content analysis is based 
on a qualitative, preliminary examination of the text. This selection of codes shapes the 
interpretation of findings.
Procedure
This form of content analysis has been transformed from quantitative enumeration to a 
more semiological analysis of meaning. The subjective elements in analysis are explicit 
through the selection of categories which invariably influence findings. Thus, in this 
thesis, the content analysis of ‘beast’ metaphors is used to expand on definitions and 
typologies of this referent identified in the discourse analysis. The analysis examines the 
range and the structure, as well as the associations, inherent to the use of ‘beast’ 
metaphors. This is an analysis of trend not predication. Simply,
Content analysis...is a method of observation. Instead of observing 
people’s behaviour directly, or asking them to respond to scales or 
interviewing them, the investigator takes the communications that people 
have produced and asks questions of communications. (Kerlinger, 
1964:544).
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The rationale for this is that the media affect and reflect social and cultural phenomena. 
The meaning of media messages contributes to an understanding of current ideologies. 
Both the latent and the manifest meaning are under examination. The aim of the present 
analysis is to deconstruct the mythological assumption about ‘beast’ references which 
render them neutral representations. Beneath the objectification of these metaphors is the 
legitimisation of certain power structures associated with specific meanings. The purpose 
of this analysis is to reveal those structures.
The word ‘beast’ was entered into the newspaper database, FTProfile, for a time range 
from August 1995 to August 1996 from the following newspapers: The Mirror (MIR), 
Sunday Mirror (SMR), the Daily Mail (DML), the Mail on Sunday (MOS), The Times 
(TMS), The Sunday Times (STM), The Guardian (GDN), The Observer (OBS), The 
Independent (IND), The Independent on Sunday (INS), The Telegraph (TEL) and the 
Sunday Telegraph (STL). 950 articles were retrieved, each containing references to 
‘beasts’. 200 articles were reviewed to construct a coding framework. All proper names, 
e.g. Beauty and the Beast, were discarded from the analysis, leaving a total of 834 articles.
All instances of ‘beast’ metaphors were coded according to these mutually exclusive 
categories. As this was not a traditional content analysis, enumeration was not the focus. 
It was the relation amongst the three main categories of Human, Animal and Object ‘beast’ 
metaphors, and the relation amongst the sub-categories, which was the key concern. The 
Coding Schedule is presented in Appendix V. Histograms were devised to represent the 
distribution of ‘beast’ metaphors amongst the categories and are presented in Chapter 7.
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5.4 Semiotic Analysis: Signifying Polysemy
Having explored the form, structure and function of ‘beast’ metaphors, I semiotically 
analysed a specific example of the ‘beast’, the werewolf. I chose a contemporary novel, 
Wilderness, and the derived television drama for analysis based on its representation of a 
traditional ‘beast’ myth, the werewolf, and the opportunity for an intertextual analysis 
between the two different forms of media.
Narrative Analysis
Narrative analysis employs many semiotic principles, and has been described thus:
If one defines narrative as a story with a beginning, middle, and end that 
reveals someone’s experiences, narratives take many forms, are told in 
many settings, before many audiences, and with various degrees of 
connection to actual events or persons. Thus themes, principle metaphors, 
definitions of narrative, defining structures of stories (beginning, middle 
and end), and conclusions are often defined poetically and artistically and 
are quite context bound. (Manning and Cullum-Swan, 1994:465).
The semiotic analysis of text presupposes the permeability of textual boundaries. As 
meaning is negotiated, interpretations of any given text are diverse and complex. Indeed,
Text...is a historical and cultural construct rather than an a priori given, and 
it breaks down and complicates the simple linear relationship between 
stimulus and response, speaker and hearer, subject and object (Livingstone 
1990:65).
Texts conspire, through language, to direct readings which are culturally appropriate. This 
process is both affective and cognitive and defies the mind/body dualism. The possible 
meanings of the text and representational processes and desires of reader are bi-directional. 
Propp’s (1968) prepositional analysis of the Russian fairy tale claims that fairy tales can 
be understood by: the stable functions of the characters; the limited functions of the fairy 
tale; the identical sequence of functions; and the typical structure of fairy tales. Invariably,
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the outcome of fairy tale is a ‘lesson’, a moral tale. Identifying with the structure of the 
text is part of the production of subjectivity. Structuralism’s rule is that activities function 
first by decomposing/deconstructing the object of perception according to some rule and 
recomposing another object that renders the first ‘intelligible’. This is accomplished by 
the creation of another object which ‘manifests the rules of functioning of the original 
object.’ (Barthes, 1972:149) The meaning of things is not to be found in the things 
themselves but in the system of signs itself. Therefore, fiction is useful as a way of 
describing the world, it makes those signified and signifying relations explicit.
Levi-Strauss’s (1963) analysis of myth was based on binary oppositions, a closed, 
synchronic model. His analysis proposed that stories (myths) unravelled paradigmatically 
through oppositions rather than in the Proppian sense of functions. The difference in 
phonemes is the foundation for meaning, therefore, meaning is relational. Phonemes are 
produced by the realisation of members of a definitive set of binary distinctive features 
which generates the phoneme’s information. Binary heuristic for analysis is relevant to 
mythemes - units of mythical thought. Signs and myths are understood because the brain 
is structured to decode binary information. Phonemes are distinctive sounds. Myths are 
distinctive themes and the brain decodes them unconsciously. Textual analyses must 
address these unconscious strategies of projection, introjection and projective identification:
We do not pretend to demonstrate how men think in the myths but rather
how these myths think themselves in men without them being aware of it.
(Culler, 1975:50)
Language is not anchored in anything at all. Langue is a freefloating system of relations 
‘contingently’ anchored in conventions not the brain. It parallels the culturally constituted 
unconscious. According to Jameson (1972), the binary method is simply a stimulant to 
perception. Behind the text there are systems of signification codifying affect responses, 
especially in fairy tales which serve to socialise desire. The werewolf myth is a fairy tale 
articulated in ‘Little Red Riding Hood’, and the films belonging to the horror genre. The
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myth is a warning about the danger of the ‘beast within’ humans, it is the bestial version 
of ‘Jekyll and Hyde’. Fear from the violence of the ‘beast’ produces discourses which 
represent humans as antithetical to ‘beasts’. Desire is key to the development of 
subjectivity and one’s own understanding of oneself. Modem fairy tales are reflections of 
the moral tales of the past and their endurance speaks volumes about their perceived 
relevance to life today. The continual struggle of humans to come to terms with 
themselves as animals is reflected in the ubiquity of these representations. Dialectic 
interaction between reader and text parallels other social relations between the Self and 
Other. These interactions reinforce and legitimise other ontological dichotomies, and, in 
the case of nonhuman animals, they are manifestations of Leach’s (1964) concept of social 
distance. The reproduction of subjectivity through this interaction is delimited through 
ideological hegemony and socially acceptable modes of behaviour. The ‘beast’ is to be 
tamed, if not destroyed, in order to preserve the ‘humanity’ of humans. The self is a 
primarily normative construction and its articulation through myths, legends and fairy tales 
is testament to the pervasive fear of the ‘beast’.
Having explored definitions of the ‘beast’ in the previous study and identified its polysemic 
meanings and uses, I wanted to further analyse the ‘beast’ and chose the mythical ‘beast’ 
reference to explore the narrative use of this image and the boundaries between humans and 
other animals which it signified. These desires were crystallised with the discovery that 
colleagues in my department were working on the production of a particular drama series 
called Wilderness. Having been told the basics of the story, and with access to the script, 
I decided to use Wilderness as a case study for my semiotic analysis of the ‘beast’, and to 
extend the analysis by looking at the transformation from the original USA novel to the 
British television drama. I bought the original book and began the process of comparison, 
identifying the level of semiosis between the original text and the derived television drama, 
and the explicit and implicit significations associated with werewolf mythology.
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Procedure
I identified primary signifiers in the text by a set of sentences. This set is the Signifying 
Unit (SU) which is the unit of reading. These SUs are translated through analysis which 
leads to the ‘dramatic’ structure of the text by decomposition that stays at the level of 
signification. The text is made to ‘slow down’ and the identification of key signifiers 
structures the textual analysis for the researcher.
Wilderness, the book and derived television drama, was chosen for analysis because it 
exemplified the difficulties in translating animal symbolism from the written to the visual 
medium. I familiarised myself with the book and the script. This process involved 
identifying major changes in protagonists, plot development, contexts and symbolism in 
relation to affect signifiers. The texts were analysed to reveal the social conventions by 
which they were constructed. Deconstruction explored the denotative and connotative 
orders of signification. The naturalisation of these conventions was examined in relation 
to the different genres and the history of the lycanthropic myth.
Connotation, as the second order of signification, involves metaphor and metonymy. 
Metaphor expresses the unfamiliar in terms of the familiar. It involves the transposition 
of ideas on the paradigmatic level. The paradigmatic level is the set of alternative 
possibilities available at each point in the narrative. It is external as coherence is given by 
the reader through inter-textual, ‘natural’ and cultural readings. Metonymy expresses the 
invocation of ideas through associated details. It involves the contiguity of ideas on the 
syntagmatic level. The syntagmatic level is the sequential structure of the text. It is 
internal as it relies on something having taken place such as repetition, similarity, 
inversion, completion or factual events in the story. The syntagm and the paradigm are 
the two major sources of variation in the structure of a text. The structure of the 
Wilderness narrative was analysed in order to reveal the latent and manifest polysemy. 
Four primary signifiers were identified: Transformation, Sexuality, Rationality and 
Freedom. Each of these themes was identified as a narrative proposition. Signifying units
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of text were analysed to illustrate the syntagmatic structure of metonymy and the 
paradigmatic structure of metaphor.
The metonymic meaning of the signifiers described how the theme fitted into the whole 
structure of the narrative. It identified the internal relations between the reinforcements 
and sequences which constituted the whole. The metaphorical meaning of the signifiers 
described how the themes fitted as a selection of the narrative. It identified the genre they 
belonged to and the central paired opposites, as well as their cultural implications. The 
analysis also explored the level of semiosis. This intertexuality examines which aspects 
of the narrative are fixed and which aspects changed across the media. Finally, specific 
or shared cultural codes were identified, and cultural assumptions that underpinned them 
were explored.
Discussion
The aim of this chapter has been to integrate the theoretical approach of Part One with the 
methods to be employed in Part Two. These qualitative methods are appropriate to the 
analysis of human subjectivity in relation to animal identity because the methods allow 
depth of analysis to account for inconsistencies in the psychodynamic construction of social 
phenomena. Triangulating the research provides multiple perspectives on representations 
and discourses on nonhuman animals. Identifying the discourses which mould human 
perceptions of nonhuman animals was facilitated by the series of interviews and the 
thematic discourse analysis. The semi-structured design of the interview allowed the 
participants to construct their own accounts of their beliefs and behaviours in relation to 
nonhuman animals. The more detailed exploration of media representations of a particular 
nonhuman animal referent, ‘beast’, was undertaken using a contemporary, semiological, 
content analysis. This semiological analysis avoids the quantitative enumerative emphasis 
whilst maintaining a wide range of examples of the uses of ‘beast’ metaphors. An 
explicitly mythological example of the ‘beast’ was semiotically analysed through the
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deconstruction of Wilderness, the book and television narratives. The lycanthropic myth, 
retold, encompassed the dynamics of human versus nonhuman animal identity and subverts 
this dualism, thus, undermining all status dichotomies.
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Comparing people to animals [is] hurtful to the human being but I  think it also 
um puts down animals, so maybe it makes it easier for society, as a whole, to 
go along with factory farming without thinking this is horrific... .people are 
able to do really brutal things. (fm3/11.3).
Overview
The aim of this chapter is to explore discourses on nonhuman animals through analysing the 
dynamics of vegetarians’ and meat eaters’ representations. The Framework Analysis of the 
interview transcripts revealed five main themes: Animals as Family Members', Choices; Ethical 
Frameworks; Origins ofLife\ and ‘Beast’ Representations. The Animals as Family Members 
theme related to the participants’ representations of pet animals. Anthropomorphic attribution 
of these pets constructed them as having identities corresponding to traditional roles in the 
family, whilst anthropocentric beliefs identified these animals’ utility as a key factor in their 
incorporation into the family. Individual Choices was a prominent theme in representations 
of vegetarianism, meat eating and animal rights. There was consensus on the issue of freedom 
to choose what to eat and what not to eat, ranging from individual choices to the use of 
different animals for food in other cultures. The naturalisation of meat eating as morally 
correct was represented through religious and secular appeals. Furthermore, the issue of 
health in determining food choice was important for both vegetarians and meat eaters. Within 
Ethical Frameworks, the participants voiced concern for the treatment of nonhuman animals 
and, here, the distinction between animal welfare and animal rights was clarified. Taboos on 
eating certain animals and methods of humane killing were articulated within this framework, 
as were representations of extreme groups such as ‘vegans’ and ‘animal rights activists’. 
Christian creation and evolution were cited as both mutually exclusive and compatible theories 
for the Origins o f Life. The final theme, ‘Beast’ Representations, incorporated the 
participants’ representations of ‘beasts’, primarily as nonhuman animals, as well as the use of 
nonhuman animal names to describe humans. These uses were predominantly pejorative and 
were also sex differentiated. The analysis of these themes identified three principal discourses 
as Object, Referent and Utensil.
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6.1 Animals As Family Members
As the process of indexing and charting showed, the primary representation of pet animals was 
of being a family member. Being one of the family is not a straightforward construction of 
this particular category of ‘animal’. It brings with it much, if not all, of the familiar 
contingencies that define modem British families. An important aspect of defining the pet is 
finding a suitable family role for the animal. There are a wide range of possibilities, including 
the father figure protector, the parent’s unconditional love, the sibling’s role as friend and 
playmate and, not least, the role of child and, in one case, compensation for the lack of a 
grandchild. The participants in this research demonstrated, through talking about their pets, 
some of the key discourses associated with pet animals. Their definitions of both their pets 
and ‘good pets’ in general provide insight to the internal structure of the concept of the ‘pet’.
Pet Identities
Some of the more conspicuous family characteristics associated with pets were the references 
to loyalty and unconditional love. An important aspect of what constituted a ‘good pet’ was 
this bond signifying exclusivity and trust. The relationship between the human (owner) and 
the nonhuman animal (pet) was characterised as reciprocal and emotional. Family pets were 
described as ‘friends’, ‘surrogate grandchildren’, ‘little sister’, ‘third brother’, and generally 
playmates for the participants when they were children. In defining their relationships with 
their pets, the participants spoke of fond memories, mutual love and trust, and growing up 
together.
The identity of the pets covered two related areas. One was how the pet was described as an 
individual animal. The other was those characteristics that the human identified with in the 
animal. Cats were generally described as ‘independent’, ‘intelligent’, ‘calm’, ‘solitary’, 
‘moody’, ‘suspicious’ and ‘affectionate’. Dogs were typically characterised as ‘mischievous’,
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‘naughty’, ‘good natured’, ‘bad tempered’, ‘friendly’, ‘loving’, ‘respectful’ and ‘obedient’. 
The majority of the respondents described themselves as either ‘cat people’ or ‘dog people’ 
and these mutually exclusive identities were reflected in their perceptions of cat versus dog 
characteristics. As one cat person claimed, ‘Cats are more intelligent than dogs even though 
you can’t train them. ’ (mm4/l .2) Whereas a dog’s apparent lack of brain power was perfectly 
endearing to another respondent:
Cats don’t seem to have a great deal of personality in the way that a dog does, 
you know, a dog can be stupid or it can be aggressive or it can be docile 
whereas a cat just seems to slink around and look shifty. (mv5/1.2)
Despite the apparent cat-dog rivalry, there was also the acute perception that nonhuman 
animals, significantly pet animals, had individual characteristics and personalities, likened to 
human personalities and differences, ‘I think animals, like people, all of them have different 
characters and even personalities’ (fm3/1.2). Yet the difficulty in assigning or recognising an 
animal’s identity was not overlooked:
How do you define the identity of a dog? It’s not something that I can write 
down a description of. It is just something that one has an emotive reaction to, 
that this dog has an identity and I can, OK that identity maybe I am imparting 
onto it but it is something that I can respond to and I can like it. It is no more 
than that. (mv2/1.2).
Part of defining the pet is the inescapable responsibility that goes with keeping a nonhuman 
animal. Such responsibility is seen by the adult participants as wholly beneficial to children, 
yet it was that inevitable responsibility of cleaning and care that led the participants, as 
children, to tire easily of their pets and, when the novelty of being responsible for another life 
wore off, all that was left were the chores of pet care. Those animals that were described as 
‘boring’ or in ‘cruel’ caged conditions were often the same animals that required the most
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cleaning. Caged birds, rodents, hamsters, snakes, guinea pigs and rabbits were all described 
as ‘boring’ and ‘tedious’ to take care of. Together with fish in tanks, these caged animals 
were described as being in cruel conditions, without freedom of their natural habitats. The 
benefits of responsibility of pets for children waned in adult years when the primary response 
to having pets was that they would ‘tie me down’ and where adequate time, space and money 
were key considerations.
Pet Utilities
Pets were also defined in terms of their utility. ‘Good entertainment’ value seemed to cover 
a wide range of useful pet activities including play, companionship, relaxation and affection. 
Pets as status symbols, or even household objects in relation to fish, were considered as 
motivations for keeping exotic or dangerous animals. Health benefits also accounted for pet 
utility, both physical activity and mental therapy. Uncomplicated affection characterised a 
number of discourses, ‘They give comfort and don’t talk back...and more in your life, another 
dimension, you know’ (fm3/1.4). The ability to use pets for human needs was an important 
aspect of understanding why people keep pets:
In a way there’s almost a whole species that’s now been created which is fine 
if people want to get enjoyment out of them... You need to own them because 
they need you to look after them so you can justify it more to 
yourself.. .because you own the animal anyway and its got no right to reject you 
because its your pet and it will bloody well love you. (mvl/ 1.4).
Moreover, there was also an awareness of the potential fallacy of the mutual unconditional 
bond between owner and pet:
I know dogs appear to get a lot out of their owner’s affections, but I just 
wonder whether that’s kind of...really you wonder who’s getting what out of 
what and...is the dog just being nice to you because you feed it. (mm2/1.4).
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There were no discemable differences between the way vegetarians and meat eaters talked 
about their pets. There was evidence for the strong emotions that the participants invested in 
their pets, especially as children. Nor was there any gender-related accounts of pet 
participation in families. The overall theme was one of pet animals as members of the family, 
trusted companions who formed emotionally reciprocal relationships with their human owners. 
These animals were neither wholly animal nor wholly human. They are the anomalous 
category of domesticated animal, naturalised as quasi-kin through anthropomorphic 
identification.
6.2 Choices
Another strong theme which characterised all of the participants’ discourse was ‘choice’. The 
three themes associated with choice were: The Concept of Choice as a Factor in Food 
Preference; The Naturalisation of Food Choice and Health as a Factor in Food Choice.
The Concept of Choice as a Factor in Food Preference
The notion of choice plays an important role in defining meat. All the participants stated that 
eating meat or not eating meat was a matter of personal choice. Meat eaters, on their part, 
understood the health benefits of vegetarianism, marginalised the ethical issues and summed 
up their opinions with statements such as, ‘It’s wholly a matter of personal choice. ’ (fm4/4.1). 
Moreover, vegetarians, too, claimed personal choice to be a significant factor in their decision 
not to eat meat, and in their expectations of others, ‘Ultimately, it’s your own choice, it’s your 
life not something you want to extend to other people’ (fv4/4.1).
Most of the vegetarians said it was not necessary for their partners to be vegetarian, and when 
it came to potential children, a number of vegetarian participants expressed the following 
view:
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I accept and understand that people do eat meat and that’s their preference...I 
wouldn’t give them [children] meat, I mean I know that’s imposing your view 
on them but I actually think now there are so many substitutes.. .but it’s a very 
individual thing. (fv2/4.1).
Being vegetarian places you in minority group in Britain and, as a member of a minority 
group, the values associated with that group will be marginalised and stigmatised. These 
quotations demonstrate the internalisation of the majority’s (meat eaters) representation of the 
minority. Being vegetarian is all right as long as it is a personal, individual choice. If you 
want to remain an accepted part of society you have to conform to the limits that society places 
on being in that minority. For vegetarians, the limits are, somewhat paradoxically, about 
choice. Meat eaters will accept vegetarians as long as vegetarians realise that being vegetarian 
is not a political, social or economic endeavour. Being vegetarian is about what you choose 
to eat for dinner, and being able to choose is everyone’s right. What you choose is your 
personal decision whether it is a matter of taste, aesthetics, health or ethics. But because the 
ethical frameworks of the vegetarian are so individualised, they do not pose a threat to the 
majority.
When vegetarians talk about being vegetarian as a personal choice, we are hearing the dictates 
of the majority. Moreover, this individualisation of a moral system carries on into the next 
generation. Vegetarians believe enough in their values to educate their children about them 
but part of that education is the notion of personal choice. They will not ‘impose’ their values 
on their children because if they do they will exceed the limits of acceptable vegetarian 
boundaries.
This sensibility feeds into our understanding of other cultures and their use of animals as pets 
or meat. Cultural choice is the macro level of personal choice. It is all right as long as they 
keep it there and do not try to convert Britain into their ways as one meat-eater commented:
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I suppose context matters. If I was abroad and people ate cats and dogs, I 
suppose, I...I perhaps I would. I suppose I am saying I wouldn’t eat my own 
cat but that is obvious, you know,...but it is context specific, over here I 
wouldn’t, somewhere else I possibly would. (mm2/4.2).
People tend to justify morally, not just explain socially, many human behaviours according 
to culture. Cultural relativism is a curious double-edged sword of the social sciences. It has 
been an undoubtedly invaluable weapon against the cultural imperialism of the West. 
Evaluating behaviour according to one’s time in history, place in society, cultural and religious 
beliefs has been a somewhat ubiquitous, if not obvious, preoccupation of modem social 
science. Yet there seems to be something rather patronising about making claims of relativism 
for all societies in the world that extol their version of the ‘truth’ and the morally correct as 
equal. But let us take a few steps back. There is truth in the notion that different cultures use 
different animal in different ways. Difference is, as always, undeniable. Indeed, there is 
something to be said for the insight of those participants who claimed that just because British 
people kept certain animals as pets did not mean that in other countries those same species of 
animal should not be eaten. And vice versa for the British agricultural animals.
Nonetheless, what about the animal? Nonhuman animals that were surrogate fathers, mothers, 
brothers, sisters, daughters, sons and best friends, in another part of the world would be 
roasted, stewed, baked or curried. Killing, cooking and eating a potential member of one’s 
family appears to be a somewhat peculiar activity. Of course in those cultures, these 
nonhuman animals are not family members, but in Britain they are and the point is that, just 
because it is another culture, we prioritise human needs over nonhuman animals lives and 
make moral culturally relativist justifications for the use of lives and deaths of those animals. 
Yet there is further insight by another meat-eater:
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My immediate reaction is that’s horrible and repulsive, and my second reaction 
is, my reaction to that is, irrational and unjustifiable because that’s a cultural 
thing...you know, simply because I can relate to cats, I ’m sure some people 
can relate to cows, for example, and would be equally repulsed by me eating 
them. (fm4/4.1).
Here, the issue of cultural relativism is apt. However, it is at the level where cultural choice 
reflects personal choice that the inconsistencies arise. The laissez faire attitudes that 
vegetarians have towards their own principles are reflected in the national considerations of 
what other cultures do with their nonhuman animals. Vegetarians think eating meat is wrong, 
for a range of reasons, but they also believe that not eating meat is a personal choice. British 
people tend to think that other countries and cultures treat nonhuman animals wrongly, but 
they also believe that doing so is a matter of cultural choice. At the heart of this matter is the 
status of the animal. Here the nonhuman animal is an irrelevance. Personal and cultural 
choice are about human rights.
Naturalisation of Food Choice
Defining nonhuman animals as meat is not the complicated task one might have imagined 
given the previous definitions of pet animals as members of the family. Indeed, it appears to 
the participants as a ‘natural’ order of things. There are nonhuman animals that are pets and 
there are nonhuman animals that are meat. Where these animals are not meat, and never 
should be, there is a clear demarcation that they have similar rights to humans. However, this 
is not a simple vegetarian versus meat eater divide that one might expect. Meat, as a 
culturally defined concept of animal, crosses the borders.
The naturalisation of food choice, here the decision to eat or not to eat meat, is characterised 
by the features of all naturalised issues. Firstly, there is a conflation between what is ‘natural’ 
and what is morally right or culturally acceptable. Secondly, the justification for eating or
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abstaining from this category of animals delineates between secular appeals to evolution and 
natural orders and religious (in these cases Christian) appeals to God and divine order. Much 
of the justification for eating meat is summed up by one participant as, ‘I believe we are meant 
to be meat eaters. ’ (mml/2.1). Several facets to this sentence are of interest. Firstly, this a 
belief, a faith in the rightness of eating meat. But it is not a religious belief. Secondly, the 
notion of what people are meant to do carries with it the implicit assumption of what it is 
morally right to do. Thirdly, being described as meat eaters is different to being described as 
eating meat. Meat eater is a defined identity and unpacking that identity will be the subject 
of discussion later in the chapter. Unravelling the secular account invariably means treading 
on evolutionary ground as one meat eater did:
Yeah, I think if someone said an argument, you know, you should not eat 
meat, I ’d say well why, you know, because it becomes a moral issue both 
ways, doesn’t it? If you’re a strict vegetarian you know eating meat is wrong, 
but I can turn it around and say well we’ve always evolved eating a bit of meat, 
you know, and maybe it does you some good. (mm3/2.1).
There is conflict, though, in this realisation from another meat eater:
I sort of believe that humans beings are omnivores and they were, they always 
have been omnivores...so I feel it’s partly a natural thing though I don’t 
personally kill animals or want to kill animals to eat them, (fml/2.1).
At this point it may be useful to evaluate these quotations. Humans are evolved animals. 
Humans are omnivores. Humans have always eaten meat. However, the brilliance of 
naturalisation is not to state the facts of the case but to expose implicitly or explicitly the value 
of the facts. Being natural makes it right, and the appeals to the goodness, or rightness, of 
what is natural is being made more and more appealing in the artificial environments of the 
modem world. The ‘food chain’, as expressed by a number of participants, supports these
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ideas, ‘The way the food chain operates and the fact that animals eat other animals...I feel it 
is natural to eat animals’ (fm3/2.2). Indeed, ‘All other animals eat meat, it’s sort of a natural 
food chain.’ (mml/2.2). There is a natural (evolved) food chain. Animals do eat other 
animals. A corollary to the ‘natural equals right’ argument is the apparent physical evidence 
offered us by the behaviours of other animals, in this case carnivores and omnivores. Other 
animals do it, therefore, as we are animals, we are justified in doing it. Vegetarians are in on 
the act too:
People have rights too and a lot of people would argue that naturally man is 
carnivorous or at least semi carnivorous...more acceptable because [it] gets 
back to the idea that people have always hunted, (mvl/2.1).
Moreover, there is some support for the notion that where naturalisation is used as a 
justification for eating meat, the idea of ‘natural’ is contradictory:
I think you’re always going to get people that eat meat and in a way it’s nature, 
whereas, apparently it’s not natural for people to eat meat...you’re always 
going to get people who are going to want to eat meat and I mean yeah the law 
of nature that you’re always going to get something killing something else to 
eat it but, you know, within reason making sure it’s done properly. (fv4/2.1).
‘Within reason’ is the ontological barrier between humans and animals. Nonhuman animals 
kill to eat and it is part of their nature. Humans kill to eat but it should not be in an animal 
nature because humans are not like other animals. We have reason. The problem of 
simultaneously being human and being animal is the source of this kind of leap in reasoning. 
The ‘reason divide’ was substituted by the ‘spiritual divide’ by the Christian participants. One 
participant considered Jesus Christ to have provided moral guidance on the question of eating 
meat:
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Because they [animals] have been eaten according to my religion, we’re 
allowed to eat them. There is nothing ethically wrong with it, so it’s not 
something on my conscience...if it was eaten by Christ then it should be, it can 
be used for his disciples. (mm5/2.3).
Indeed, another participant claimed, ‘There is nothing in the Bible that says you should be 
vegetarian.’ (mv4/2.3) And according to this vegetarian Christian, ‘Some [Christians] say 
vegetarians are Satanists.’ (mv4/2.3) The association of vegetarianism with Satanism is a clear 
cut representation of Eastern religions such as Buddhism and Hinduism or Jainism. Believing 
that animals have equal value to humans is akin to saying God is an animal, as humans are 
made in the image of God. Conveniently enough the Devil is believed to be bestial, often 
represented as a half man half animal chimera. Thus, vegetarians worship their own animal- 
God, Satan. An interesting argument but one we shall have to leave for now. The crux of 
the matter here is that animals are God given to humans:
I think you can make a distinction between necessity and luxury and how we 
exploit the resources that God gave us, i. e. the animal kingdom and whatever 
else in order to fulfil our needs. (fm4/2.34).
The final reference for the naturalisation of eating meat is one that appears also to have 
religious roots:
People say, well they’re bred for meat so what’s wrong with eating them and 
if we didn’t breed them for meat they wouldn’t exist so, you know, there’s 
nothing wrong with eating them.. .which I think is not a good argument because 
it’s justifying the cruelty that’s done to them. (mv5/2.4)
This argument also applies to zoos and nonhuman animals in captivity generally. There 
appears to be a belief, which must be based significantly in religious beliefs, that life is 
waiting to be bom. With regard to human life, it is not inconceivable that some people do
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hold notions of babies in heaven simply waiting to be bom. With regards to other animals, 
there seems to be the same kind of argument: life at any cost, and it applies also to concern 
about endangered species. With regards to farm animals, the argument might go something 
like this: if we didn’t breed them, raise them and kill them for food, they would never have 
had existed and that would be a bad thing because life is everything. Given the choice, one 
might argue that, your average caged pig would have chosen another planet to be bom on. 
But here I am perilously close to falling, however flippantly, into this ‘life is everything’ 
reasoning. There seems to be so much that is sacred about life in general, but actually in 
practice this applies to humans only, that the belief system associated with justifying killing 
nonhuman animals for food has been infiltrated by it. This is a peculiar irony that requires 
some mind-set shift. The right to life is not being applied to nonhuman animals. Yet it is 
being used rhetorically to justify their deaths.
Health as a Factor in Food Choice
Defining animals as meat requires that eating meat is a ‘natural’ and, therefore, right thing to 
do. One of the factors that buttresses this argument is the health issue. Meat is defined as 
either a source of healthy protein or a source of unhealthy cholesterol on the one hand, and 
is characterised by high profile debates on issues such as BSE and other food scares on the 
other. The evolutionary justification has the added advantage of health benefits:
I just believe there’s a medical reason for it, maybe there’s something in meat
which is good and which er if you don’t eat meat you might miss out.
(mm3/3.1).
One of the important parts of this factor is the parent’s reactions to their children giving up 
meat. Health was said to be a primary concern. It also figured strongly in the question of 
whether vegetarians would bring up their children to eat meat or not as one vegetarian 
believed, ‘I also think children should have quite a lot of protein to grow and everything so
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they probably should have ham, meat you know’ (fv3/3.1) The representation of meat, 
especially red meat, as unhealthy shared equal coverage:
Obviously red meat contains a lot of cholesterol and fat and obviously if you 
had natural protein substance like soya bean equivalent...you know you could 
obviously have a healthier diet. (mm5/3.2).
An interesting aspect of defining meat as unhealthy was that, not only did the vegetarians cite 
health reasons alongside ethical reasons for not eating meat, but meat eaters themselves 
claimed to be eating less and less meat for health reasons. Their understanding of why people 
stopped eating meat was balanced between the ethical and the health arguments. It appears 
that the awareness of the health risks associated with meat provides a point of reference for 
meat eaters towards vegetarians. Everyone agrees that cutting back on meat is a good thing 
for people’s health, but the corollary of that is that the ethical aspects of abstaining from eating 
meat become marginalised. Modern day vegetarians are as likely to be concerned primarily 
about their health as they are about the animals being consumed. Indeed, where the ethical 
issues of animal rights are so contentious, the health issue of human heart disease is not.
BSE has had some far reaching effects on British sensibilities about meat. There are issues 
of nationalism beyond the scope of this chapter, but there are also important insights to why 
increasing vegetarianism is not necessarily a reflection of increasing awareness about animals. 
Several of the meat eaters claimed that BSE had been a decisive factor in them cutting down 
on, or eliminating, beef from their diets, as demonstrated by this meat-eater:
BSE is pretty worrying...it shows the poor standards of farming which cast 
doubt on the quality of the meat products we eat...it’s something to be fearful 
of and, as a result, I have stopped eating beef. (mm5/3.3)
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BSE has also given some credence to vegetarianism:
With the beef crisis at the moment, that’s suddenly given vegetarians a bit more 
respect, you know, people are sort of saying, perhaps thinking, well it’s not so 
vital after all. (fv5/3.3).
Yet the whole issue of food scares had one meat eating participant claim:
If you don’t eat meat what else do you eat? Chicken is said to be, you know, 
full of salmonella, umm equally, you know, fruit and vegetables are covered 
in pesticides, eggs you can’t, cheese you can’t, you know, whatever, you’ve 
got to make a decision somewhere. (fm4/3.4).
In this respect, meat is defined as the staple of British food. If you do not eat meat, what else 
is there? Many of the participants referred to their family life and the food they ate when they 
were children. The ‘meat and two veg’ meal was as much a part of the fabric of British 
family life as the pet. Recognising the health risks of meat, the cross-contamination of BSE, 
an increasing awareness of food hygiene and the effects of chemicals used in farming are 
generational differences that led parents of vegetarians to rationalise their children’s abstinence 
from meat as faddish, nonsensical behaviour.
6.3 Ethical Frameworks
Part of the participants’ understanding of nonhuman animals was their awareness of ethical 
issues involving these animals. This awareness had two strands. One was the more general 
realisation of animal issues involving farming methods, the protection of endangered species, 
pet breeding, zoos and experimentation. All the participants voiced some concern about the 
way nonhuman animals were treated in these areas. Part of their ethical framework was that 
these animals should be protected from ‘abuse’ but if conditions were good then the captivity 
or killing was justified. Eating meat was not necessarily an ethical issue for the meat eaters 
but there was an awareness of animal welfare, as one meat eater claimed:
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The way animals are farmed and battery hens, the way cattle are slaughtered, 
the kinds of information I ’ve gathered about just the way things are produced 
and killed, (fml/8.1).
Animal welfare was perceived to involve the protection of animals, summarised as, ‘Animals 
have the right not to be mistreated’ (mm4/8.1). Often animal welfare was likened to human 
welfare, specifically child welfare, implying the responsibility of humans to more vulnerable 
beings. The second strand to the theme of awareness was the vegetarian respondents’ 
motivation for becoming vegetarian. Raised consciousness about the lives and deaths of 
nonhuman animals featured prominently:
[Becoming vegetarian is a] consciousness about killing animals...and animal 
abuse...human consciousness about animal welfare...and animal rights. 
(fvl/8.1).
Another vegetarian described his motivation to stop eating meat as part of a broader political 
awareness, ‘[Animals are] unacceptably degraded by the way they are treated like 
umm.. .uniform objects in a production line’ (mv2/8.1). Indeed, the reevaluation of the status 
of animals was considered to be a central issue in the protection of animals, as one vegetarian 
observed, ‘Just because you’ve brought them into the world doesn’t justify cruelty to them.’ 
(mv5/8.1). An important aspect of awareness was the association made between meat and the 
animal that the meat came from. For the meat eaters, the association was consciously avoided 
whilst for the vegetarians the connection between the dead flesh and the living animal was a 
strong motivating factor for them becoming vegetarian. As a strategy for defending the 
emotions against being confronted with images of dead animals, meat was completely 
estranged from its origins. One meat eater described this disassociation as:
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It’s just out of sight, out of mind when you’re eating your roast chicken on a 
Sunday, you know, you don’t think about these poor little things going through 
the battery conveyor belt having their heads chopped off. (mm 1/8.1).
Part of this disassociation was the familiarity of these animals as food products and, therefore, 
there was no sense amongst the meat eaters that they had any kind of emotional investment in 
these animals. Therefore, the animals could be killed for food, guilt free as this meat eater 
commented:
You don’t have much affection for them [farm animals] so you don’t feel, you 
feel rather indifferent about whether or not they’re slaughtered for food.. .when 
you look at some food and you think of the animal from which it has been 
produced um, you know, that kind of turns you off. (mm5/8.2).
There is obviously some feeling of repulsion or guilt associated with the realisation that what 
you are eating was once an alive animal. An equally obvious defence to those feelings is the 
disassociation between the packaged or cooked product and the body parts of a corpse:
It’s just the whole thing about I can’t disassociate the meat from the animal, 
well I think when you’ve been brought up with products like chicken and beef 
you learn to disassociate what you’re eating from what it is when it’s on four 
legs and I can’t do that with those things because I ’m not used to it. (fm5/8.2).
The awareness of meat as animal provoked many of the vegetarians to consider whether they 
could continue to eat animals. Indeed, it was the defining factor in the conversion from meat 
eating to vegetarianism as described by this vegetarian, ‘[It was about] making the connection 
between living things and slaughter um...and the thing that was on your plate’ (mv5/8.2).
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At the heart of all the participants’ concept of ethics was the hierarchy between human and 
nonhuman animals. All of the participants believed that human life was more important than 
nonhuman animal life. There were a variety of justifications for this and amongst the most 
prominent were consciousness, intelligence, the evolutionary tree and the concept that humans 
have God-given souls. The meat eaters were unequivocal about the moral relation of humans 
to other animals:
Sometimes I think it’s a bit perverse that we, we’re so worried about the way 
animals are treated...I think humans are more important period...animals are 
owned by people whereas humans are not owned, therefore, there are different 
rules. (mm4/8.3).
Apart form the issues of consciousness and status, there were references to a distinct category 
of humans:
I cannot get to grips with the theory that we evolved from animals...cos I tend 
to think if we evolved from animals then why are the animals still here. 
(fm5/8.3).
For the vegetarians their statements about the relative positions and value of humans and 
animals were more qualified:
Obviously the main difference between us and animals is that we think and we 
think ahead and we’re far more intelligent urn...but whether that gives us the 
right to abuse animals, I don’t think it does. (mv5/8.3).
There is a huge problem with the assumption that although humans are more important than 
other animals, these animals still should not be abused. There are many fundamental 
hierarchies in life in a variety of abilities and behaviours. As all life has evolved through
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natural selection, successful species will be specially adapted to their environments and by 
their physiologies. The abilities of each successful species, therefore, will, on balance, grant 
them adaptive fitness. Because there are different environments and different physiological 
limits to each species, there will be inevitable hierarchies across species for a number of 
abilities. At this level of analysis there is no implicit or explicit value attached to those 
abilities except for the adaptive advantage that each characteristic confers on that species. 
Human consciousness, including language and intelligence, is an adaptation of our species. 
The adaptive advantages that it has provided are undeniable. And here we reach the point of 
the naturalistic fallacy which states that simply because something is natural (evolved) does 
not mean that it is morally desirable or right. Evolution has no morality. Human 
consciousness has evolved to allow the human concept of morality which is historically and 
culturally situated. Darwin did not describe a hierarchical tree of evolution. Implicit to the 
definition of natural selection is a bush-like evolution, a more egalitarian notion of how life 
evolved and how various life forms are related to each other. The fact that humans can make 
moral and ethical evaluations does not necessarily mean that those animals incapable of making 
moral choices should be denied moral consideration and treatment. The use of human 
consciousness to sustain a moral hierarchy erases the possibility of including animals in the 
human moral sphere.
The justification for excluding animals from the human moral sphere is not that humans are 
not animals but that humans are a special animal:
We are just like other animals except that we’ve got a higher intelligence and 
we’ve got consciousness...that I think makes us more supreme in terms of what 
we can do. (mm5/8.4).
The crux of the matter was summed up by the following participant:
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We’ve become like a dominant species yet we may have evolved from what 
we’re calling now subordinate species um...I don’t know, maybe there isn’t 
really any difference between eating animals and eating each other. (fv5/8.4).
Taboos on Eating Animals
Defining what is meat also means defining what is not meat, or what is not accepted as edible. 
Animals who are pets are the main category of what is not edible meat:
I wouldn’t consider eating [cat] but that’s because...it has an emotional 
um...either emotional connection with a cat, you know, I guess...animals that 
I recognise as being domesticated, I would feel kind of...feel that I wouldn’t 
want to eat. Yeah I would consider them to be meat but not edible. (mm2/6.1).
Part of this reasoning is associated with the cultural choice concept. Humans form emotional 
bonds with their pets. Certain animals in this country are considered to be pets, whilst others 
are meat, and there are a few cross category animals such as rabbits. Leach (1964) says of 
the taboo on eating pets:
I think most Englishmen would find the idea of eating dog equally disgusting 
[as humans] and in a similar way. I believe that this latter disgust is largely a 
matter of verbal categories. There are contexts in colloquial English in which 
man and dog may be thought of as beings of the same kind. Man and dog are 
‘companions’; the dog is ‘the friend of man’. On the other hand man and food 
are antithetical categories. Man is not food, so dog cannot be food either 
(Leach, 1964:32).
Because there is an emotional bond, an emotional investment on the part of the human, the pet 
animal is conferred with a higher status compared to meat animals. The participant recognises 
that cats can be meat, like humans can be meat. Another participant qualifies the 
categorisation by saying that it is not edible.
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It’s because I associate say a dog or a cat with, you know, with...attachment 
and friendship and the thought of being killed and eaten is not very nice. 
(fm2/6.1).
Vegetarians obviously did not make a point of not eating their pets as they did not eat any 
animal. Nonetheless, one vegetarian provided some insight to the status of pet animals that 
supports the contention above, ‘Dogs are represented alongside humans...they are a form of 
human...definitely animals are another human being but one that can’t talk’ (fvl/6.1). 
Indeed, Simoons (1967:114) observes that:
Familiarity with animals, particularly in functional relationships and as pets, 
led to the rejection of entire species of domestic animal. Avoidance of dog 
flesh in the Western world may have come about because the dog was the 
friend of the family and eating it seemed an act akin to cannibalism.
Taboos on eating pets, whilst being of primary concern, were not the only exemptions. Meat 
eaters, on the whole, disliked animal organs, ‘I dislike organs...part of the processing system 
so not particularly, I don’t know, healthy... look unpleasant.’ (mm5/6.2). Moreover, the idea 
of being presented with a recognisable animal produced revulsion:
It’s basically the idea of eating something which is dead.. .when you see a dead 
animal in front of you, then obviously that can put you off your meal. 
(mm5/6.3).
And the irony of fish-eating vegetarians was not lost on another participant:
I mean I particularly have a problem even with a lot of people who are 
vegetarian who actually eat fish, and I always find that really odd because it 
does, it looks more like a living creature on your plate than almost anything 
else. (fv2/6.3).
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Of course, the ultimate taboo is human meat and the problems even understanding the taboo 
are summed up by the following participant:
I suppose it’s hypocritical but no I can’t condone eating human under any 
circumstances...I can’t think of a good argument for...for not eating oneself,
I mean obviously killing someone to eat them is wrong...but apart from that, 
it would be unpleasant and it’s not a pleasant thought...it’s interesting that I 
don’t have the same revulsion about eating animals as I do about eating people. 
(mv3/6.4).
Humane Ways of Living and Dying
One of the ways in which people describe essentially violent behaviour is to term it ‘humane’. 
Humane is a catchall for the good means to a bad end. Indeed, the humane means justify the 
violent end. Humane killing then is, as described by one meat eating participant:
It’s probably very similar to the death sentence in America, you know, where 
we say...you cannot shoot someone, you know, then you electrocute someone 
and then we move it on from electrocution to sort of chemical injection and 
more and more we sort of disassociate ourselves with any of it, you know, 
there’s less blood involved and there’s less...now you don’t even touch, things 
are automatically press a computer button and you get stuff injected.. .you sleep 
and then you’re dead. (mm3/5.1).
Humane killing is about that very method of disassociating from the act of killing itself. To 
render something humane is to make it more palatable. The death sentence allegory is highly 
appropriate. Indeed, killing animals again crosses the vegetarian meat eater border, ‘I think 
killing animals for meat...in a humane manner is acceptable.’ (fml/5.1). And on the 
vegetarian side, ‘If they were killed humanely as well it would change my opinion. ’ (fv4/5.1).
Part of the humane means towards the end of death is the notion that animals should have good 
living conditions. Keeping animals in environments as close to their natural habitats as
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possible and using ‘humane farming methods’ sanitise the end, ‘If animals had a good standard 
of life, I wouldn’t object to them being used for food.’ (mv2/5.2) Being vegetarian for some 
of the participants is about being humane. It is about acknowledging and protesting, 
personally, about the living conditions of British farm animals. But the concept of being 
humane also signifies something else to this meat eater:
Animals have the right to be treated in a humane way and I suppose using the 
word humane towards an animal might sound a bit odd but...that’s how I 
would like to treat an animal...humane is defined as how you would treat other 
humans. (mv5/5.2).
There are several points to be made here. Humans can obviously be treated in abysmal ways 
by other humans, so that can not serve as a benchmark for how they should treat other 
animals. Humans, on the whole, do not aspire to treat all other humans as they would want 
themselves to be treated. Boundaries of one sort or another create endless sources of 
categorisation and discrimination. The social distance, as described by Leach in Chapter Two, 
is a feature of how humans relate to each other in terms of family, friends, nationality, 
religion and ‘race’. Such boundaries concerning race, religion, sex and culture do not need 
to be created for other animals. The difference is as obvious as it can be. As a generally 
undifferentiated category of Other (with the exception of pets) animals provide a ideological 
tabula rasa for humans to imprint on with their projections of the bestial. As nonhuman 
animals are not humans (and, importantly, humans are not animals) they can not be treated as 
humans. They can not be treated in a human-like manner. So they must succumb to the 
estranged concept of the ‘humane’. Humane does not quite make it as a ‘human’ way of 
behaving. When we talk about genocide, homicide or suicide it does not tend to be couched 
in ‘humane’ terms. Nor should it be. But because nonhuman animals are mere animals, and 
humans are, paradoxically, by nature not, the slaughter, experimentation and vivisection on 
nonhuman animals should be ‘humane’ because it being humane is what, in part, makes
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humans human. This kind of justification is rife:
It is fair that animals don’t have the right to life provided that the life they do 
have is free from cruelty and the death they have is humane but I think I 
personally tend to look at it as part of urn...the food chain. (fm3/5.3).
Extreme Groups
A side-effect of defining nonhuman animals is that people are categorised in terms of their 
relationships with or beliefs about these animals. To be normal requires the concept of what 
is abnormal. And to hold justified concerns about the status and treatment of nonhuman 
animals in society necessitates the concept of extreme and, consequently, unjustifiable concern 
as one vegetarian claimed, ‘Some people are animal lovers and they may be extreme but 
people in Britain do love their pets’, (mvl/7.1).
Britain as a nation of animal lovers is a peculiar national trait, unrivalled throughout the 
world. There are two related issues here. First is the general meaning associated with being 
a nation of animal lovers which one meat eater responded to as, ‘Yeah people do really dote 
on animals a lot and they are really sentimental about animals which I find a bit nauseating’ 
(fm 1/7.1). The underpinnings of this concern are supported by the fact that the RSPCA 
receives more donations a year than the NSPCC, and are reflected in another vegetarian’s 
observations, ‘We have more consciousness or more adoration of animals than we do with 
children’ (fv 1/7.1).
The use of the phrase ‘animal lover’ to characterise the British describes a national obsession 
with pets and the cases of prioritising nonhuman animals over humans. The second issue is 
to do with the specific semantics of the term ‘lover’. The use of the term ‘lover’ implies 
passion and one of the participants described British relations with their pets as passionate. 
Also, one vegetarian commented:
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I suppose animal lover should really mean...in the same way the word lover 
connotates something very strong, it’s not like best friend or sexual partner, 
it’s, it’s much stronger than that so maybe, maybe it’s been diluted. (fm4/7.1).
The original sense of ‘lover’ was simply someone who loved, but modem day use has 
sexualised the word and people are still happy to call themselves animal lovers. Another 
source of categorisation is vegans. The meat eater’s attitude might be fairly predictable:
The one I question is veganism actually because I feel that once you start 
denying your body calcium and milk and cheese and all other dairy products 
um...it’s not really a very positive thing to do to yourself. (fm5/7.2).
However, having already been marginalised in society, the vegetarians’ responses to vegans 
are more interesting:
I do tend to think about why am I, you know, why aren’t I vegan and 
sometimes think well, you know, perhaps that’s a bit extreme and...not very 
healthy...restricting...removing yourself from society, (mvl/7.2).
Vegetarians utilise the same health argument against vegans, as meat eaters use against 
vegetarians. In the face of a more coherent and consistent ethical framework, people 
invariably seek alternative levels of evaluation and criticism which are substantially irrelevant 
to argument.
Animal rights activists also receive a bad press and the representation of animal rights 
campaigners as terrorists has particular potency for British people with one meat eater 
recalling, ‘More active more...possibly controversial and umm...I don’t know, I just have this 
image in my head of people with balaclavers’. (fm2/7.3). The representations of animal rights 
activists as militant terrorists has several effects. In terms of the national psyche, influenced
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by media representations, the perceived extremism of these activists provides a counterpoint 
to the acceptable concept of animal welfare. If granting nonhuman animals rights means 
succumbing to the demands of terrorists then those rights will be denied. The concept of 
rights at the heart of the debate is often neglected or misrepresented. The debate is grounded 
firmly in animal welfare rhetoric. The representation then leads people to believe that animal 
rights activists prioritise nonhuman animals over people, this representation renders them 
abnormal, possibly dysfunctional and antisocial members of society, as suggested by this 
quotation:
My immediate reaction is.. .people stomping around the country causing general 
chaos I have to say, it’s pretty much like CND umm.. .fairly unhelpful actually 
towards animals by the trouble they cause. (fm5/7.3).
Inverting the hierarchy and placing animals above humans is obviously not perceived as a 
rational enterprise:
If they stepped back and took a more rational approach to it and a more 
democratic approach to it um...they might find that people do care...all they 
get thrown back at them is an antagonistic approach because of the way they 
behave. (fm5/7.3).
The vegetarian reaction to animal rights activists is equally dismissive, ‘[They are] extreme, 
militant and disruptive.’ (fv4/7.3). Vegetarians themselves were not, on the whole, perceived 
as extreme as long as they did not try to ‘force’ other people into their way of thinking and 
eating. Again, the health issues provided an ideological bridge between the two groups. Yet 
at the heart of the argument against vegetarianism was the concept of pushing that reasoning 
to extreme limits:
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Maybe in twenty years time we’ll find out that plants have got feelings as well 
and it means you can’t eat, you know, um...if we’re pushed to the extreme, it 
becomes a ridiculous argument. (mm3/7.4).
This is a common argument against vegetarianism and veganism. Its basic premise is that, 
given the possibility that all life can experience suffering or pain, abstaining from only a few 
life forms is not only hypocritical but pointless as we all have to eat to survive. The reality 
of experiencing pain and the philosophical debates on the nature of suffering are not to be 
discussed here, however, the rhetorical device of the accusation of hypocrisy is an interesting 
one. The definition of hypocrisy is the simulation of virtue, it is a pretence at goodness. 
Hypocrites are people who consciously pretend to be doing the right thing whilst knowing all 
along that they are not. It is seen as the height of deception because the pretender may gain 
credit and praise for certain beliefs and behaviours that they know to be false. Being accused 
of hypocrisy is not to be taken lightly. But why employ this attack against vegetarians. The 
answer lies in the marginalisation of animal rights and the line of reasoning is as follows.
Animals are not human because humans are not animals. Humans are special either because 
they are made in the image of God and have souls or because they are the pinnacle of the 
‘evolutionary tree’ and have minds. Nonhuman animals are, therefore, morally inferior to 
humans and should not be afforded the same rights as humans. People who believe otherwise 
pose a serious threat to the dominant ideology. Granting animals rights has immense 
implications for religion, the economy, agriculture, in fact virtually for all of human activities 
from big business to the weekly shopping list. Human civilisation is built on the acceptance 
that nonhuman animals are inferior and humans are justified in using them as objects. In order 
to suppress those people who believe that nonhuman animals should be afforded with rights, 
it is in the interests of society to marginalise them as extremists, revolutionaries who would 
undermine the very fabric of social order. Vegans and animal rights activists make up this
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group of radicals. Vegetarians are in a grey area. The health issue looms large so they do 
have a get out clause, but they pose a similar, if somewhat diluted risk. After all the step 
from being vegetarian to being vegan is not, philosophically speaking, a difficult one. 
Availability, access and finance are the obstacles to overcome. Nonetheless, any such threat 
that normal vegetarians might become abnormal vegans is thwarted by the notion of hypocrisy.
The first accusation is that vegetarians are hypocritical, not because they eat dairy products, 
but because they eat plants, and plants may have feelings too. This avoids allowing 
vegetarians to consider fully the problem of not wanting to support the meat industry, whilst 
sustaining it through supporting the dairy industry. However, everyone knows plants do not 
feel pain or anything else for that matter. So the second line of attack is that vegetarians are 
hypocrites because they are not vegans, but to be vegan you would have to be mad, so for the 
sake of your mental, as well as your physical, health you had better eat meat. It is a brilliant 
ploy and it works at preventing vegetarians becoming vegan.
6.4 Origins of Life
Ideas on the Christian creation ranged considerably from:
When God was talking to Adam in the first Creation, he said, you know, I ’ve 
put all this under your control, under your command. (fm4/9.1).
mediated by:
I don’t believe in literal creation cos I can’t accept from the physical evidence 
like fossils that um it was um a literal seven day creation.. .1 do believe that we 
were ultimately, everything was created by God. (mv4/9.1).
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to:
I don’t believe in God...think people need a desire for immortality. It says 
something about themselves.. .religion is a form of self worship, (fvl/9.1).
And there was equal speculation about the validity of Darwinian evolution:
In terms of evolution we are all related but then again I wouldn’t like to push 
it too far. (mm3/9.2).
Understanding peoples’ interpretation of Darwinism can provide some insight to how they 
perceive humans are related to animals, and whether they think humans are animals at all. 
This is not a simple religious-secular divide. Whether we got here because God put us here 
or because we were the results of millions of years of natural selection, humans are different 
to animals in the minds of many people and this is evident in the following comment:
Darwin never wanted selection of species and natural selection to be ascribed 
to humankind, it was. As soon as you take the soul, the spirit or whatever is 
different in humankind out from the animal kingdom, then why should you 
worry about killing somebody bad...same level as the animal kingdom. 
(fm4/9.2).
The Descent o f Man aside, what matters here is the signification of ‘animal’. Animal signifies 
not human. But why animal, why not any other object? Why does it make intuitive sense to 
refer to animal behaviour in relation to humans? The answer lies in the obvious similarities 
between humans and animals. It is easy for people to project human behaviour and 
characteristics onto animals because humans are animals and, by definition, engage in 
animalistic behaviours. The reason that predominantly negative human characteristics, such 
as violence, are projected onto the concept of ‘animal’ is because of the religious and secular 
hierarchy between humans and animals. In other words, animals provide the perfect
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‘scapegoats’ for unacceptable human behaviour.
The relationship between creation and evolution is an interesting sideline. There appears to 
be a tendency to interpret these two versions of the origins of life as compatible, ‘I think 
creation is actually um...described by evolution or evolution was part of creation.’ (mm5/9.3). 
Indeed, aside from that there was a conspicuous lack of conviction in some secular 
participants’ acceptance of evolution, ‘I would be interested in alternatives as much as in 
Darwinism...there are other theories which are yet to be developed.’ (mv2/9.4). However, 
the important point here is that whether somebody believes primarily in creation or primarily 
in evolution, the underlying tendency is to categorise humans as not animal in relation to all 
other animal species. This hierarchical categorisation provides the foundations for the 
psychodynamic projection and introjection of human characteristics using nonhuman animals 
as the primary referent.
6.5 ‘Beast’ Representations
The final theme explores the use of nonhuman animals as referents. Participants’ 
understanding of the word ‘beast’ was predominantly related to nonhuman animals, indeed, 
some participants believed that the word ‘beast’ was interchangeable for the word ‘animal’. 
Animal beasts were described as, ‘Hairy, homy animals, attacking people.’ (mm2/10.2), to 
‘Little beasties which would probably be the most dangerous ones, the ones we can’t control, 
viruses, bacteria’. (mm3/10.1). The implicit notion of a threat or danger was summed up by 
one participant as:
Things that pose a threat to humans or another animal which is potentially able 
to kill a human...quite fearful...the word ‘beast’ is more strongly akin to 
animals as opposed to humans...violent. (mm5/10.1).
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Beast was also interchangeable with animal, described as a technical term rather than an 
evaluation,’Wild creatures, not necessarily uncontrolled or negative, just wild.’ (fml/10.1). 
The meaning of ‘beast’ varied from simply meaning animal to negative images of aggression, 
violence and intimidation. Indeed, there were, ‘Connotations of sort of subordination to 
humans.’ (fv5/10.1). The paradox of the beast was that, although there were a number of 
animal associations, the beast was ultimately unknowable:
Beast whatever it may be has a certain tragedy about it in that it is a living 
thing, it is an animate thing, it moves about, it has an independent life...yet we 
will never really understand that creature or rather as the beast was not 
understood by Beauty. (mv2/10.1).
Beasts could also be humans, although they were described predominantly as animals and the 
connotations were equally negative:
I don’t really associate it with any human beings except, you know, people who 
do...you know criminal things...media perceptions...child molesters, perverts. 
(fm2/10.2).
But ‘beast’ was also described as a ‘joking put down’ and ‘it can also be used in a camp way’. 
The most telling meaning of ‘beast’ when applied to humans was, ‘Someone’s a beast when 
you say they’re like an animal.’ (mv4/10.2). Beasts were also mythical creatures, ‘Often in 
mythology we are presented with a beast being an aggressive big animal powerful in physical 
strength’. (mm4/10.3). The most common fictional reference was to Beauty and the Beast.. 
The ‘beast’ in this case was described as, ‘Half man half animal. ’ (mvl/10.3). Other mythical 
creatures were characterised as werewolves or monsters, ‘Tall, fat, hairy...horns, big fangs, 
dripping blood that sort of thing.’ (mv3/10.3). And the features of such a ‘legendary monster’ 
would be, ‘You probably, when you think of a beast, you think it’s something that goes round 
killing for the sake of it and, you know, wanton destruction’. (fv4/10.3).
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The final ‘beast’ connotation was less common but still culturally significant, ‘Number of the 
beast in the Bible like the Devil. ’ (mv4/10.4). Here, the association between vegetarianism 
and Satanism is clarified. The Biblical reference clearly associates the Devil with beast 
imagery:
Here is the key; and anyone who has intelligence may work out the number of 
the beast. The number represents a man’s name, and the numerical value of 
its letters 666. (13:18)
Animal Images
Other animal images that were used to describe people were predominantly negative and sex 
differentiated. Female insults were cited as the primary uses of nonhuman animal names. 
Several of these terms overlapped in meaning but their underlying assumptions were the same:
A bitch is a conniving woman, going behind people’s backs, general 
bitchiness...obviously cow and bitch is a female dog and cow is female, why 
it’s used for women, I don’t really know, (mml/11.1).
Most metaphors refer to domesticated animals bred for human service and consumption. 
Several of the participants cited ‘cow’ as a nonhuman animal image used for women, ‘Cow 
is derogatory for female.. .gives milk.. .equivalent in female form. ’ (fv5/11.1). The use of 
‘cow’ to describe women reflects the exploitation of cows based on their sex:
Cows...generally women who have irritated men get called cows, fat old 
cows...I should imagine that large women get called ‘cow’ a lot more than 
thinner women and that’s because cows are big bovine daisy things that are just 
dared to do as it’s told and if it annoys you and doesn’t do what it’s told 
then...it’s wrong (mvl/11.1).
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Cows are female, domestically bred, agricultural animals. They are used for their milk, their 
muscle (meat) and their skin (leather). Cows are naturally large animals but their apparent 
fatness is purely a product of their captivity. On the one hand it is due to being overfed for 
increased meat production but the main source of fatness is that dairy cows are kept 
continually pregnant to provide milk. They are milked during and after pregnancy. Calves 
are removed from their mother when they are between one and three days old. Many calves 
are exported for veal, others reared for beef and some of the females are reared to replace the 
dairy cows. Cows’ udders are unnaturally swollen due to the prevalence of mastitis caused 
by injected Bovine Somatotropin (a genetically engineered growth hormone) and by producing 
too much milk, resulting from high protein concentrates in their diets. Pregnancy, mastitis 
and increased body mass produces an exaggerated version of the original animal. Cows 
appear fat because people make them that way. The association between cows and women is 
based on the reproductive utility of cows. Cows are useful not only for meat but also for 
milk. Only female mammals (including women) produce milk. Cows are the primary animals 
used for milk. The representation of cows as fat, stupid and ‘silly’ is a projective defence 
mechanism that allows both women and cows to be dehumanised and objectified.
The female reproductive system is used in other animal associations, ‘A bitch is an assertive 
women, sexual connotations.’ (mvl/11.1). Moreover, ‘Bitchy...she’s like a bitch on 
heat.. .pregnant bitch.. .grouchy because having puppies. ’ (fv2/11.1). A bitch is a female dog 
of breeding age. There are two main facets to the association between women and bitches. 
The first is, in common with ‘cow’, a function of their reproductive systems. Dunayer 
(1995:14) assesses this use of ‘bitch’ as:
Familiarity with the numerous ways in which breeders have disabled dogs 
through inbreeding and treated them like commodities dispels any mystery as 
to why bitch carries contempt.
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The second is the exclusively female use of the word ‘bitch’. Even when applied to men, the 
term ‘bitch’ is feminising. This also true of male gay discourse. The primary meaning of 
‘bitch’ is being female, note ‘son of a bitch’, the primary meaning of ‘cow’ is reproductivity, 
a function of being female. Apart from ‘cow’ and ‘bitch’, another common derogatory term 
for a woman was ‘dog’:
Dog is used to describe a woman who’s ugly, whereas, bitch could be used to 
describe a woman who’s maybe ugly as well but more likely to be venomous 
in someway. (m m 4/ll.l).
‘Dog’ is more than just a physical insult, it has strong sexual connotations associated with 
promiscuity as one male vegetarian suggested, ‘I think the worst insult is "dog"...implication 
that this is a woman of zero value...sexually available and unattractive’. (m v2/ll.l). 
Moreover, another male vegetarian observed that,’"Dog" is ugly...keep a dog like keep a 
wife’. (m v5/ll.l).
‘Dog’ is a relatively recent animal term used for women. In the past ‘cur’ would have been 
applied to men. Nowadays, in the USA ‘dog’ is a common name for men. In Britain, 
however, ‘dog’ can refer to a man but is more likely to be used against a woman with 
reference to physical attractiveness. Dogs are common pets. They are owned and subservient 
to the desires of their owners. The insult ‘dog’ has two elements, firstly, the domestic status 
of dogs and, secondly, the sexual behaviour of dogs. The physical features of dogs (large wet 
nose, big tongue and teeth) are generally less attractive in relation to woman than men. For 
example, calling a woman a ‘cat’ in relation to her physical appearance would be 
complimentary, thus, the use of the word ‘feline’ to describe sexually attractive women. On 
the whole, dogs are identified with men and cats are identified with women.
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Women could also be called ‘horses’, ‘dragons’ or ‘catty’. The reasons why women were 
called these animal names were explained as, ‘You’re kind of, you know, trying to say you’re 
not as good as me, you’re nothing. ’ (mm4/l 1.1). As one female vegetarian claimed:
It’s implied that women have got qualities that are more irrational or emotional 
or wild and, therefore, more like the animals than superior intelligence. 
(fv3 /ll.l).
Indeed, the gender issue was clear for one participant:
It’s interesting that even when it comes to applying insults and compliments, 
people will draw sex discrimination so a woman would be described as a vixen 
rather than a fox...a vixen is seen, I think, as sly. (m v2/ll.l).
The stereotypical association between women and nature, and men and culture have been well 
documented (see Plumwood, 1993) and one female participant expressed the relationship as, 
‘Men exert power over women through associating them with wild animals’. (fv4/ll.l).
Male nonhuman animal names shared some of the features of female names but were not so 
predominantly negative:
I would use the word ‘pussy’ quite a lot. Now I don’t use that to in relation 
to female genitalia necessarily, although I understand that if I called a male 
friend a ‘pussy’, I’m sort of suggesting femininity by that so, and that’s 
become much more of a common term. (mm4/11.2).
Calling a man a ‘bitch’ also implied femininity through being effeminate. There were, ‘More 
violent associations...fox, beast, animal’. (fm2/11.2) to describe the way men behaved as 
opposed to the way women looked. Next to bitch, cow and dog, ‘pig’ was commonly referred 
to, ‘Not uncommon for a man to be described as a pig.. .bloated, fat.. .gluttonous and crude. ’
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(mv2/11.2).
‘Pig’ was not gender specific because the female reproductive functions were not so obvious 
as they were for ‘cow’ or ‘bitch’. Leach (1964) has described the suppression and projection 
of the guilt associated with breeding an animal simply to kill it:
...we rear pigs for the sole purpose of killing and eating them, and this is 
rather a shameful thing, a shame which quickly attaches to the pig itself 
(Leach, 1964:51).
Pigs are one of the few agricultural animals that serve no other purpose apart from providing 
their dead flesh as meat. Using ‘pig’ as a pejorative lends acceptability to the suffering they 
endure from their imprisonment. The representation of the pig as male conflicts with the 
image of the pig as a sow. Women who call men ‘chauvinistic pigs’ are dehumanising men 
using a female animal referent which is simply the reverse of what men do to women when 
they call them ‘cows’.
The positive names attributed to women were conspicuous through their absence in relation 
to men. When women were referred to using positive or complimentary animal imagery it 
was, invariably, concerned with their sexual appearance, whereas, ‘Animal phrases [for men] 
are power words...strong as an ox or bull headed’. (fv2/11.2). However, men could also be 
referred to as ‘snakes’, ‘rats’, ‘toads’ or’sharks’.
Whether these terms were negative or positive depended on how important the participants 
thought the role of language was in relation to behaviour, as one male participant extolled, 
‘Bitch...it’s just an insult...rolls off the tongue rather well.’ (mml/11.5). The relation 
between thought and language was more explicit here:
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If a person thinks of animals in a negative way then, you know, they’re 
obviously going to perceive it (name) in an even more negative way. 
(mm3/11.5).
Positive animal images or names used to describe humans were few and far between, ‘Foxy 
attractive woman.’ (fm4/11.6) and ‘Free as a bird.’ (mv5/11.6).
The notion that these names might be dehumanising and, therefore, harmful to humans and 
other animals was expressed:
You are sort of using an animal word to, you know,...some person for some 
reason...you hurt the person by saying these words...to say, you know, you are 
just like an animal, just to say you are inferior, you are horrible... you’re bad.
(fv3/11.30).
Comparing people to animals...hurtful to the human being but I think it also 
um puts down animals, so maybe it makes it easier for society, as a whole, to 
go along with factory farming without thinking this is horrific....people are 
able to do really brutal things. (fm3/11.3).
However, next to the notion that calling people by animal names was hurtful to the person and 
could affect the way people viewed the animal was the feeling that these were standard phrases 
in common use and that their effects, if any, were limited, as one participant bizarrely 
claimed, ‘Doesn’t devalue animals because they don’t understand. ’ (mm4/11.4). An obvious, 
if somewhat perplexing justification! Parsimony was also cited as a rationale for the use of 
animal images, ‘They are good metaphors...instead of listing all the things associated with 
them...everybody knows what they mean’ (fm2/11.4), as were physical acts towards animals:
I don’t think it has a great deal of impact on the way animals are treated 
because there are a lot of other things that sort of keep animals in that position.
You know the fact that we eat them, (mvl/11.4).
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The separation of language from beliefs and behaviour was a common response, summarised 
by this participant as, ‘The words are derogatory but words are separate to behaviour and 
doesn’t affect the way people view animals’. (fV2/11.4). Another participant concluded:
I don’t think that, you know, by using a derogatory term in relation to pigs the 
whole time that people would think that pigs were lesser creatures than 
before.. .just part of language really and not really thought about. (fv5/11.4).
Discussion
The purpose of this chapter has been to analyse the participants’ representations of animals in 
order to identify the primary discourses which both reflect and affect human beliefs about, and 
behaviour towards, other animals. The texts are the products of a particular discursive 
practice, qualitative semi-structured interviews. They were produced within the parameters 
of the interview schedule, the interviewer-interviewee relation, individual’s subjective 
positions and the social and institutional ideologies that mould those subjectivities. 
Associations and disassociations were identified through the process of subjective 
interpretation. This interpretation produced the intertheme patterns discussed above.
Through this analysis, I identified three key discourses. Here, I follow Hollway’s (1989) 
account of her discourses relating to gender:
These categories do not refer to actual entities. They are heuristic, that is, they 
are tools to help in organising the accounts of participants... (Hollway, 
1989:53-54).
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Discourses are series of organised signifiers which provide a systematic way of deriving 
meaning from texts. My analysis revealed that the participants organised their relations with 
nonhuman animals in three dominant ways. Here I delineate three dominant discourses which 
help to organise the participants’ accounts in terms of the content of their representations of 
nonhuman animals. The importance of these discourses is that they reproduce ‘human’ 
subjectivity through the subordination of nonhuman animals. These discourses are: (i) the 
Object discourse which organises those signifiers that define nonhuman animals; (ii) the 
Referent discourse which arranges the signifiers that relate humans to other animals; (iii) the 
Utensil discourse which orchestrates those signifiers that provide implicit and explicit 
explanations for the human relations to other animals. These terms, ‘object’, ‘referent’ and 
‘utensil’, were not referred to in the interviews as actual animals. Here, they serve as 
heuristics for organising the participants’ accounts into meaningful dominant discourses which 
characterise their relations with nonhuman animals. The relation amongst these discourses is 
dynamic, each affecting the availability and status of the other. The focus of this discussion 
will be the identification of these representations as discourses.
The Object Discourse
Participants’ representations of nonhuman animals were characterised by the Object discourse. 
This discourse referred to significations of nonhuman animals as material things. Nonhuman 
animals, whether they conformed to family, food or fantasy images, were primarily signified 
through the process of objectification. First, there was the consistent denial of agency or self 
to nonhuman animals. The pronoun ‘it’ was used to refer to these animals even when their 
sex was known as in the case of familiar pet animals. The use of ‘it’ as opposed to ‘he’ or 
‘she’ is a generic linguistic device that effectively eradicates the possibility of ascribing rights, 
or moral consideration, to other animals. ‘It’ signifies the objectified status of nonhuman 
animals. Where these animals are assigned identities as pets (‘good’ animals), it is probable 
that their owners are engaged in an anthropomorphic form of projection, reflected by their
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understanding of what a pet animal is or should be. Pets are human psychodynamic 
constructions which do not negate the primary construction of pets as ‘its’. Second, nonhuman 
animals were signified as commodities, articles of trade which are bought and sold on a daily 
basis - possessions subject to financial exchange. Finally, animals were signified as products. 
They were described in terms of their muscles, milk, skin and physiological systems. The 
status of animals as possessions, commodities and products objectifies them. These 
representations of nonhuman animals compound the ‘it’ signifier.
The availability of the Object discourse allows individuals to define nonhuman animals as 
inferior to humans. This reflects the primary ontological divide between humans and all other 
animals, and it affects the extent to which humans permit certain nonhuman animals access to 
either the object or subject positions within discourses. Nonhuman animals are not active in 
their discursive positioning. They are positioned as possessions, commodities and products 
through the dominant Object discourse. The participants’ investments in the available subject 
positions presented by the Object discourse were constrained by the ideology of humans as not 
‘real’ animals. Objectification of nonhuman animals is considerably more acceptable than the 
objectification of human animals. The Object discourse contained within it the signifiers of 
objectification - descriptions of nonhuman animals as possessions, commodities, products and 
dehumanising terms of abuse.
The Referent Discourse
The Referent discourse organised the participants’ relations with nonhuman animals into 
signifiers of human versus animal identity. There were three sets of signifiers which 
constituted the Referent discourse. The first was the way in which representations of 
nonhuman animals signified the moral antithesis between humans and animals through 
hierarchical dichotomies. There were two angles to this notion of hierarchy. One was the 
religious, in this case Christian, belief that humans were not animals because humans were
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made in the image of God and, therefore, had souls. The ‘Adam and Eve’ story was quoted 
as the time at which humans became separate to animals when humans discovered morality. 
Here the Referent discourse contains within it the notion that nonhuman animals signify 
immorality. The same kind of reasoning, with different protagonists, was initiated by the 
more secular participants. They described the evolution of species according to natural 
selection. Their interpretations of Darwinism were, on the whole, correct, yet their 
application of his findings were as ontologically different as the Christians’ accounts. The 
secular human:animal divide was also signified by appeals to different mental faculties, 
consciousness, intelligence and language. These two forms of hierarchy were based on 
essentially the same assumption, evolution may have happened the way Darwin described, but 
humans were fundamentally different to other animals, a notion that Darwin rejected. The 
Referent discourse organised signifiers which implied ontological difference between humans 
and all other animals. This difference was hierarchical with the participants making claims 
for the superior or privileged status of humans based on the Referent significations of 
nonhuman animals as morally, intellectually and emotionally inferior to humans.
The second feature of this discourse follows from the hierarchical dichotomy between humans 
and animals, notably that humans are special. The prioritisation of humans against other 
animals was accounted for, when it could be accounted for, by group membership. People 
prioritise people simply because they are people. That fact that humans are seen to be 
ontologically separate to other animals warrants that they be given special moral consideration. 
The notion that humans are special is a relational one. Either possession of a soul or a mind 
guarantees a superior status to humans in relation to animals. Those humans who are 
dehumanised as nonhuman animals suffer through association. Here the Referent discourse 
identifies a series of signifiers which, simultaneously, objectify nonhuman animals and 
dehumanise human animals.
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The third aspect to the Referent discourse is the psychodynamics of anthropomorphism and 
zoomorphism. Anthropomorphism is the attribution of human form or personality, in this case 
to other animals. Zoomorphism is the representation of humans as animals. Humans are 
animals so this representation is about the human construction of ‘animal’, the bestial. 
Anthropomorphism is a form of projection. Zoomorphism is a form of introjection. The 
concept of ‘animal’ is the resource for psychodynamic splitting. The theriomorphic image is 
one in which someone or something is represented as a ‘beast’, whereas, the therianthropic 
image is one that combines human and beast forms. Theriomorphism is an expression of 
metonymy and usually refers to human identity. Therianthropism is an expression of metaphor 
and typically refers to otherness. Nonhuman animals were signified according to these forms. 
When animals are pets, part of the family, what is perceived to be human characteristics are 
projected onto them. This kind of anthropomorphism signifies the animal as not-animal. 
Animal representationss such as ‘beast’ are predominantly therianthropic, a combination of 
human and animal forms. The representation of Satan as a half-human, half-animal beast 
exemplifies the power of the therianthropic image. Its anomalous nature provokes deep 
reactions and fear. The Devil is a metaphorical representation, a transposition of ideas along 
the vertical axis. Other animal referents such as the derogatory terms are typically 
theriomorphic. Signifiers such as ‘cow’, ‘dog’ and ‘pig’ are metonymic expressions that 
represent the association of ideas on the horizontal level. These different signifiers interact 
to produce the Referent discourse. Nonhuman animals are signified within the Referent 
discourse as inferior in order that humans can fulfil their desire to exist beyond the animal 
kingdom.
The Utensil Discourse
The participants characterised their relations with nonhuman animals in terms of their utility. 
The Utensil discourse describes those signifiers which constructed nonhuman animals as 
having some use for humans. Nonhuman animals were describes in terms of their utility
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whether they were pets, meat or terms of expression. As pets, animals were educational, 
entertaining, status symbols and decorative. As meat, animals were nutritional, a source of 
pleasure and had health benefits. As metaphors for humans, animals were parsimonious and 
useful images. Nonhuman animals as projections of human behaviour were also ‘scapegoats’. 
The signification of certain human behaviours as animalistic implied that these animals were 
morally reprehensible in their natural behaviour and that some other aspects of human 
behaviour were not, in fact, animalistic at all because humans were perceived as a special, 
unique category. The economic, cultural, social, health, naturalised and anthropocentric 
reasons for signifying, constructing and treating animals as objects provided the rationale for 
this discourse. Nonhuman animals are objects because people want to possess them. They 
are products because people want to consume them. They are commodities because people 
want to make financial gain from them. ‘Animal’ refers to what is not human because humans 
do not want to be animals. Nonhuman animals signify what is negative about human 
behaviour because humans want to justify treating other animals as less than human. 
Nonhuman animals are signified by the Utensil discourse because they are the means, the 
implements, by which people achieve these desires.
This analysis of the participants’ texts illustrates the content of the predominant discourses 
which is the material for moulding subjectivities. The analysis has concentrated on the 
emergent discourses and how they construct the concept of ‘animal’ and ‘animality’. These 
discourses indicate the extent to which human representations of other animals form a 
significant part of the relations which produce individual subjectivities. It would have been 
almost impossible to gain any insight to these issues by asking the participants if, and to what 
extent, they believed ‘animal identity’ formed part of their subjectivities. However, by 
exploring what these participants believed about nonhuman animals, in a variety of domains 
(pets, meat, images), it was possible to glean a sense of the importance of the human:animal 
dichotomy as it is invested in through these beliefs and behaviours. The following chapter will
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explore the construction of one of these nonhuman animal images, the ‘beast’. The 
participants identified the ‘beast’ as predominantly ‘animal’ and, when referring to humans, 
it implied negative characteristics. The role of the ‘beast’ in constructing and mediating 
definitions of human versus nonhuman animal identities will be the focus of Chapter Seven.
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This is what manners do, he said. They make the distinction between man and 
beast. (DTL 24 May 96).
Overview
In this chapter I analyse representations of the ‘beast’ in the British press by exploring the 
metaphorical use of the ‘beast’ through a semiological content analysis. I examine 950 
newspaper articles from 1st August 1995 to 31st August 1996 (see Chapter 5 for details). Any 
names using ‘beast’ such as references to ‘Beauty and the Beast’ films were eliminated from 
the analysis, leaving 834 articles. I constructed a coding frame for the three primary 
representations: ‘beast’ metaphors used to describe humans (n=288), ‘beast’ metaphors used 
to describe nonhuman ‘animals’ (n=339), and ‘beast’ metaphors used to describe inanimate 
‘objects’ (n=207). Further exploration led to sub-categories within each of these domains. 
The use of ‘object’ here is different to the identification of the Object discourse in the previous 
chapter. There, the Object discourse referred to the organisation of signifiers which served 
to objectify nonhuman animals. In that way, animal subjects were constructed as objects. 
Here, the code, object, refers to that category of inanimate things which does not include 
nonhuman animals. Here I use the word ‘object’ to refer to a category of ‘beast’ metaphors 
used to describe inanimate things. In the previous chapter, the interview participants signified 
nonhuman animals in ways which constituted objectification - the construction of an animate 
subject into an inanimate object. In this chapter, the use of ‘beast’ metaphors across all these 
categories is explored using semiotic and psychodynamic principles. I identify the denotative 
and connotative levels of signification and the ideological contexts which the use of these 
metaphors supports. I explore the differential use of anthropomorphism and zoomorphism, 
including the zoomorphic strategies of therianthropism and theriomorphism. This analysis 
examines to what extent taboo characteristics are dealt with through ‘beast’ metaphors and how 
the concept of taboo mediates binary oppositions between humans and other animals. The 
findings of this analysis support the relationship between the Referent Discourse and the 
Object Discourse illustrated in the previous chapter. A histogram represents the distribution 
of the ‘beast’ metaphors amongst the three domains:
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Figure 7.1: The Overall Distribution of ‘Beast’ Metaphors
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‘Beast’ metaphors referring to humans totalled 288 (34.5% of the total). In terms of 
frequency of metaphors, this was the second largest category after Animal. The Human 
category had five sub-categories of Body, Violence, Satanism, Enemy and Rare. Most of the 
metaphors were concentrated in the Body (n =  103) and Violence (n =  101) themes, whilst there 
were equal fewest (n= 20) in the Satanism and Rare sub-categories, and Enemy had an 
intermediate number (n=44). Details of the distribution of these metaphors, their meaning 
and article examples are presented in this section, beginning with a histogram.
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Figure 7.2: The Distribution of Human Beast Metaphors
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Somatophobia and the Mind:Body Dualism
The category, Body, encompasses the descriptions of physical appearance including size, facial 
features, attractiveness and the general aesthetics of a human being. The ‘beast’ metaphor 
used in these contexts was predominantly negative, referring to ‘ugliness’ and stereotypically 
unattractive physical qualities. The majority of the metaphors in the Human category were 
coded as ‘Body’ metaphors.
‘Beauty and the Beast’ was a common metaphor used to describe the relation between the 
unattractive and attractive. The headline: ‘Logic suggests style will overcome raw
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commitment in beauty and the beast encounter’ (DTL 13 Dec 95), was a reference to the 
‘ageing lions’ in the Republic of Ireland’s football team. However, the metaphor is extended 
to reveal further meanings of the ‘beast’, such as courage and spirit:
It is beauty versus the beast; total football v boot-ball; but such criticism has 
a positive rather than a negative effect on the Irish, who beat Holland when it 
comes to team spirit. If Ireland have to take on the rest of the world, too, then 
so be it.
The denotative level of signification originally is the ‘beast’ as the ‘ageing lion’, the 
connotative level of meaning refers to the associated characteristics of lions - fortitude, 
determination and tenacity. The ‘King of the Jungle’ myth informs these connotations making 
the meaning of ‘beast’ here not so obviously negative. The ‘beast’ can also be a powerful 
positive image, but here weakened by the inherent ageism associated with unattractiveness.
The more abstract related features of the beast’s body were encompassed by references to 
imprisonment in the following article:
He was clearly tense, jiggling his leg and pacing around like a caged beast.
(STL 21 Apr 96)
This metaphor refers to an actor in preparation for going on stage. The tension associated 
with nervousness of being frightened in easily encapsulated by the image of a ‘caged beast’ 
The caged status of a nonhuman animal, which this is a reference to, is a salient one, given 
the predominance of zoos, circuses and laboratory images depicting the ‘pacing’ behaviour of 
those animals.
Another very physical image of the ‘beast’ is of rapacity, the predatory search for food, often 
anthropomorphised into greed. The association between the hunting habits of nonhuman 
predators and the voracious desires of some humans is encapsulated in the following article 
referring to the press:
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.. .has grown into a ravenous beast hungry for every titbit of news the Downing 
Street staff throw at it. (TMS 19 Aug 95).
‘Ravenous beasts’ are common images that describe rapacious human behaviour. The 
denotative image of a hungry animal is almost inseparable from the morally imbued judgement 
of avarice and insatiability which informs the connotative level of signification. The 
mythologised ‘beast’, the belligerent monsterised nonhuman animal provides a complex, yet 
parsimonious, referent for human projection of human-constructed values and interpretations.
This ‘beast’ referent is an example of somatophobia (Spelman, 1982), fear of the body. The 
Christian and Cartesian mind/body dualism described in Part One, accounts for the relegation 
of the body to the status of ‘beast’. The human difficulty of acknowledging and accepting 
the dynamic integration of mind and body is reflected in the projection of the ‘beast’ onto the 
body. The body is ‘animal’. It bleeds, excretes and hurts, and these bodily functions are 
beyond the control of the conscious mind. The bifurcation of the human being into the 
physical body and spiritual/social mind is the root cause of the degradation of the body in 
favour of the mind, the repression of bodily functions, the projection of sexual desire and the 
taboo status of excretion. The relational nature of body and mind was pointed out by 
Henriques et al (1984:21):
The point that we are making is that whilst we should avoid founding a theory 
of subjectivity on a taken-for-granted biological origin, we cannot construct a 
position which altogether denies biology any effects. The only way to do this 
without granting either term of the biology-society couple the status of pregiven 
categories is to reconceptualize them in such a way that the implicit dualism is 
dissolved in favour of stressing the relational character of their mutual effects.
This quotation addresses the nature/nurture dualism which still dominates social psychology. 
The somatophobia, animal phobia and speciesism at the heart of the dualism prescribe it as the 
only scenario. The possibility of a relational character is subsumed beneath the prejudices of
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both schools of thought.
‘Red in Tooth and Claw’
Violence was the second largest category, close on the heels of Body. ‘Beast’ metaphors 
coded under the category, Violence, referred to all forms of physical violence. These included 
sexual violence, general brutality or savagery, institutional violence and the general violation 
of another human or other animal. Under the original piloted coding framework, sex was 
categorised separately. However, the pilot analysis revealed that the only sexual references 
to ‘beasts’ were those involving violence, usually rape or sexual assault of children. The 
recoded framework collapsed the sex category within the violence category. The references 
to ‘beasts’ in this category were dominated by ‘sex beast’. One of the typical references to 
‘beasts’ as violent sex offenders was an article on a convicted child killer who was suspected 
of killing a 13 year old girl: ‘Father’s Letter To Sex Beast: Father of Genette Tate Appeals 
For Meeting With Child Killer Robert Black’ (DMR 02 Jul 96). Black was also referred to 
as ‘sex-fiend’ and ‘fiend’ may also mean ‘beast’, referring to the monstrous, demonic and 
maniacal aspects of the metaphor. ‘Sex beast’ is a salient metaphor, used predominantly in 
the tabloids, to describe violent sex offenders. Of course, all sex offences are violent, 
however, this metaphor was used more frequently with offences against children rather than 
against women, suggesting that sexual assaults on children are perceived as inherently more 
violent or more ‘inhuman’ and, therefore, reprehensible than assaults on women. Humans 
only have acceptable sex between adults, so sexual assault of men on women is still considered 
‘human behaviour’ but with too much violence. However, sexual assault of an adult on a 
child (whether or not physical violence is used to achieve the assault) has no place in ‘human 
behaviour’, therefore, it is what ‘beasts’ do. This ignores the fact that sexually mature 
animals do not have sex with immature ones in any species except humans. The ability to 
quantify the suffering of those who have experienced sexual assault is beyond my imagination 
but the differential use of ‘beast’ metaphors in the press suggests otherwise.
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Sexual violence is bestial because nonhuman animal sexual relations are constructed as violent. 
Sociobiological stereotypes dictate that the male is sexually aggressive whilst the female is 
sexually passive. The details of sexual selection are not of concern here. However, the use 
of bestial images to convey meaning about human behaviour is a slippery semantic slope. The 
‘sex beasts’ of the tabloids are not a million miles away from the psychodynamic construction 
of human masculinity as animalistic. Sex is one of the important exceptions to the 
stereotypical rule that women are closer to nature than men. The notion of ‘stud’ used in 
agriculture is routinely applied to sexually active men. The animal images associated with 
human male sexuality are predominantly positive, conveying strength, agency, appetite and 
power. ‘Sex beast’ is not necessarily intended as a derogatory term in all contexts. Here, 
animality, sexuality and bestiality are ideological partners.
Brutality is a corollary to bestiality, the ‘brute’ and the ‘beast’ often serve the same function 
in bifurcating humans from nonhuman animals, as references such as ‘...the man known as 
"The Beast" for his brutality...’ (STL 26 May 96), referring to a Mafia godfather, indicate. 
Brutality is a word used to describe cruelty, often meaning without any compassion. It is a 
base form of violation, unforgiving and often unforgivable. Its derivation from brute and 
‘beast’ bind it to the synonymous function of ‘beast’ as ‘animal’. Being bestial is being 
animalistic; being brutal is an explicitly negative and semantically related consequence. The 
‘brutality’ of human behaviour is a rationalising description. In the endless search to separate 
humans from other animals, to elevate humans beyond the status of animals, human 
unacceptable behaviours are constructed as bestial and, therefore, projected onto the nonhuman 
animal representations.
Human violence is often conceptualised as bestial. In an article on Killing Me Softly, the 
television drama based on the true story of a woman who killed her husband after years of 
abuse, the actor who played the husband reports: ‘I wanted to play up the sympathy so that 
Malcolm doesn’t come over as just a beast.’ (DMR 06 Jul 96). Here, the important part of
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the metaphor is not that a man who is violent towards his wife is a ‘beast’, but that he could 
be 'just a beast’. Being merely a ‘beast’ implies that, as a human, the man had no redeeming 
qualities. The actor obviously believes that the husband did and, therefore, wishes to portray 
a fuller picture than is implied by the referent ‘beast’. The connotations refer to savagery and 
barbarism of ‘beasts’, the feral sadism of monsters. Though these ‘beasts’ might be figments 
of the human imagination, they are reified in the representations of the nonhuman animal 
world as brutal. Here, humans can not be simple ‘beasts’ for humans are more than animals.
As several authors have suggested (Baker, 1993, Birke, 1994, Adams, 1995) violence is one 
of the key human behavioural characteristics which is systematically projected onto animal 
images. The ‘beast’ is a representation of taboo. Physical violence is morally unacceptable 
within our culture and the representation of violence is an indication of the moral value 
attached to it. Violence is animalistic, it belongs to the animal world because nonhuman 
animals are constructed as amoral. However, when animalistic behaviour is introjected onto 
human behaviour it takes on an immoral tone. The immorality of human (animalistic) 
behaviour then feeds back into representations of the animal kingdom strewn with violent, 
immoral, sexually rapacious relations. Here, the symbolic animal dominates human 
understanding of the real animal.
This projection of human violence has two main functions. One is that it constructs violence 
within the ‘animal’ domain. This serves to justify the ontological divide between humans and 
other animals. Nonhuman animals’ apparent lack of morality and their ‘violent natures’ means 
that treating them as objects becomes easily justified and institutionalising the subjugation of 
the nonhuman animal world becomes legitimised. The other function is to support systems 
of legalised violence within humans. On the face of it, physical violence is obviously 
reprehensible, but this construction of violence as primarily physical, therefore bestial, feeds 
into representations of normal (morally acceptable) and abnormal (morally unacceptable) 
behaviour. The need to define oneself as ‘normal’ often leads to the stigmatisation of a
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suitable Other as abnormal. Physical violence provides a salient target for society to aim its 
moral disapproval at. However, the focus of physical forms of violence means that the 
naturalised conditions in society which produce that violence are ignored. Violence is not the 
exclusive characteristic of the ‘abnormal’ members of society. Rather, as societies are built 
on subject-object relations, the violation of the lives of certain members of society (human and 
nonhuman animals) is integral to each individual’s place in society. This form of violence is 
institutionalised. It is ideological and affects epistemological and ontological constructions of 
life. Violence is something we all take part in. Some forms of violence are more explicit and 
obvious and, therefore, subject to moral disapproval and legal sanctions. The displacement 
of moral outrage on these forms of violence ensure that those who are outraged deny their 
complicity in supporting and reproducing systems of ideological violence. Human brutality 
not only divides humans from other animals, it separates us amongst ourselves.
The use of violence against animals to violate women has been documented in chapter two. 
Here, the concept of bestiality is explored further. Bestiality is the sexual abuse of animals 
other than human. Its counterpart is the concept of zoophilia, an attempt to claim equal sexual 
relations between humans and other animals. The defence claims of zoophiliacs sound 
peculiarly similar to those of paedophiles, both these groups, predominantly of human males, 
use the suffix ‘phile’, meaning ‘lover’, in this case lover of nonhuman animals or human 
children. ‘Lover’ is used here literally as sexual lover, however, zoophiles and paedophiles 
often claim to love the animals and children as a defence to justify their abuse. Yet zoophiles 
are proponents of bestiality, like paedophiles are proponents of the sexual abuse of children.
The Therianthropic Devil
Beast metaphors coded under the category, Satanism, referred to devil-worship, the number 
of the beast, 666, demons and black magic. Satan was the chief fallen angel from the 
Kingdom of Heaven. He is characterised in Christian theology as the Devil, who is God’s 
primary adversary. Representations of the Devil as a ‘beast’ conform to the rules of
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theriomorphism and therianthropism (see Chapter 4). Theriomorphism and therianthropism 
are forms of zoomorphism. Baker (1993:108) makes the following connections between these 
terms and metonymy and metaphor:
Where animal imagery is used to make statements about human identity, 
metonymic representations of selfhood will typically take theriomorphic form, 
whereas metaphoric representations of otherness will typically take 
therianthropic form. In other words we tend to represent ourselves as wholly 
animal, but our others as only half-animal.
The Devil representations as ‘beasts’ conform to the metaphorical state of therianthropism. 
The predominance of half-man, half-animal images of the Devil are testament to the power 
of this chimeric image. The dissolution of boundaries and the restructuring of identity creates 
the anxiety and fear designed to be induced by Satan. Salvation from this terror is only to be 
found with God, whose representation as a grandfather-type Western male leaves no ambiguity 
about his humanness.
An article on Aleister Crowley, a man obsessed with violence, drugs, sex and black magic 
reported that his reputation as ‘The Great Beast’ (SMR 30 Jun 96) demonstrates the power of 
the therianthropic images which rests on its metonymic structure and the violation of species 
boundaries. The notion of physical integrity, well documented in Douglas’s (1969) analysis 
of pollution and taboo, and Leach’s (1964) analysis of animal categories and verbal abuse, has 
deep psychological foundations. The therianthropic image is a disturbing one because it 
violates natural (physical) structures by combining parts of discrete objects into a chimeric 
whole. People are able to project their fears of the physical integration of human and 
nonhuman by creating fantasy images to articulate their anxieties. The Devil crosses these 
tensions. The metaphysical need for Evil arises from the psychological construction of Good 
in the form of God. For any sense to be made of moral perfection, the personification of 
immorality is inevitable. The forces of Good and Evil, archetypal Derridean concepts, are 
played out in numerous myths and legends. Here though, the Christian reference to the Devil
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as a ‘beast’ is pertinent to the Christian construction of humans as not-animal.
In the Christian hierarchical scheme of things, humans are created in the image of God, and 
God gave humans ‘dominion’ over the ‘animals’. God, humans and animals are qualitatively 
different entities although humans are ontologically closer to God than they are to the ‘beasts’. 
The Christian construction and representation of the Devil, Satan, the fallen angel, as bestial 
plays on the moral implication of this hierarchical taxonomy. The Devil is more ‘animal’ than 
human, God is more ‘human’ than even humans are. This moral dichotomy forms a dynamic 
relation with representations of nonhuman animals. Prejudice against other animals is 
supported by the concept of a bestial Devil, whilst representations of the Devil as bestial is 
supported by the constructed bestiality of nonhuman animal behaviour, which is, is turn, 
naturalised through the projection of violent human behaviour as brutal, or animalistic.
The physical hybrid is a parallel metaphor for the cognitive hybrid. The fact that humans are 
animals means that it is impossible to separate human cognitive abilities from animal cognitive 
abilities, as one is part of the other. It only makes sense to differentiate cognitive abilities 
between species. Human thought processes are as much ‘animal’ as any other animal’s simply 
because we are animals. The behaviours which derive from these thought processes, such as 
sexual behaviour, which we manifestly share with many other animals, are, therefore, 
constructed as immoral and projected onto the bestial image. Whereas, the physical chimeras 
are the integration of visibly different forms (different species morphologies), the cognitive 
hybrid is a representation of the ‘invisible’ aspects of life such as thought processes, and in 
this sense the cognitive hybrid is impossible. It is a misnomer as the relation between human 
and animal cognition is not of a hybrid nature, it is one and the same thing. An attempt to 
construct a cognitive hybrid is at the heart of the fantasy chimeric constructions of half-human, 
half-animal. These physical hybrids are an attempt to address the deeper issues of cognitive 
continuity and discontinuity.
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Another aspect of the Christian construction of the Devil as bestial is the etymological roots 
of Lucifer as described by Lopez (1978). The Greek word for wolf is lukos, close to the term 
for light, leukos. The Latin homology of lupus and lucis is a linguistic linkage that associates 
the twilight prowling wolves with the fallen lightbearer Lucem Ferre - Lucifer, the angel who 
rebelled against God and the quintessential personification of darkness. The depiction of the 
Devil and his followers as half-animal is testament to the power and pervasiveness of the 
therianthropic image of the Other. The metaphorical use of the wolf will be explored in the 
following chapter on Wilderness.
The Bestial Enemy
The ‘beast’ metaphors coded under the category of Enemy referred to opposition, adversaries, 
rivals, antagonists or nemesis. They were usually characterised in terms of politics, sport, 
business or culture. In less racially aware times, the national or racial enemy, too, would have 
been subject to the reconstruction of the therianthropic image. Hybrid racist images of a 
variety of different ethnicities serve to heighten the concept of otherness. The enemy is not 
simply like an animal in a metonymic sense, the enemy is an animal in a bestial, metaphorical 
sense. Nowadays, the British press does not propound xenophobic images to the extent that 
they once did. These images have been diluted from bigotry to nationalism. However, the 
cultural institution of politics, sport and business provide plenty of opportunity for the 
dehumanisation of the Other.
The use of ‘beast’ to describe a political adversary was commonplace. The threatening nature 
of the opposition was encapsulated in the article on Tony Blair:
After wasting two years firing off in all directions, Tory strategists have 
refocused on a new, and, they claim, equally dangerous beast. They are 
portraying Mr Blair as an importer of continental social democrat ideas. (TMS 
08 Jul 96).
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The implicit notion of ‘beasts’ as monsters or predators (often conflated terms) mean that 
encounters with human adversarial ‘beasts’ are likely to be perceived as perilous. Beasts are 
threatening, not only because of their physical strength and predatory instincts, but also 
because they potentially jeopardise the boundaries between humans and other animals. In a 
Leachian sense, ‘beasts’ are simultaneously human and not-human, animal and not-animal. 
They cross the borders of conceptual beings in order to legitimise those borders. A ‘beast’ 
metaphor used in a sports context illustrates this point:
The return of the powerful Nadal does make them an even tougher proposition, 
although all the lurid propaganda about the so-called beast of Barcelona is as 
misplaced as it is liable to be counter-productive. (DML 22 Jun 96).
Representation of the opposition, whatever form it takes, as bestial supports Thomas’s (1983) 
notion that the dehumanisation (my term not his) of the Other makes the oppression or defeat 
of that Other possible, even desirable. The British labelling of another country’s sportsman 
as a ‘beast’ has as much to do with xenophobia as it does with the perceived power or brutality 
of Nadal. The zoomorphism of humans is a complex process requiring the initial denial of 
humans as animals and the subsequent projection or attribution of stereotypical nonhuman 
animal characteristics onto a given human or group of humans. Both zoomorphism and 
anthropomorphism are forms of dehumanisation, both strategies are based on the hierarchical 
dichotomy between humans and all other animals, and both are strategies for maintaining and 
legitimising that relationship.
Endangered Species
The ‘beast’ metaphors coded under the category of Rare referred to the unusual, different, 
unique, the strange and singular. The basis of this comparison was the concept of endangered 
species. ‘Beast’ has an implicit mythical dimension to it. The fantasy animals of the Animal 
Beast section are evidence of that. One of the characteristics of mythical animals is their 
rarity. Mythological status is unobtainable to the ubiquitous species. The concept of a rare
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beast is the conflation between the mythical status of the ‘beast’ and the use of the term to 
refer to endangered species. The mythologisation of endangered species is encapsulated in 
Kappeler’s comments:
[in relation to] the protection of endangered species, the fundamental 
presupposition remains that a moderate, ‘lawful’ amount of killing may take 
place. The aim is not to put an end to the slaughtering, the aim is moderate 
slaughtering, slaughtering ‘within limits’: permitted murder of individuals 
within a prohibition to exterminate the entire species....Self-interest is the 
motive, for the slaughters as well as the protectors, an interest that the survival 
of the species guarantees and to which the interests of individuals are being 
sacrificed. (Kappeler, 1995:326-7).
The rarity of the endangered ‘beast’ make it an exemplar of rare human qualities; rare, I 
presume because they are perceived as human ideals. The following article makes such a 
claim for ‘honour’:
He is rather an old-fashioned and rare beast, a man of honour, and neither the 
army nor British hockey are likely to forget it. (STM 16 Jun 96).
Old fashioned values and good qualities are represented as absent from modem British life. 
The nostalgia for the past echoes the romanticised images of the endangered species in relation 
to the reality of modem life and the status of British nonhuman animals. The image of the 
‘noble beast’ also informs this nostalgia, a representation akin to the ‘noble savage’ and 
equally condescending:
There’s something brave and unwhingeing about Shirley Bassey - something 
old-fashioned. She’s a noble beast. That’s what these people have come to 
see. (MOS 16 Jun 96).
Twenty or thirty years ago Shirley Bassey received a great deal of bad press - they could not 
make up their minds whether she was black or white, so they were always representing her 
as not cultural enough, in a Western enthnocentric sense, preferring to describe her sexuality
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through reference to ‘animality’. Now she is older, and having ‘stood the test of time’, she 
is allowed to be a noble beast, thus, giving her honorary (white) human status. Being ‘noble’ 
is about being magnanimous and admirable through having or being perceived to have human 
ideals of behaviour. This kind of behaviour is doubtlessly rare, if not impossible, as the 
fallibility of the human species is what denies us deification. Honesty is one such ideal and 
its status as rare in certain circumstances is exemplified in the following quotation:
Perhaps Jack should give Douglas Hogg credit for being that strange beast, an
honest Old Etonian: the rest of us skulk by on charm. (DTL 13 Apr 96).
Being rare, being unusual, fits the human understanding of other animals on two levels. First, 
there is the denotative level of signification, rare ‘beasts’ are rare nonhuman animals, 
endangered species, either through natural selection or, more usually these days, through loss 
of habitat, pollution or hunting. The rare ‘beast’ is the endangered beast. However, at the 
connotative level of signification, rarity is more about strangeness, the extraordinary, and 
many nonhuman animals, throughout human history, have appeared as strange, different 
beings, unknowable and indecipherable. Before ethological studies, human understanding of 
nonhuman animals was confined to the duel strategies of anthropomorphism and zoomorphism. 
Nowadays, human understanding of other animals has been greatly informed by naturalistic 
studies and the dissemination of information through the media (a double-edged sword if ever 
there was one). However, dehumanisation continues as a method of transforming the alien 
into the native.
Anthropomorphism is a way of getting to know other animals and, simultaneously, getting to 
know ourselves. Anthropomorphism works as a heuristic because humans are animals, 
therefore consciously attributing, or unconsciously projecting, some human characteristics onto 
other species makes sense. We all evolved through the same mechanisms. The content of 
what we do may be hugely different, but the reasons why we do things may equally be 
surprisingly similar. Anthropomorphism does not work when it takes on an anthropocentric
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tone, when the world works and is measured from a human value-laden point o f view. This 
defeats the notion that humans are animals in the same way that all animals are animals, as it 
presupposes an ontological divide, or epistemological hierarchy at the very least.
7.2 The Animal Beast
M ost o f the ‘beast’ metaphors were coded under the Animal category (n=339), forming 
40.6% of the total number of metaphors coded. These metaphors were distributed amongst 
five sub-categories: Fantasy, Wild, Domestic, Work and Generalised Other. The majority of 
the metaphors by far were coded as Wild (n =  139). Fewest were coded as W ork (n=46), 
whist the intermediates were Fantasy (n=60) and equal numbers (n= 47) for Domestic and 
Generalised Other. Details of the distribution of these metaphors, their meanings and article 
examples are presented in this section, beginning with a histogram.
Figure 7.3: The Distribution of Animal Beast Metaphors
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Fantasy Animals
The ‘beast’ metaphors coded under the category, Fantasy, referred to mythical animals, aliens 
or hybrids. The fantastical images and myths relating to nonhuman animals reflect the way 
modem Britons relate to other species. These reflections constitute the multiplicity of roles 
which animals play in human cultural and psychological lives. The imaginary beasts give 
insight to the human imagination. Indeed, mythical beasts are a ubiquitous part of human 
legends (South, 1987). An English cultural ‘beast’ of mythology is the dragon, heroically 
slain by St George, England patron saint:
In the satisfyingly weird opening ceremony at Euro 96, St George fought the 
dragon. Being none too bright and a bit lumbering, this beast was the perfect 
opposition for the direct and spirited English approach. (DTL 15 Jun 96).
In the typology of things, dragons are, undoubtedly, animals, fantastical creations of the 
human imagination. These mythical monsters are chimeric, often with reptilian bodies and 
wings, with a tendency to breathe fire. Satan was once commonly referred to as ‘the old 
Dragon’, nowadays the referent is used to describe women as part of the plethora of bestial 
pejoratives.
Fantasy animals often exemplify human ideals through magical powers. The unicorn, pegasus 
and other creatures which inhabited the ancient mythical worlds played parts in parables which 
retold human moral systems through typical narrative structures. The nonhuman animal 
chimeras do not imbue a sense of fear as do the human therianthropic images of devils and 
demons because the boundaries they cross are not subject to the ontological distinction which 
separates humans from other animals.
Wild Beasts
The Wild category contained by far the most references to nonhuman animal ‘beasts’. ‘Wild’ 
has several meanings. Predominantly, it signifies being untamed or undomesticated. It can 
also mean violent or disordered. The positive side to these meanings is the notion of freedom,
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a somewhat sentimentalised, romantic human construct, to be explored in the following 
chapter. The untamed notion of wild implies not only freedom but the more negative 
interpretation of being uncontrollable and, therefore, threatening. The landscape against 
which the concept of ‘wild’ is situated is the wilderness. The animals which symbolise 
freedom are often metaphors for human desire to escape the constraints of the modem world.
For Britain, and much of the ‘Western’ world, the ‘wild beasts’ inhabited the wilderness of 
the African, South American and Indian continents. These places were also home to 
‘savages’, humans who were apparently so close to the natural world as to render the 
distinction between these humans and other animals almost meaningless. These stereotypical 
images of the past resonate in the modem world with representations of nonwhites as more 
physical, sexual, heretical and irrational. The nonhuman animals which lived in these strange, 
distant lands were utterly different to homegrown ‘beasts’. Imported and caged in zoos across 
the Western world, these earthly aliens came to represent the natural world in the ever 
increasing industrialised nations. The metaphors which grew from these initial contacts 
represented the strangeness of these animals. The size of one animal helped ground a 
metaphorical image:
‘Everyone’s been looking at the elephant in different ways. Now we are
beginning to see the whole beast’. (DML 11 Jul 96).
A native inhabitant of Britain, the fox, has attracted a large amount of media attention 
recently. The proposed bill to ban fox hunting with hounds produced a huge response 
reflecting the ambivalent attitudes that British people have towards other animals. The debates 
that centred on rural versus urban Britain, class issues, freedom to pursue ‘sport’, and animal 
welfare versus animal rights are interesting in themselves and highly indicative of the extent 
to which nonhuman animal issues are profound human issues. Nevertheless, these issues are 
not my concern here. In terms of bestial representations, what is interesting is the extent to 
which foxes were maligned as ravenous beasts. Before these debates on fox hunting, a writer
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for the Daily Telegraph described the fox as:
The fox is a handsome, intelligent and even admirable beast but, like many 
wild animals, it is a clever and ruthless killer. (DTL 04 Jul 96).
The extent to which humans are in a place to describe species qualities which subsume 
individual members of that species, when the equivalent is abhorred in relation to humans, is 
an interesting sideline. The main crux of the matter here is the extent to which this writer 
attributes ‘intelligence’ and ‘ruthlessness’ to all foxes. Undoubtedly some foxes are more or 
less ‘intelligent’ just as humans are, however, ruthlessness is another matter altogether. To 
be ruthless is in a sense to be brutal, merciless and inhuman. To have compassion has been 
appropriated as exclusively human, yet to not have it, to be ‘ruthless’, is attributed to other 
animals with ease. The term ‘ruthless’ is value-laden with moral overtones. To the extent 
that the moral capacities of foxes are unknown to humans, to talk of them as being ‘ruthless’ 
makes little sense, unless the aim is to ‘dehumanise’ the fox. As compassion is a human 
quality, denying the fox compassion by constructing them as ‘ruthless’ constructs the fox, 
within human terms, as inhuman. Leach (1964:52) accounts for the issue as:
Just as the obscene rabbit, which is ambiguously game or vermin, occupies an 
intermediate status between the farm and field categories [see Chapter 2], the 
fox occupies the borderline between edible field and inedible wild animals. In 
England the hunting and killing of foxes is a barbarous ritual surrounded by 
extraordinary and fantastic taboos.
Foxes are not human. However, representing foxes within the human moral domain as 
immoral is a necessary strategy in order to dehumanise them. Dehumanised nonhuman 
animals, even more so then dehumanised human animals, are perfect for bearing the brunt of 
human moral outrage and suffering the consequences of their perceived immorality. Here, 
again, the concept of the ‘beast’ transcends the lines between species. Foxes, and other 
animals, are beasts because humans project bestial characteristics onto them. An escaped 
‘wild boar’ represented the same issues. Nonhuman animals on the loose are bestial because
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they have violated their imprisonment:
For several months police had been trying to corral the beast which alarmed 
villagers in Hatfield Peveral and Wickham Bishops by wandering into their 
gardens. (DTL 03 Apr 96).
Equally, any nonhuman animal which threatens a human is acting, in some sense, immorally:
The jaws of the beast remained tightly locked on the man’s hooter, even after 
his friends had cut off its head. (DMR 15 Jan 96).
There is a profound relationship between humans and their conception of the ‘wild’. The wild 
is represented as the antithesis to human civilisation and for that reason, throughout history, 
humans have attempted to subjugate the wilderness and its inhabitants, whether human or 
nonhuman. The representation of nonhuman animals which threaten the legitimacy of human 
control and exploitation of the wild as bestial ensures the moral righteousness of this 
oppression. However, the fate of many of these animals has been as described by Birke 
(1994:19):
We have subdued animals to make them domesticated, tamed by contrast to 
those existing ‘in the wild’. We domesticate them as beasts of burden in 
agriculture, as companions in our homes, for sport of various kinds. Taming 
may, in other circumstances, imply removing the animal symbolically from its 
wilderness; at its extreme, this may mean that the animal either becomes, or is 
controlled by, a machine.
Domestic and Dehumanised
The ‘beast’ metaphors coded under the category, Domestic, referred to selectively bred 
animals used for production and consumption, in other words, agricultural animals. Here is 
the flip side to the ‘wild beast’, the tamed animal, but still, nonetheless, a beast. Animals 
which we eat, we might well want to represent as ‘beasts’. Beasts, generally, do not invoke 
sympathy, note there is no category for pet animals described as beasts. Here, domestic
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‘beasts’ signify the deanimalisation of animals. This is a complex process contingent on many 
factors. One is that ‘animal’ is polysemic, the meaning of a pet cat is almost the antithesis to 
a domestic pig. If one takes the highest order in welfare or rights status given to any animal, 
then pet animals feature highly as family members receive more consideration than the family 
dinner. Therefore, the process of deanimalisation here is really a process of dehumanisation 
because pet animals are not in the Leachian sense wholly animals. Structurally, pet animals 
are a naturalised anomaly. They are imbued with human characteristics. Consequently, the 
deanimalisation of agricultural animals as ‘beasts’ is actually the dehumanisation of those 
animals based on the human construct of pet animals as not-animal.
Human guilt about the rearing and killing of other animals is rationalised away through 
psychodynamic means. As seen in the previous chapter, agricultural animals are used 
ubiquitously as terms of abuse - ‘fat cow’, ‘greedy pig’ and ‘cowardly chicken’ are a few of 
them. These representations support speciesist discourses about these animals - they are ‘part 
of the food chain’, ‘if we didn’t eat them, they wouldn’t exist’. These rationalisations are key 
mechanisms for maintaining a moral and social distance between the way we treat our pets and 
the way we treat our meat. The dehumanisation of animals is inherent to the 
anthropomorphism of animals. These processes are selective but the underlying qualities are 
the same. Intelligence, personality and affection are described as key elements in good pets, 
the same qualities are denied to other animals based on human exploitation of them.
There is an obvious connection between the representation of agricultural animals as bestial.
Human anxiety about eating other animals is bound to be allayed by the representation of those
animals as ‘beasts’, a representation which simultaneously objectifies those animals and
provides a rationale for human consumption of them. The use of this image is played out in
this article for full effect:
Never mind milking the sacred cow, the Pistols intended to carve it up, make 
burgers and feed them raw to the public. If the beast in question had BSE, all 
the better. (MOS 30 Jun 96).
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The concept of the ‘beast’ mediates the living animal and the dead meat. Agricultural animals, 
on the whole, do not have reputations for aggressiveness or hostility to humans. Cows, sheep, 
pigs and poultry are not renowned for their despicable natures. Killing these animals for food 
requires some kind of rationalisation for any guilt that might be attached to their slaughter. 
The metaphorical use of their species names to abuse verbally humans is one way of 
subjugating their status and creating negative images of them. The ‘beast’ metaphor, a 
predominantly negative image implying brutality and savagery, is another way of constructing 
the agricultural animal as negatively as possible. And where it is possible to exploit humans 
based on their representation as bestial, it is almost desirable to exploit, though of course it 
is not seen in these terms, nonhuman animals based on their representation as ‘beasts’:
From the sweeping prairies of the west to the genteel pastures of New England, 
the cow is facing a challenge as the beast of choice for a burger. (STM 12 May 
96).
Closer to home, one of the most controversial artists of modem Britain is Damien Hirst. His 
agricultural animals suspended in formaldehyde are examples of postmodern artistic 
representation, the collapse of genres as the realism of traditional art is taken to its logical 
conclusions with the presentation of the real object, harking back to a traditional artistic skill, 
taxidermy. Outrage against Hirst has taken the form of the welfarists. The real dead animal 
and the roast dinner are estranged concepts that allow meat eating welfarists to convey their 
sense of disgust at the apparent morbidity of these works. Yet the art critic’s appreciation of 
Hirst’s work may be close to the artist’s intentions:
The skill of such an art [taxidermy] is to enliven a carcass so well that the 
viewer is momentarily fooled that the beast is alive. In this skill Damien Hirst 
excels: with their gracefully arched backs and delicately placed hooves, Hirst’s 
pickled beasts serenely capture the joys of the farmyard and take them to an 
urban audience. (STL 03 Dec 95).
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‘Capturing joy’ through death is undoubtedly some kind of achievement, however, the essence 
of this writer’s critique holds true even if his details are mythical. Pets, zoos, cuddly toys and 
artistic representations of nonhuman animals are continual attempts of human to know 
nonhuman animals but on human terms. Dead calves do not tell us anything about factory 
farming and the lives and deaths of agricultural animals except that, in this representation, 
death is acceptable. Displaying death may be contested, but the actual death is part and parcel 
of the ‘joys of the farmyard’. Whilst I agree with this critic’s appreciation of urban Britain’s 
desire for the ‘natural’, my reading of the details of this work of art differs. I see it as a 
representation of horror, the terrifying juxtaposition of life and death, the inability to 
appreciate one without the other, the terrorising image of happiness and freedom frozen 
forever in the rigour mortis of death. The representation of agricultural animals in children’s 
story books are another example of the horror of myth. Polysemic interpretations are the 
explicit definitions of art. Artistic creativity lends itself to numerous interpretations, however, 
the description of the dead calf by the art critic as a ‘beast’ is indicative of the contradictory 
status of agricultural animals and the dubious claims in relation to the reality of farm life.
An interesting example of how nonhuman animal categories are culturally determined was 
presented in an account of eating ‘dog’. It may be conspicuous through its absence that none 
of the ‘animal’ beast category has a reference to pets. However, pets are not bestial, they are 
family members and, therefore, their absence is consistent with the British classification of 
nonhuman animals. Here, however, dog as meat is referred to as a ‘beast’:
I recently heard a gourmet acquaintance describe a Korean dog delicacy with 
unsavoury relish. The meat, he said, was more succulent than that of any other 
beast he had ever eaten. (DTL 25 Aug 95).
The context in which a dog could be referred to as a ‘beast’ has all the hallmarks of the way 
a cow or pig might be referred to as ‘beasts’. The literal and symbolic transformation of an 
animal into a product requires this process of dehumanisation. The cultural contexts may vary
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but the means by which the exploitation of the nonhuman animal world is achieved shares 
many characteristics. I could not apply these findings universally, nor would I want to since 
there is much that is peculiar to this nation of ‘animal-lovers’. However, the increasing 
‘globalisation’ of industry, the homogenising effects of the mass media and the massive 
advances in technology are making the world a much smaller place, and the everyday practices 
of living life in relation to other animals may be becoming less localised and more subject to 
hegemonic ideologies.
Beasts of Burden
Work ‘beasts’ comprised a group of domesticated animals which were bred for work but not 
consumption; for example, horses. These included ‘beasts of burden’, trained animals, 
entertainment animals and animals used for labour. When nonhuman animals are not 
culturally constructed as suitable for food, they are often subject to other forms of use. These 
animals were used extensively before industrialisation. Nowadays, their use comes in the form 
of entertainment. This utilitarian theme reflects the human tendency to dichotomise animals 
into ones to have relationships with and others to be used (Arluke, 1988; Russow, 1989).
An entertainment nonhuman animal, the bull, is represented as a ‘beast’ not only to justify the 
exploitation of the bull but to contribute to the bravado attributed to the matador. This 
archetypal battle between ‘man and beast’ is played out in arenas across Spain and is cherished 
as part of Spanish culture and heritage. The representation of the bull as bestial is a necessary 
precursor to the glory heaped on the matador after he has killed the bull. One of the few 
female bull fighters did not quite manage the kill in a blaze of glory:
Sanchez eventually managed to kill the beast as it collapsed exhausted in a
comer. (STM 07 Jul 96).
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An example of British tensions in relation to other animals was evident in the debate on 
‘dangerous dogs’ in the wake of attacks on children. With reactionary sentiments running 
high, the government banned certain breeds of dogs. The hitherto lack of reference to pets 
as ‘beasts’ is not remedied here, rather the status of certain dogs as ‘killers’ precedes the 
notion of them being legitimate pets. These ‘beasts’ might make suitable working guard dogs 
but their place as family members is severely contested, as one writer comments:
It has the genes of a killer: Why anybody in society, beyond those trained to 
control professional guard dogs, should be allowed to own such a beast is 
beyond me. (STM 24 Mar 96).
Certain nonhuman animals can be pets, but only the kind of pets that ‘good’ pets make. 
Humans want nonhuman animals on human terms. These animals are not only ideological 
creations but also physical creations, designed by humans for human use. The artificial 
breeding of ‘wild’ dogs into modem day pedigrees, speciesism at its most grotesque, has 
produced animals that humans no longer want. When the animal becomes a menace to 
humans, the animal will always lose out despite the circumstances, despite the provocations, 
despite the human responsibilities. Frankenstein’s ‘monster’, the allegorical human created 
‘beast’, was the victim of Dr. Frankenstein not vice versa.
The Generalised Other
This category of Generalised Other reflected the differentiation between humans and all other 
animals. In this context, all nonhuman animals were referred to as an undifferentiated 
category of ‘beast’. This dichotomy reflects the dual meaning of beast as a technical 
(interchangeable) term for animal (nonhuman) and as a negative term in the hierarchy between 
humans and other animals. In Derridean (1978) terms, the definition of humans is dependent 
on the subordinated definition of animal. The representations of ‘beasts’ as having strength 
and stamina, presumably based in the metaphorical and literal use of ‘beasts of burden’, is 
evident in a number of references to human physical endeavours:
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The significance of the statistics has certainly not escaped McCoist, who, 
according to Brown, ‘has been training like a beast and smiling all through it’.
(DTL 14 Jul 96).
Similes, however, were often substituted by statements of contrast when ontological 
distinctions were to be made between humans and other animals based on arbitrary factors:
That is what manners do, he said. They make the distinction between man and 
beast. (DTL 24 May 96).
Indeed, where there was any recognition of nonhuman animal suffering at the hands of 
humans, it too relapsed into dualist terminology and impoverished the argument through such 
epistemological assumptions:
It is not the first indication that modem food technology, driven relentlessly by 
the profit motive, may destroy the natural barriers between man and beast 
which protect us from countless complaints from which animals suffer - many 
of which we are totally unaware of. (DML 30 Apr 96).
These references to ‘working like a beast’, ‘man and beast’ and the like are metaphorical 
reflections of ontological divides. The model of dehumanisation suggests that the relation 
between the construction of human subjectivity and the construction of animal identity is 
psychodynamic. The process is shaped by social strategies and psychoanalytical defence 
mechanisms. The hegemonic ideological discourses which are produced and reproduced 
everyday by individuals’ positioning in relation to the Other provide the most salient forms 
of knowledge about other animals. The discursive nature of knowledge means that it is 
imbued with power that determines what is culturally acceptable and what is not. This process 
of naturalisation of belief systems interactively produces subjectivities which are dependent 
on the subordination of the Other. The hierarchical relation between humans and nonhumans 
is semantically, and ideologically, interdependent but the psychodynamic process of 
naturalisation renders these two categories distinct givens. Dehumanisation is the process
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which consciously and unconsciously links these two domains. The human dependency on 
their construction of nonhuman animal identity as inferior is a prerequisite to the formation 
and legitimisation of human subjectivity. The anthropocentric construction of identity means 
that human characteristics are the measure of subjective life. Nonhuman animals are 
anthropomorphised in order that they may be dehumanised.
7.3 The Object Beast
The least number of ‘beast’ metaphors in a particular category were coded under the Object 
category (n=207), which is 24.8% of the total. There were five sub-categories to the Object 
‘beast’ metaphors including Obstacle, Power, threat, Size and Other. Most of these metaphors 
were coded as Power (n =76), whilst the least were coded as Threat (n=24). The intermediate 
categories were Size (n= 41), Other (n=34) and Obstacle (n =  32). The distribution of these 
metaphors, their meanings and article examples are presented in this section, beginning with 
a histogram.
Figure 7.4: The Distribution of Object Beast Metaphors
Obstacle Power Threat Size Other
Object Beast Metaphors
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Overcoming Obstacles
The ‘beast’ metaphors coded under the category of Obstacle referred to the taming of the 
‘beast’, overcoming barriers, hurdles, restraints and deterrents, and triumphing over nature. 
These objectified representations are based on the legendary discourses about human slaying 
beasts. The ‘beast’ as enemy, the demonised animal, is the referent for these object beasts. 
Many of these metaphors were sports references, overcoming the opposition and ‘taming the 
beast’ were salient referents:
Surrey’s opening pair made the pitch look a much tamer beast while they 
rattled up a partnership of 85 in the remainder of the morning session. (DTL 
06 Jul 96).
The ‘beast on my back’ metaphor also enjoyed the obstacle status, and this kind of 
metaphorical persecution suggests a power inversion of the relationship between human and 
‘beast’, but still one that is dependent on the negative connotations of ‘beast’:
The day I decided to break up the band, it was like an enormous beast had been 
lifted off my back I could finally get on with this other stuff, the stuff I feel in 
my guts to be right. (TMS 21 Jun 96).
One of the most common objects referred to as ‘beasts’ were cars. Cars are notably 
anthropomorphised. Often referred to as ‘she’, yet also cultural icons to masculinity and 
phallic representation, cars are one of the few objects which receive the kind of 
anthropomorphic attribution that nonhuman animals do. References to cars as ‘beasts’ were 
notable in several of the Object categories. Their size, power, human control and potential 
threat are features that cars share in common with the stereotypical image of nonhuman animal 
‘beasts’:
And when you get the beast rolling, another problem rears its ugly head: 
vibration. The new engine has the same basic design as a Formula One unit 
where refinement is not really an issue. (STM 19 May 96).
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‘The nature of the beast’ is a metaphor that cropped up time and time again, and here it is a 
reference to the obstacle of writer’s block.
The writer’s block - by this time I could no longer deny the nature of the beast 
- was all the more bewildering for coming out of the blue. ( DTL 30 Sep 95).
In general, the ‘nature of the beast’ is a metaphor based on the biological bases of nonhuman 
animal behaviour. Here, the essence of the phrase is captured by the meaning of ‘nature’. 
The common objection to the notion of the ‘natural’, that it is deterministic and reductionist, 
is based on the dualistic opposition of ‘nature’ to ‘culture’. The nature/nurture debate is still 
pervasive within social sciences, as the dualistic paradigm perpetuates itself, and these 
meanings imbue the nonscientific world. To talk about the ‘nature’ of an entity is to attempt 
to describe its essence, unchanging character. The ‘nature of the beast’ suggests that there is 
a fundamental character which exists and which can be described and accessed. Humans often 
talk about other animals in this way, denying them complex social interactions, environmental 
learning, agency and subjectivity. The human identity attributed to nonhuman animals is 
predetermined by the notion that ‘beasts’ are simple manifestations of essential ingredients.
Power of the Beast
The Power ‘beast’ metaphors referred to strength, fortitude, stamina, authority and energy. 
These are the characteristics which define the ‘beast’ as an adversary, but put to human 
advantage they become the key elements of power desired in certain objects, notably cars. 
However, there were other references to power which were about cognitive rather than 
physical strength:
A PC with Windows 3.1 installed, and all the software you need, is still a 
powerful beast, and the cost of moving to 95, when you add in extra memory, 
processing power and possibly disk space, will remain substantial. (STM 28 
Jan 96).
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Power underpins the other categories in this Object beast section - Obstacle, Threat and Size. 
Indeed, the categories here are more interrelated than those for Human or Animal ‘beast’ 
metaphors. The reason for this is that objects do not live in any biological sense, have no 
sentience or agency, and, therefore, no conscious behaviour. They are, in all the references 
here, under the control of humans, usually built by humans to suit some function or the other. 
There is no form of interaction like there is between two animals (human or otherwise), no 
emotion or desire, no telos in Rollin’s (1992) terms. Consequently, the uses of these objects 
will significantly determine their representations (as they do for other animals) with the 
proviso that these anthropomorphic and zoomorphic projections and attributions are limited 
by the absence of conscious behaviour. When objects were represented as threatening ‘beasts’ 
it was because these objects - institutions, businesses or corporations - consisted of people.
The Threatening Beast
The threat ‘beast’ metaphors referred to fear of domination, intimidation, danger, menace and 
fear of the other. Again, the notion of the threatening ‘beast’ ties into the representation of 
‘beasts’ as strong adversaries. Corporations, businesses and institutions, though comprised 
by people, were coded as Objects because these metaphors did not refer to humans beings 
themselves but the organisations which humans built and represented:
‘They thought that being a minority group no longer mattered in a civilised 
Europe, and they thought the wild beast had been tamed ... The wild beast is 
out there, and the ground feels steady under my feet’. (MOS 26 May 96).
The representation of an injured nonhuman animal as threatening was drawn upon to make 
similar claims about organisations:
A wounded beast can be dangerous when cornered. Computer games retailer 
Rhino, badly gored in the High Street jungle, is fighting back. (DML 14 Oct 
95).
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The implicit notion that beasts are powerful and adversarial informs these images of threat and 
danger. Yet the power of the ‘beast’ mirrors the power of dehumanisation. Beasts are not 
only constructed as powerful so that humans gain some sense of glory through destroying 
them. Their power is more clandestine and, therefore, more potent. This power resides in 
the threat that ‘beast’ poses as an anomalous category, somewhere between human and 
nonhuman, neither wholly one or the other. Because humans have bifurcated the category 
‘animal’ into human and animals, the desire to know the animal, both the human animal and 
other animals, is reconciled through the metaphorical construction of the ‘beast’. The ‘beast’ 
walks an unsteady line between maintaining the dualism between humans and other animals 
through representing anthropomorphic and zoomorphic strategies, and denying the dichotomy 
through representing the continuity amongst species.
Sizing the Beast
‘Beasts’ are often described as large animals, a representation which complements the notion 
of threat and power. In the Object category, the Size metaphors referred to the immensity of 
objects as well as their huge presence and far reaching effects. The devouring image of the 
‘beast’ is drawn upon in this rapacious metaphor:
Some boxes have a higher letter capacity than others. The hungriest box is the 
Town and Country - a C-Type Siamese twinned beast with double slots and 
dual cages inside, each holding 4.8 cubic feet of mail. (DML 18 Jun 96).
The anthropomorphisation of architecture is a common strategy aimed at getting to grips with 
the power of this form of construction and representation. Comprehending huge lifeless 
objects through reference to the bestial construction of animals provides a heuristic link 
between one form of construction and another:
‘The cathedral here is like some huge, living beast,’ reflects the artist Honor 
Brogan, who has been commissioned by the festival to draw and paint it for an 
exhibition in its chapterhouse. (STL 07 Jul 96).
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Moreover, cars were again subject to bestial representation with their size this time being the 
connecting factor:
It’s too big a beast somehow to negotiate narrow roads with parked cars. (DML 
09 Dec 95).
Other
Not all the Object metaphors could be categorised as well as the Human or Animal metaphors. 
Some miscellaneous references were coded as Other.
Discussion
In the Human category, representations of the ‘beast’ drew on nonhuman animal imagery. 
The representations of rapacious predators, the sexual and physical violence of ‘nature, red 
in tooth and claw’, endangered species, caged animals, the therianthropic images of the Devil 
and the enemy based on the power of the anomalous image of half-human half-animal, all 
these images were drawn from what people think they know of the nonhuman animal world. 
In the (nonhuman)Animal category, representations of the ‘beast’ also drew on nonhuman 
animal imagery. Representations of endangered species, the synonymous references to 
‘beasts’ as animals, the dehumanisation of domestic animals, the reproduction of animal 
‘warfare’, and the general human:animal dichotomy, all these representations of Animal 
‘beasts’ drew, again, on what people think they know about the nonhuman animal world. In 
the (inanimate) Object category, representations of the ‘beast’ drew on several aspects of the 
same theme, the literal and symbolic threat of nonhuman animals.
Nonhuman animal imagery was the primary metaphor for the representation of humans, 
nonhuman animals and inanimate objects. The predominance of this zoomorphism explains 
how the Object discourse, as described in the previous chapter, relates to the Referent
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discourse. The representation chosen here was ‘beast’. The categories which emerged from 
the coding were Human, (nonhuman) Animal and (inanimate) Object. The use, primarily, of 
nonhuman animal imagery to describe these three domains of ‘beast’ representations indicates 
the relation between ‘beast’, ‘human’, ‘animal’ and ‘object’. It supports the human:animal 
dichotomy and the subject:object dichotomy. Human characteristics were not 
anthropomorphised to either the (nonhuman) Animal or the (inanimate) Object category. 
Human and Object ‘beasts’ were, essentially, nonhuman animal ‘beasts’. These dichotomies 
suggest that equation of (nonhuman) Animal and (inanimate) Object, therefore, the 
human(subject):animal(object) dichotomy. Here is the influence of the Object discourse which 
organised the interview participants’ significations which defined nonhuman animals. The 
zoomorphic strategies employed here indicate that the representation ‘beast’ is literally and 
symbolically associated with nonhuman animals. The way in which the representation is 
employed suggests its basis in the objectification of nonhuman animals. Here, the 
subject:object dichotomy, as described in Chapter 2, is repeated in the humanranimal 
dichotomy.
Figure 7.5: Constructing the ‘Beast’ *
Therianthropism
(ii) ZOOMORPHISM
Theriomorphism
ANIMAL
HUMAN
(Self) ((iii)'BEASr humannonhuman
(i) ANTHROPOMORPHISM
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(i) Humans anthropomorphise nonhuman animals with ‘human’ characteristics. A prime 
example of this are pet animals. These animals are not beasts, they were absent from the 
analysis. However, they are still possessions as evident in the Object discourse described in 
Chapter 6. Anthropomorphism from humans to nonhumans is a one-way process.
(ii) Humans zoomorphise nonhuman and human animals as bestial. Zoomorphism consists of 
two processes - therianthropism and theriomorphism. Zoomorphism of humans is a form of 
dehumanisation. Humans who are dehumanised through zoomorphic constructions may 
engage in the two-way process of unconscious intersubjective investment by participating in 
the zoomorphic and anthropomorphic projections.
(iii) The ‘beast’ is a zoomorphic construction based on the equation of animality with the 
bestial and/or brutal. ‘Beast’ here may refer to human or nonhuman animals. However, 
despite this semantic overlap, it maintains the ontological divide between ‘human’ and 
‘animal’ through its primary meaning as ‘animal’.
‘Beast’ metaphors represent the ‘bad’ part of the psychodynamic split of ‘animal’. The 
metaphors analysed here were predominantly based on the concept of ‘beast=animal’. This 
image was used to describe humans, nonhuman animals and inanimate objects. The 
dominance of the ‘animal’ meaning of ‘beast’ attests to its role in the dehumanisation of 
humans and its equation with the ‘object’ status of inanimate things.
‘Beast’ is synonymous with nonhuman animal and is also a negative representation of human 
animals. This inherent anthropocentrism naturalises the speciesist construction of ‘animal’ as 
the moral antithesis to ‘human’. Nonhuman animal meanings were invoked across the three 
categories of human, nonhuman animals and inanimate objects. The zoomorphic strategy of 
constructing the ‘beast’ is evidence of the psychodynamic split of ‘animal’ (‘bad’) in humans 
into the Other - either other humans, nonhuman animals or inanimate objects. The projection
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of the ‘beast’ protects the ontological status of ‘human’ as distinct from and superior to 
‘animal’.
Like gender, the ‘beast’ has multiple meanings. The suppressed signification of the bestial is, 
perhaps paradoxically, closer to the truth of our relationship as biological beings to other 
species. Our animality, the ‘beast inside’, is forever projected onto the ‘beast outside’, the 
signified animal, the non-human, or at very least the dehumanised human. In this continual 
play of suppression, the expressed is rational, reasonable, moral, human. The expressed 
human signification is, thus, privileged, naturalised, mythologised and, ultimately, mystified. 
This splitting of differences through introjection and projection is the key to unconscious 
positioning in discourses. Here, the discursive contents of those splits support the findings of 
the previous chapter: the dominance of the Referent and the Object discourses as the 
predominant organisers of nonhuman animal signifiers. This continual, dynamic, interplay 
between the unconscious mind and hegemonic discourses constructs human subjectivity so that 
borders between self and society are no longer visible. The illusion of self-containment is 
shattered, yet the subject is recognisable. The deconstruction of this illusory and delusionary 
dualism renders human experience and existence so much more complex and rich. 
Assumptions about nature and culture also begin to fade. The constricting chains of duality 
and opposition, of hierarchy and hegemony, appear in their true colours as constructions, as 
relational, as political. The masks of personality versus society are stripped away to reveal 
an interconnected, power-play of related subjectivities. The deconstruction of the 
naturalisation of personality leads to the unveiling of human subjectivity and rationality, and 
to a revelation of the ‘beast’.
A particular ‘beast’ referred to in the interviews and alluded to in the Fantasy category here 
is the werewolf. The therianthropic representation of the chimeric man-wolf has pervaded 
British literature and film for many decades. This reconstructed animal represents human fear 
of the ‘beast’, the animal within as well as nonhuman animals. This human:animal dichotomy
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underpins the ubiquity of this image. In the following chapter on Wilderness, I shall explore 
this lycanthropic myth in two contemporary representations: the original novel and the derived 
television drama. This analysis will examine the semiosis of themes as they appear across 
these texts, and it will illustrate the tensions which arise from addressing species boundaries 
and acknowledging that humans are animals.
-238-
8: WILDERNESS: A SEMIOTIC ANALYSIS OF NARRATIVE
...the life o f a wild animal becomes an ideal, an ideal internalised as a 
feeling surrounding a repressed desire. The image o f a wild animal 
becomes the starting point o f a day-dream, a point from which the day- 
dreamer departs with his back turned. (Berger, 1980:15)
Overview
This chapter explores a contemporary interpretation of a particular ‘beast’ myth, the 
werewolf. Here, I semiotically analyse the original novel, Wilderness written by Dennis 
Danvers (1991), and compare its narrative structure and meanings to the derived television 
drama, Wilderness produced by Red Rooster Film and Television Entertainment Ltd and 
screenplay written by Andrew Davies and Bernadette Davis (1996). My interpretation of 
the texts reveals four primary themes, each signifying paradigmatic and syntagmatic 
structures within the texts. The first theme, Transformation, has metaphorical, ideological 
and physical levels of signification attached to it. Anthropomorphism and zoomorphism 
demarcate the points of continuity and discontinuity within the dynamics of human-animal 
relations. The second theme, Sexuality, is perused as a play of bestial signs. Their 
meanings, interactions and consequences are related to representations of human versus 
nonhuman animal. The third theme, Rationality, provides an ontological divide between 
humans and other animals. The rational divide separates irrationality and savagery from 
the illusions of control and order. ‘The beast within’ is an extended metaphor for the 
retrained, repressed human animal which resides on the hierarchical dualistic foundations 
of species sentimentality and unresolved unconscious conflict. Here, fantasy versus reality 
is the mainstay of the illusion of sanity. The final theme, Freedom, revolves around the 
concepts of gender, sexual and animal liberation. It plays as an extended metaphor for the 
imposed restrictions on women and other animals. Freedom signifies the liberation from 
social constraints and the individual metamorphosis from human to animal to the human 
animal. These main themes of transformation, sexuality, rationality and freedom are 
compared between the original novel and the television drama derived from that text. The 
model of dehumanisation is used to interpret the findings.
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8.1: Transformation
Where I  live as a women is to some men a wilderness. But to me it is home.
Le Guin (1989:46)
The wolf is o f the wilderness, and inseparable from it. But it can get by
elsewhere. Durward Allen: The Wolves ofMinong (quoted from Wilderness)
Transformation is a key signifier throughout the narrative. The most obvious 
transformation is Alice’s change from woman to wolf. The lycanthropic elements to the 
tale are imbued with references to human relations with other animals, to species 
boundaries and to the mythical significance of the wolf. The modem twist on this ancient 
myth is that here the werewolf is a woman, and she is not a werewolf in the traditional 
sense. The werewolves of horror stories are invariably therianthropic images depicting 
half-man half-wolf, producing a terrifying beast. Here there is a theriomorphic 
transformation of Alice into the wolf. The wolf is not chimeric but a complete 
transformation from one species to another. The significance of this transformation is 
captured by the following themes of Acceptance, Resistance, Continuity and Discontinuity.
Accepting Change
One of the primary polysemic signifiers identified within the category of Transformation 
is acceptance. The acceptance by Alice of her physical transformation is evident 
throughout the story. This acts as a point of orientation throughout the narrative. Within 
the syntagmatic structure of the texts, Alice’s transformation is a metonymic reference to 
other issues of change and acceptance. The acceptance of the transformation of the woman 
to wolf is a focus point that pulls together other aspects of the story identifying ‘change’ 
as crucial to life and fear of change as deleterious. A significant aspect of the plot 
development is Luther’s, Alice’s psychotherapist’s, reactions to her transformation. His 
acceptance of her is key not only to Alice’s interests but also to Luther’s mental 
deterioration and increasing obsessiveness with Alice. During their first meeting, Luther 
reassures Alice, No, I don’t believe you actually are a werewolf, but, as I  say, I  do believe
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you sincerely believe you are, and I still like and respect you just the same. p.9 Alice’s 
acceptance of herself as the wolf, After almost twenty years, being a werewolf had a 
chilling dailiness about it (p.45), relates to other instances of acceptance of change 
whereby humans’ lives change constantly and the search for stability begins with accepting 
those changes. Alice’s desires stem from her need to accept herself as both woman and 
wolf, and to have others accept her as such. It is the main point of contention that gives 
rise to the subplots and subtextual messages in the story. The respective book and script 
authors handle the acceptance of Alice’s transformation in similar ways. Her confusion 
is evident and her desire to resolve the ambiguity of her identity is a major concern of the 
plot.
Within the paradigmatic structure of the texts, acceptance of the transformation is a 
meaningful part of the narrative in itself. It describes acknowledging and accepting the fact 
that humans are animals. Indeed, this human:animal dichotomy is the central paired 
opposition in the texts. Acceptance of the human animal amounts to the deconstruction of 
this hierarchical dichotomy and the reconstruction into an integrated dynamic whole. 
Humans are animals, and Alice’s physical transformation into the wolf is an extended 
metaphor for that fact. The destruction or denial of the wolf necessitates the annihilation 
of herself.
Underpinning this desire for resolution is the ultimate recognition that she is both woman 
and wolf, but other people’s failure to accept her identities forces her to retreat from the 
woman’s world into that of the wolf. This escape is handled differently as it emerges from 
the original book to the television, and for important reasons to be discussed later. 
Nevertheless, the way in which the respective authors deal with this issue of acceptance is 
revealed in their grammatical description of the change and their identification of the wolf. 
Some of the key tenets in the original text such as the animal nature of humans, the 
continuity of emotions between species and the desire to escape ideological constraints 
about species behaviour are encompassed in the way Danvers refers to the wolf. The
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wolfs desires are highlighted in his text, they are equally important to the desires of Alice 
as the woman. Danvers identifies the wolf with agency, subjectivity and emotional needs. 
His pronoun ‘she’ to refer to the wolf encapsulates this message. However, the screenplay 
writers do not share these assertions initially. Their reading of Danvers’ text does not 
leave them with a sense of the wolfs agency. The reconstructed wolf is objectified, 
dehumanised, and referred to as ‘it’ in the script. This objectification is retracted in the 
television drama where Alice does refer to the wolf as ‘her’ and ‘she’, revealing both her 
own acceptance of the wolf, and the problem of trying to dehumanise the basic message 
of the original text.
Resisting Change
The paradigmatic opposite to acceptance is resistance, and this signifier is equally evident 
throughout the narratives. Resistance to Alice’s transformation from woman into wolf 
serves to disrupt the story. The status quo is challenged as, in turn, Luther, Dan (her 
lover) and other key players deny the reality of Alice’s experience. The disruptive 
structure of this narrative proposition is essential to the development of the plot and the 
establishment of narrative. Metaphorically, resistance signifies human desire for the 
predictable, knowable and, essentially, controllable aspects of life. Indeed, Alice’s 
ambivalence towards her own identity is evident, She wished she could be one or the other, 
the woman or the wolf. (p. 132). Species boundaries are biological facts, untenable yet for 
the process of natural selection. The social meanings attached to those boundaries, 
however, are fluid and sometimes arbitrary. The value of a species is established 
anthropocentrically with human utility being its primary benchmark. The key protagonists’ 
resistance to the transformation signifies an inherent desire to categorise the value 
associated with different species as immutable and given, with the proviso that the human 
species is at the pinnacle. Metaphorically, resistance stands for this fear of the variable 
nature of life and the mutability of life characteristics amongst species. The expression of 
this fear is rationalised through the denial of the human animal and of so-called human 
characteristics in other animals. The irrationality of fear and prejudice is evident through
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the projection of violence and immorality onto other animals, rendering them ‘scapegoats’ 
for the most contentious of human experience. This dualism of acceptance:resistance is 
grounded in other, equally pernicious, dichotomies. It establishes boundaries between 
notions of ‘us’ and ‘them’ which are conflated to ‘good’ and ‘bad’, and rationalised 
through appeals to ‘chaos’ and ‘order’.
The implications of these paired opposites are that the interdependence of meaning is 
denied, the dynamic interactive nature of the biological and cultural is repressed through 
the ontological divide between animal and human, and the continuity amongst species is 
rendered insignificant. Battle lines are drawn between the rational, knowable and moral 
human and the non-rational, alien and immoral animal. Significantly, humans are at ease 
in denying any capacity for rationality to other animals but, when it comes to the question 
of morality, animals are attributed moral status seemingly without contradiction, a status 
which is invariably negative.
The syntagmatic structure of resistance as a signifying proposition centres on its role in the 
development of characters and plot. It is central to this story that Alice’s transformation 
is resisted. Metonymically, the resistance Alice demonstrates to her own dilemma echoes 
the problems that the other protagonists have with her transformation. Alice’s desire for 
a normal life is expressed through her desire for a relationship and for children, as Danvers 
comments. ..she had come to believe she was a freak mutation, an anomaly that began 
with her and, when she died childless, would end with her. (p. 13) Alice’s resistance to the 
inevitability of her own situation is reflected in Luther’s denial of his mental breakdown, 
Dan’s reluctance to continue the relationship with her, her father’s emotional estrangement 
and society’s disbelief in the lycanthropic myth.
Where the Good:Evil divide has informed much of the debate on human-animal relations, 
women and animals have often found themselves on the same side of the divide separated 
from the moral guardians by ideological walls constructed to keep out the bestial. The
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wolf, as such a beast, has long been the archetype of menace both in European literature 
and folklore. Indeed, the witch-burning of the Middle Ages is said to have coincided (but 
not so coincidently) with the Church-sponsored campaign against the wolf (Antonio, 1995). 
Moreover, whereas human werewolf burning ended in the eighteenth century, the 
nonhuman wolves suffered for their reputation until the present-day. Their persecution 
runs parallel to the ontological separation of nonhuman nature from human nature.
Continuity Amongst Species
Continuity within Transformation is a resolution to the disruption of resistance. It signifies 
the interdependence and interaction between the cultural human and the biological animal. 
The syntagmatic structure of continuity focuses the main themes of the story into one 
insight. Within the notion of continuity there is implicit acceptance of Alice’s 
transformation. She is both human and animal. So are we all. Continuity between Alice 
the woman and the wolf is most explicitly expressed through the emotional experience of 
each animal, She wondered just before she changed whether the wolf would feel scared or 
betrayed. They seemed to meet for a moment, Alice and the wolf and each knew the other 
was frightened and alone, (p. 103) Despite the physical transformation, Alice and the wolf 
share feelings of isolation and imprisonment, She lies down in the silence. As a wolf she 
doesn’t think in words, but then she doesn’t need words to feel lonely, (p.25) It is this 
continuity that allows the reader to enter the world of the wolf. The accusation of 
anthropomorphism is highly inappropriate. Indeed, some forms of anthropomorphism are 
insidiously anthropocentrism, the idea that other animals do not experience emotions like 
humans implicitly presumes that human emotions are the definitive emotions and that other 
experience must be derived from that definition. Anthropomorphism, however, can be an 
useful heuristic that allows humans to acknowledge the emotional lives of other animals 
and not to assume that emotions are exclusively human. Within the context of the 
narrative, the continuity between Alice and the wolf provides a dual perspective on the 
central issues of freedom and change. The wolf seemed like someone else, who was also 
her at the same time. (p.42).
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The paradigmatic structure of continuity as a narrative resolution is based on the 
human:animal opposition which is reflected in mind:body dualism. These dualisms are 
reinforced through the separation of nature and culture into arbitrary variables that have 
differential influence on the lives of animals versus humans. Continuity amongst species 
is a Darwinian fact, yet human desire to disassociate themselves from the rest of the animal 
kingdom has led to religious, secular and scientific justifications of the chasm between 
humans and other animals. In terms of cultural continuity, women have historically been 
associated with animals, rendering them dehumanised, objectified and commodified. The 
association of women and wolves, in light of religious prejudices, is an obvious one. 
Women were more often than men to be associated with nature, animals and, therefore, 
the irrationality and immorality of bestial existence. Wolves were represented as cruel, 
ferocious, rapacious creatures capable of treachery and lust. Significantly, lupus and 
lupana have the same etymological root. The latin for ‘whore’, lupa, is the homophone for 
wolf. This sexual imagery is embedded in the Western imagination concerning women, 
animals and sex. The link between the wolf and human female conjures the image of 
sinful sexuality, a rapacity that is actually uniquely human.
The vituperative use of animal imagery belies the socially empowering image of females 
(wolves) as leaders and survivors. With some anthropomorphic license, the female wolfs 
‘spirit’ is said to resemble courage (Antonio, 1995). The emotional congruence evident 
here finds support in evolutionary continuity of the mammalian brain, and in the increasing 
calls for the redefinition of anthropomorphism as a scientific heuristic rather than sin. 
Indeed, the zoomoiphism of men’s insistence on the cultural and philosophical construction 
of women as incarnations of evil, that justify both their persecution and the near extinction 
of those animals closely associated with them, has barely received a mention in the 
vilification of anthropomorphism as sin.
The collective Western memory of wolves is dominated by the religious concept of the 
devouring demon (described in Chapter 7). The vituperative abuse of the species masks
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the fact that the wolf usually mates for life, may engage in temporary solitude, belongs to 
highly co-operative social groups that shun humans, feeds their old and collectively cares 
for their young. These evolutionary facts are in themselves, of course, amoral, however, 
they certainly fit the bill for historical and contemporary notions of being morally 
responsible humans, even belonging to the much quoted ethos of family values! The 
intelligence, subjectivity and agency of wolves has most certainly been relegated to the 
chaotic wilds and, psychologically speaking, women have also often been subject to that 
kind of exile (Le Guin, 1989). Indeed, the ‘wild, wolf woman’ is a cultural archetype that 
unites images of freedom, sexuality and emotions (Estes, 1992).
Discontinuity Amongst Species
Discontinuity within the transformation of Alice is another disruption within the narrative. 
It signifies the guilt felt by Alice as the woman towards the imprisonment of the wolf. It 
further represents the inability of others to understand the transformation, and to be fearful 
of what is unrecognisable in Alice, It wasn’t just the way she looked; it was something else, 
her \presence* in the room. He didn't know what else to call it. (p. 19) Dan’s ambivalence 
towards Alice is evidence of the problem of discontinuity between the woman and the wolf, 
as Alice comments: I'm certainly the most mysterious animal he's ever encountered. 
(p.63). Discontinuity signifies syntagmatically the problem of misunderstanding Alice’s 
transformation. The wolf is represented as monstrous, the savagery of animal behaviour, 
whilst Alice is perceived as ‘crazy’, deluded through guilt and sexual desire. Learning 
about werewolves, wolves, science and magic hadn ’t made any difference in the pattern o f 
her life, had made nothing less painful, (p.45). Indeed, Alice appears resigned to the 
ambiguity of her identity: Kill her, most likely, or try to, and she would kill them. She was 
reasonably sure they would dissect her, eventually. They would have to. They would have 
to figure her out. (p. 101)
The inveterate relationship between women and nature reflects the wider construction of 
evolutionary continuity and ideological discontinuity. The androcentrism of the male-
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female dualism is reflected in the anthropocentrism of the human:animal dichotomy. 
Rather than interpreting these relations as reciprocal, with knowledge of one structuring 
the knowledge of the other, they are presented as antithetical and hierarchical. Even when 
feminists move beyond the dualisms of gender, they often fall into the trap of replacing one 
system of hierarchy with another. However, concern for nonhuman animals has the 
potential to threaten notions of patriarchy or androcentrism because it questions the very 
nature of Otherness (Halpin, 1989), the relation between subjectivity and objectivity, and 
the gender assumptions surrounding species differentiation. As the boundaries of 
Otherness begin to be blurred, the construction of empathy and compassion as feminine 
(and, therefore, weak) also begins to defy stultification (Haraway, 1991). The very notion 
of how we use the idea of ‘animal’ becomes a question of how we construct and perceive 
nonhuman animal images and concepts of the Other, as insights to human ambivalence 
towards other animals. With increasing perspicacity, the deconstruction of ‘animal’ 
demonstrates what we think of ourselves through the projection of our most unresolved and 
contradictory desires.
8.2: Sexuality: Reasoning With Animal Passions
Sexuality is assigned in this hierarchical scheme o f things to nature.
(Seidler, 1987:91)
Human sexuality is an area of intense contradiction and anxiety. Our primate sexuality 
connects us to all other animal species who reproduce sexually, yet our unique social and 
cultural construction of sex separates us from our animal relatives. Anxiety arises from 
this ambiguity over the exact demarcation of human sexuality as opposed to nonhuman 
animal sex. Human reluctance, even fear, of acknowledging their animal nature means 
that sex is highly ritualised and rendered a taboo subject in order to disassociate humans 
from the rest of the animal kingdom. However intellectual, linguistic, technological and 
artistic we are as a species, we still have sex, and at the heart of this human behaviour, we 
are engaging in an undeniably animalistic behaviour. The fact that all our behaviour is
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animalistic by virtue of us being animals is unnecessarily splitting hairs but, perhaps, worth 
mentioning anyway. The issue here, however, is that human sexuality has been 
constructed as animalistic, carrying with it all the negative connotations of animality - 
bestial, instinctual, base, immoral, offensive to the well-honed sophisticated mind of 
modem man and woman. Throughout Wilderness, Sexuality relates to the concepts of 
Casual, Emotional, Unresolved and Physical.
Casual Sex
Sexuality is a signifier of multiple associations. Its polysemic character traverses the 
following theme of Rationality as its preferred reading mirrors the animal:human, 
instinctual:rational and immoral:moral dichotomies. A primary signifier for the central 
role of sexuality in this narrative is casual sexuality. The casual, uncomplicated sexual 
encounters of Alice are orientating propositions and the contexts are important. Alice is 
not a prostitute nor is she a nymphomaniac, however, her desire for human intimacy 
readily translates into one night stands. Emotionally divorced physical satisfaction is the 
only apparent substitute for emotional contentment in the beginning of the story. The 
syntagmatic structure of the metaphor of sexuality is encompassed in the way it defines the 
protagonists’ relationships. The reader’s perception of Alice is directed by her emotional 
needs and the physical translation of those desires. Whereas her apparent sexual 
independence and assertiveness may be read as a feminist coup on the traditional sex roles, 
its relation to defining concepts of being human and having sexual desires with 
simultaneous desires for love and acceptance form the crux of the casual nature of sex in 
the early stages of the narrative. Sex is important because it signifies, simultaneously, the 
human and the nonhuman animal. It reflects the continuity in behaviour between species 
and emphasises the uniqueness of human construction of sexuality, a social phenomenon 
aimed at resolving intense contradiction within sexual behaviour. Rationalising sex is not 
easy to do. Sexual reproduction is an evolutionary fact, human sexuality is the 
amalgamation of physical, emotional, moral and rational aspects of behaviour. What 
casual sex signifies is a lack, an emotional lack that finds expression in the emotionlessness
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of sexuality. Syntagmatically, casual sex signifies Alice’s profound problem - the 
reconciliation of herself as human and as animal. Sex to the other characters is part of 
emotional desire (Dan, his wife, Luther’s wife) or obsession (Luther). To Alice, sex is the 
denial of emotions and the rationalisation of desire. As Danvers writes: When she wanted 
sex, she went to the bar. (p.44).
Apart from Alice’s own search for casual sex, there is another narrative proposition that 
exemplifies emotional absence. The attempted rape episode is Alice’s first sexual 
experience and it signifies many issues. Firstly, there is the gender issue and that is based 
in myths of seduction and the fetishising of violence. Secondly, there is the association 
with strong emotions, fear and anger and the appearance of the wolf. Thirdly, there is the 
relation between the emergence of transformation as a theme, and this violent sexual 
experience. Alice’s belief in her complicity in this episode is evident, as she rejects his 
sexual advances: Now he would think she didn ’t like him or was scared like some little girl 
who wouldn’t go out after dark. That would be it. He wouldn’t have any more to do with 
her. (p.70).
The paired opposites which are structured around the paradigmatic elements of casual 
sexuality are premised on the traditional notion of morality and immorality. Casual sex, 
emotionally untied, is subject to the gender stereotypes of aggression and submission - real 
men want it and real women must resist. Nevertheless, casual sex as a paradigm within 
the narrative, is the manifestation of Alice’s dual existence, as woman and wolf, as 
emotionally in need and physically satisfied. There is both freedom and constraint evident 
in the portrayal of this theme. A sexual freedom that is associated with uninvolved sex 
rests on the assumption that an unified integrated emotional and sexual experience is 
constraining, somehow deceptive and luring. Sexual freedom is imbued with cultural 
concepts of morality, gender and liberty. However, in Alice’s case sexual freedom is a 
misnomer, signifying her emotional and physical constraint. She is, simultaneously, 
liberated as an animal and constrained as a woman; liberated physically and constrained
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emotionally. Alice’s sexual desires conceal her emotional needs: She couldn't remember 
his name. She'd slept with him three or four weeks ago. (p.20). She looked him in the 
eye. She hoped her face was completely devoid o f emotion, (p. 20).
So casual sex is problematic. We want it but we want to disguise it, separate it from the 
civilised behaviour of everyday life, render it so taboo that mentioning sex in ‘polite 
company’ may stigmatise you forever as a social outcast, attention-seeker, pervert or 
worse. Yet sex is fundamental. It seems tautological to say so, but it affects human life 
in a more clandestine manner than actual sexual acts. Sex permeates social life in 
numerous untold ways. Human gender identity is inextricably wound up with sexual 
identity. This association has been well documented by gender analysts, however, it fails 
to account for the primary construction of sex, that of the bestial. Our behaviour as 
gendered subjects is interwoven with our expectations of sexual behaviour. However, 
beyond the gender dimension, although most certainly tied up with it, is the idea of the 
animal.
Animals are not what they seem. In fact, nonhuman animals are often what people desire 
them to be - pets, meat, entertainment, objects, machines, toys and fantasies. The point 
here is that humans have constructed the very notion of ‘animal’ to reflect and fulfil their 
own needs. Part of that construction is the concept of a wild and brutish sexuality, 
untamed feral encounters. Certitude and voraciousness go hand in hand with this type of 
representation. When we talk about sex, we might think of ‘animal lust’. When we need 
to remove ourselves from the ‘animal’ domain, we ‘make love’. This kind of dichotomous 
representation is not unusual when humans try to resolve the ambivalence they feel about 
themselves, other animals and sex. In fact, these dichotomies are naturalised and, 
therefore, assumed to be self-evident. Indeed, the processes of naturalisation - the equation 
of what is morally right with what is natural, the removal of history and culture, the denial 
of social relativity - often rely, in secular society, on interpretations (often 
misinterpretations) of Darwin’s theory of evolution. Sometimes people will admit that we
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are animals, usually when justifying a particular set of sexual behaviours.
At the level of semiosis, the theme casual sexuality is pertinent to intertextual styles and 
meanings. In the book, sexuality is an important narrative player. Alice’s sexual 
experiences are integral to her emotional states and reflect both her desires and repulsions. 
However, the television translation of the role of sexuality succumbs to an unnecessary 
exposure. The tenderness and revelation of emotional desire, as expressed in the book, are 
replaced in the television drama with relentless naked images of Alice, greased and dirty, 
and sexual explicitness irrelevant to the original tenets of the book. This serves to 
objectify Alice. It is the observer’s perspective on Alice rather than Alice as the subject 
observing experiencing herself as the wolf. Whereas the reader’s imagination was 
encouraged to build on the syntagmatic relations within the narrative, the viewer’s 
imagination had little, if anything to do and sexuality became purely paradigmatic, 
exemplifying the genre of sexual primacy and visual explicitness. The drama fails 
catastrophically to integrate the concept of sexuality to the related narrative issue and in 
doing so, impoverishes the story and the associated meanings.
Emotional Involvement
The counterpoint to casual sexuality is emotional sexuality. It has already been suggested 
that this dichotomy reflects gender stereotypes and, therefore, fails to address the integrated 
experience of sex. The emotional aspects of sexuality provide the disruption to Alice’s 
casual sex behaviour. Her sexuality is introduced as casual, uninvolved and intentional, 
however, the narrative mechanism which propels the plot is Alice’s emotional desires. 
These desires for intimacy, freedom, truth, children, family and happiness revolve around 
the problem of emotional sexuality. As a defining characteristic in human identity and 
subjectivity, sexuality is a powerful motive for the rationalisation of desire. As sexual and 
sexualised animals, humans experience the intense contradiction of the physical and the 
emotional. Syntagmatically, Alice’s desire for an emotional relationship explains her 
unhappiness, and her experience of entrapment. Her life was unbelievable, even to herself
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She never acted on her strongest feelings, ran from those she most desired, (p.99). 
Emotional fulfilment is the keystone for both Alice as woman and as the wolf. Indeed, 
whilst Alice’s apparent promiscuity is self explained as a way of rationalising her emotions, 
the very desire to rationalise is emotional: She would be homy, she always was the night 
after, but she would also be most desperate to be someone who didn ’t go to bars, who went 
out on a date with nice men who wanted to get to know her. (p.46). Paradigmatically, the 
theme of emotional sexuality centres on the mind:body dualism and its relation to 
masculinity:femininity and culture:nature. Within the structure of the narrative, the 
tension between these dualisms is explored through the notion of unrequited emotional and 
physical desire. At the heart of these dualisms is the categorical, meaningful distinction 
between humans and all other animals.
The counterpoint to Alice integrating her emotional needs with her sexual desires is 
Luther’s psychological breakdown. Whereas Alice’s sexuality is initially expressed as 
emotionally devoid, and then as part of her emotional desire, Luther’s emotional 
breakdown manifests itself through sexual obsession for Alice and the rationalisation of that 
obsession.
Recognising that humans are animals is not necessarily a straightforward process that one 
might hope for. As I have already said, ‘animal’ can mean many things, nevertheless, we 
might expect that, at least, we are on the right road, even if we are not all travelling in the 
same direction. However, when people acquiesce to the notion that humans are animals, 
they do so with certain aims in mind. One such aim is to justify, morally, the sexual 
behaviour of some humans by recall to the perceived fixity of evolved characteristics. 
People use their interpretation of evolution to justify sexual behaviour that might otherwise 
be subject to moral indignation. It is not with any great surprise that the main use of this 
justification concerns male sexuality.
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This is not to say that female sexuality has not also been justified by appeals to the forces 
of nature, but rather that the balance of favour in these matters rests most forcibly in the 
male camp. This is not because people, in general, have a good understanding of sexual 
selection but rather that they choose to see snippets of evolutionary theory through 
biologically determined lenses in order to lend some ‘scientific’ credibility to their 
intensely contradictory desires. Animal lust and machismo are ideological buddies. When 
women are seen as sexual sirens who seduce men with heartless witchery, the ideas of 
nature can also come into play. These fantasy figures are constructed to resolve the 
feelings of fear that female sexuality arouses in men. The power of these images resides 
in the dynamics of seduction. The psychodynamic projection of sexual desire and the 
introjection of victimisation conspire, through inter-subjective relations, to protect the man 
from recognising his own emotions, a threat more terrifying than any witch imaginable. 
The woman, meanwhile is rendered naturally seductive, a femme fatale, with an eye on 
crushing vulnerable men within the walls of her vagina.
Unresolved Feelings
A relatively minor, yet interesting, aspect of sexuality is the play on unresolved feelings. 
This characterises the male protagonists in Wilderness more so than the females. Dan’s 
unresolved conflict between lust and love, and his fear of emotional exposure given his 
recent divorce, add a masculine dimension to the issue of sexuality: At first he couldn't 
seem to decide whether he wanted to rape or caress her, and she wasn ’t sure what she 
wanted from him either. But then he was sweet, but not too sweet, and she clung to him 
under the sky as if  she might fall into the earth if she let him go. (p. 107). As a syntagmatic 
element in the narrative, unresolved sexuality signifies intense emotional and rational 
contradiction in human behaviour. The desire for sex and sexual fulfilment is dependent 
on the interaction of reason and emotions, and this dynamic force is not easily separated 
and compartmentalised.
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Human subjectivity is a complex entity. Understanding it requires that we step back from 
the restrictions of unitary rational individualism and engage in a debate on the interactive 
dynamics of the human psyche and human cultural life. This fundamentally discursive and 
psychodynamic enterprise cannot afford to lose sight of the way in which human sexual 
desire dictates concepts of identity and normality. Whereas the naturalisation of some 
aspects of male sexuality serves to reinforce concepts of human animality, the association 
between rationality and masculinity provides an intellectual counterpoint to the savagery 
of sexuality. The physical, emotional and animal side of sex is somewhat antithetical to 
the higher echelons of cerebrality and logic. Nevertheless, they are simultaneously 
retained within the parameters of masculine identity, an archetypal identity seemingly 
without contingency. It is this fragmented, highly contradictory notion of the subject that 
illuminates human perception of ourselves and other animals, as indicated by Dan: He was 
not sure what he needed. His reactions to women - lust, tenderness, curiosity - often 
seemed indistinguishable, (p. 3 6).
The rational masculinity is in constant battle against the seducing sorceress, and when 
‘animal passions’ are aroused, it is the woman who is held responsible for the abandonment 
of morality. Sexuality is beyond the control of reason and, therefore, if sexuality itself 
cannot be controlled then those responsible for it must be. As Luther’s insight, in the 
television drama, suggests: The wolf is deeply embedded in you. To be precise, in your 
sexuality. You love the wolf, but she’s hard to handle, she won’t be contained - she’s too 
strong. Strong enough to kill a man. There's enormous anger there. A sexual rage. (3/3). 
Issues of sexuality and gender are a potential threat to the established dictates and 
discourses of a rationalist, androcentric society. Moreover, issues of animality and 
sexuality are a danger to anthropocentric assumptions about the nature of human and 
nonhuman animal identity. The Cartesian separation of the mind and body so effectively 
denigrated the body that it produced the somatophobic phenomenon by which the body is 
feared and reviled in favour of the mind. This mind:body split parallels the human:animal 
divide. The concept of the human signifies all that is intellectual, rational, logical and
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moral. The concept of the animal symbolises all that is irrational, immoral, illogical, 
‘dumb’, and generally undesirable.
The unresolved aspects of sexuality are highlighted at the level of semiosis. Not only did 
the television drama render the narrative explicitly sexual, it tried to comment on the 
notion of animal or bestial sexuality through crude references to the ‘hunt’ and anal sex. 
Specifically, the role of Alice’s colleague, Serena, in the drama is to provide the sexual 
banter that the audience presumably requires in order to understand the relation between 
human and nonhuman animal sex. The purpose of this could be one of three options. 
Either the intent was to ‘pander to the audience’, or it was necessary to deal with the 
difficulties of the original text, or it was aimed at ‘naturalising’ or defining the subversive 
elements of the original text. My conclusion, having read the book and watched the film 
is that the subtle connection between the body, sex and desire and the conflict between the 
‘human’ and ‘animal’ self is subsumed beneath Serena’s sexual gossip. This kind of 
titillation assumes a simplistic notion of humans as animals based on negative stereotypes 
of bestiality. It therefore undermines the text’s subversive messages and plays to the 
presumed desires of the audience.
Physical Satisfaction
The counterpoint to the notion of unresolved sexuality is physical sexuality which 
integrates and acknowledges the emotional and rational components of human sexual 
experience. The most telling example of this is Alice and Dan’s relationship where 
physical attraction is underpinned by emotional needs and the desire for intimacy. Finding 
a student attractive, Dan feels: His fantasy lost its charm. He could not lose himself in 
eyes that were closed, (p.32) The expression of physical desire through sex is located in 
their mutual recognition of emotional need and commitment. Dan’s fear of Alice is 
expressed as fear of her psychological instability yet it can also be read as part of the 
unresolved tensions within his own sexuality. Her emotional needs outweigh his sexual 
desire and so he returns to the familiar physical and emotional relationship with his ex­
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wife. However, his final acceptance of her frees himself from this intense contradiction, 
and the integrated physical sexuality, expressed between him and Alice, illustrates the 
resolution of the previous narrative propositions. Physical sex encompasses the desire for 
emotional freedom: As he moved harder, each thrust seemed to loosen something deep 
inside her until the scream wailed up, shaking her whole body - loud, inarticulate, 
shameless, (p. 111). Paradigmatically, physical sexuality transcends the hierarchical 
dualisms of animal:human, body:mind and rational:emotional. It expresses the 
interdependence of those categories in terms of meaning and definition. This form of 
sexuality escapes the constraints of dualistic convention.
However, the body is desired through sexuality. After all, it is not the mind we want to 
sexually engage with alone, however much the mind plays a role in the sexual experience. 
The power of the human mind is represented as residing in its ability to override the body 
and to overcome the ‘beast within’. The ‘naturally’ evolved moral capacities of humans 
has served to disassociate humans from nature and to discredit any other animal’s right to 
inclusion within the moral sphere. Moral thoughts belong to the mind, whereas, immoral 
acts belong to the body. Sexuality is relegated to the nonhuman animal status, suffering 
the constraints of stereotypes in true repressive style. In order to maintain the superiority 
of the rational, masculine-defined mind, men needed to become the masters of the natural 
world (and all its associates) and, thereby, affirm their humanity. As women were 
constructed as being closer to nature than men, they were also subject to domination and 
subservience. This denial of the human animal, the denial of sexual equality and the denial 
of acceptable sexual and emotional lives in men resulted in an ideological chasm that 
rendered nature the object and man the master. This disembodied concept of rationality 
easily replaces the religious concept of a soul. The eternal divine spirit, in secular terms, 
becomes the ephemeral mind. This segregation of mind from body is a fundamental form 
of displacement. The human, predominantly male, identification with the rational mind 
has led to an internal estrangement in the human animal between the mind and the rest of 
the body.
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This kind of separation is necessary in order to affirm one’s own gender identity. The 
denial of animality and femininity is a fundamental part of the psychodynamic construction 
of male human sexuality. This denial leads to anxiety about concealing one’s sexual and 
gender identity, an anxiety which is mediated through the projection of desire onto the 
Other - the animal or the woman. These disguised desires serve to reinforce the dichotomy 
between humans and other animals, and between men and women. Those denied aspects 
of human subjectivity, however, will find expression, and if that takes the form of 
projection, reality becomes distorted and prejudice and violence will be natural products 
of disassociation. This misconstrued reality prevents people from recognising themselves 
as sexual animals (a factual rather than a derisory phrase). Of course, women engage in 
these psychodynamic plays of identity affirmation as well, however, the relationships 
between men and women are structured so that the man’s privileged access to masculinity 
is the norm (the morally right and evolutionarily natural), and the woman’s make do with 
femininity is the deviant (immoral and unnatural) yet, predictably enough, highly desirable. 
This intense conflict between reason and desire is at the heart of modem, Western 
industrialised, Cartesian assumptions on the nature of the human psyche.
8.3: Rationalising Madness
... (there has been) a continuing allegiance paid to ‘reason’ and the 
complete failure to listen either to one’s own ‘necessary ’ madness or to 
those labelled ‘mad’. (Sheridan, 1980:14)
Nonhuman animals are often said to serve as a mirror to human society, on the one hand, 
but also to provide an antithesis to humankind, a means of recognising and then 
subordinating the ‘beast within’ (Birke, 1994). The concept of rationality is an important 
rhetorical device for ensuring the proper demarcation of humanity’s boundaries. 
Rationality dictates what is normal and, therefore, morally acceptable, and what is 
abnormal and, therefore, morally unacceptable. Animals are the quintessential Other, our 
own home-based aliens, unknowable and fundamentally different. The fact that any entity
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is not completely knowable, however, does not prevent humans worldwide from creating 
knowledge about animals. Such knowledge, whether lay or scientific, is more often than 
not, either anthropocentric to the point of prejudice or anthropomorphic to the point of 
sentimentality. The real animal, the animal between, or even beyond, these polar visions 
is rendered invisible. The constructed animal provides the point of reference for 
humankind, a point of inferiority in intellect, status, power and reason. Within 
Wilderness, the theme of Rationality manifests in the areas of Control, Emotional, Superior 
and Sanity.
Control and Order
The rational mind is the defining factor of modem day (post Enlightenment) humans. 
Where once there was the ubiquitous notion of man made in the image of God and 
separated from other animals by their souls, secular societies have found an easy transition 
from one ephemeral concept - the soul - to another - the mind. Nowadays, the ability of 
the mind to reason has become an important player in the moral evaluation of species. The 
capacity to reason, though, is not an uniquely human capacity, indeed, the continuity 
amongst species extends to cognitive capacities. There are, of course, immense 
differences, but these differences as Darwin stated are of degree rather than kind. Part 
of the appeal of the superiority of the human rational mind is its ability to elevate humans 
out of the animal kingdom through the control of what is perceived to be irrational. This 
is a pervasive form of disciplinary power (Foucault, 1980) which privileges the unitary, 
individual subject of the Enlightenment.
Control is a significant feature of the Rationality theme. It is evident in the psychotherapy 
plotline as being both indicative of the aims of psychotherapy and of Luther’s desire to 
control Alice. He was losing control o f the situation. Alice knew she could only stray so 
far before he brought her back in line. (p. 10). Psychotherapy can be liberating as long as 
it does not replace the dictates of one kind of emotional stress with another. The problem 
with trying to be normal is that it invariably involves revoking the most normative aspects
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of one’s subjectivity such as emotional desires. Alice’s desire to reconcile the woman and 
the wolf lead her initially to want to control the wolf. This, in turn, makes her vulnerable 
to Luther’s increasing psychological instability that expresses itself with the obsessional 
desire to control Alice through sexual subordination. This demonstrates the syntagmatic 
role of control in the narrative. The relationship between Alice and Luther is centred on 
their mutually reinforcing desire for control. Alice would... remind herself o f the chaos she 
avoided in her own life by keeping things under control, (p. 143). Metonymically, this 
thematic aspect relates to the wider issues of human control over other animals, and the 
ideological imperialism of culture over nature. These battles reflect the epistemological 
relation between the wild and the civil, a hierarchical dichotomy which simplifies human 
existence into good and bad, right and wrong.
As a paradigmatic structure, control signifies the tension between order and chaos, the 
objective and subjective, the mind and body and the male and female. At the heart of these 
opposites is the ontological divide between human and nonhuman animal identity. The 
metaphorical notion of control is exemplified by the ‘beast within’. The symbolic animal 
is a real creation, masterminded in the human psyche where internal conflict about the 
simultaneous status of human as animal and not-animal provides an endless source of 
anxiety. The fragmented, contradictory minds of discursive subjects are presented as 
cohesive, predictable, rational and, ultimately, unanimal. The sources that feed the 
concept of rationality, the ‘metaphysics of logocentrism’ as Derrida called it, are 
ubiquitous everyday relationships with the Other, surviving on projections and introjections 
of reviled and desired characteristics. The irrationality of animality becomes the nemesis 
of human rationality. What is logical, reasonable and intelligent about humans is an 
ideological boundary that puts humans on a higher ground to other animals. The ‘beast’ 
is to be caged, controlled, tamed and conquered less it threatens the very cornerstone of 
what makes humans human, or at least what is commonly assumed to make humans 
human.
-259-
8: Wilderness: A Semiotic Analysis o f Narrative
Emotion versus Reason
As part of the legacy of mind:body dualism, reason and emotion have been ontologically 
separated. The idea of an emotional rationality seems a contradiction in terms. However, 
the reality of reasoning is that it has an emotional basis, and the contingency of emotions 
is that they are often subject to, or mediated by, rational thought. The interdependency 
of these concepts is revealed when the prejudices upon which they are separated are 
deconstructed. The integration of emotions and reason form a syntagmatic part of the 
narrative structure by illustrating Alice’s desires to reconcile the tensions between herself 
as a human woman and as a female wolf. The highly emotional aspects of passion, often 
described as sexual love, mean that it is often termed irrational, mad or ‘crazy’, the feeling 
of falling in love defies the rationalistic model and is described by Dan in a comparison 
between Alice’s allegedly unstable mind and his own feelings for her: Maybe she was 
crazy. Maybe they were both crazy. He’d fallen in love so quickly and so completely, so 
much passion had startled him. (p.216).
The main narrative episodes involving the battle between emotions and reason centre on 
Luther’s breakdown. His initial job to help Alice in what he perceives to be a 
psychological disorder leads to his own emotional breakdown which he rationalises by 
projecting his sexual desires onto Alice. An exemplifying visual metaphor for this 
breakdown is Luther’s obsession with the detail of his topiary. The plant animals are 
pruned and cared for whilst his marriage deteriorates and his work becomes distorted. The 
topiary remains a bizarre picture of perfection. As Luther’s frustration with Alice grows, 
his anger and psychological breakdown lead him to attack the topiary, decapitating the 
horticultural creatures, in a frenzy of destruction of contrived nature, obsessive order and 
emotional control.
Rationality provides an ontological and epistemological divide between humans and all 
other animals. The ability to reason, inductively or deductively, has expanded into the 
essence of humanity and the archenemy of animality and bestiality. It carries with it more
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than the capacity of an evolved brain, but also the moral contingencies of a species valued 
beyond all others. Here there is no dispute that humans have the ability to be rational, to 
engage in logical arguments in ways that no other species on this planet has been seen to 
do. What is being discussed is the moral and ethical significance that has become attached 
to an uniquely human capacity in order to denigrate all other species who are said to lack 
such an ability. In the first instance, it is not at all clear that other animals lack rationality, 
even if it were possible to define conclusively what rationality is, it is a question of degree 
rather than kind, as it is with many other characteristics previously held to be uniquely 
human. The crux of the matter is the symbolic use of rationality as a concept to demarcate 
humanistic versus animalistic behaviour. Luther’s psychological deterioration signifies 
blurring the boundaries between human and animal behaviour, excess of emotions and a 
lack of reason.
Superiority Complexes
The notion of superiority in the theme of Rationality expresses itself in the relationships 
between Alice and the psychiatrists/psychotherapist who evaluate her mental and emotional 
health, as she comments on Luther’s attitude to her: It suited him, so reasonable and 
above it all. (p. 11). Moreover, during the her mental assessment following the attempted 
rape, she was examined by ...a  trio o f psychiatrists whose condescendingly smiles, Alice 
noticed, bore a remarkable resemblance to that o f the boy she had killed, (p.76). Her 
experience of condescension and being patronised exemplifies the notion that making 
rational judgements about mental health of others involves implicitly a prerequisite of 
superiority in knowledge, control and emotions. In particular, Luther’s self-centredness 
expresses itself through arrogance and dismissal of his wife, colleagues and, ultimately, 
of Alice’s desires. His belief in his own superior reasoning, however obsessional and 
deluded, leads him to create an image of Alice as a willing participant, though 
unconsciously so, and, therefore, complicit with his ideas of treatment involving sexual 
relationships and the release of Alice’s repressed sexual appetite: He suspected the 
beginnings o f transference. That could prove useful in her treatment - handled properly,
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he reminded himself (p. 128).
Underlying the syntagmatic structure of superiority in Rationality, is the paradigmatic 
theme centred on the human:animal dichotomy under the project of the Enlightenment. 
Humans have constructed and morally elevated the concept of rationality, and with it 
objectivity, to estrange themselves from other animals. The ability to reason has played 
a significant role in the establishment, maintenance and justification of status hierarchies 
including between humans and other animals. It is this inherent superior value which 
legitimises the subordination and exploitation of human and nonhuman animals. 
Rationality is often purveyed as an upholder of discontinuity between humans and 
nonhuman animals and, often, between men and women. The wilderness, occupied by 
nonhuman animals, women and Others, is an unassimilated adversary, an alien defined 
through difference and subject to the propaganda of a culture that keeps watching the skies. 
The universal wilderness is the conceptual parallel to the earthly wilderness, an unknown, 
frightening uninhabitable place. The ‘rational’ mind of man seeks to exclude the irrational 
fear of difference. Its value is in its instrumentality and utility, subject to the stereotypes 
of sentimentality or subservience. Wilderness, more than anything, is a cultural artefact 
(Plumwood, 1993). Wilderness resides behind a definitional wall of madness, chaos, 
turmoil and anarchy. ‘Civilisation’ protects those humans perceived as ‘sane’ because only 
the sane desire civilisation. Wilderness is the domain of nonhuman animals, savages, 
women and the defamed underbelly of human psyche.
When the wilderness is not the enemy, it becomes, through existential dualistic reverence, 
the salvation of humankind, the spiritual guide to the folly of human endeavour. Or, more 
precisely, once the wilderness is cleared of its naturally crazy inhabitants, the civilised 
human is free to rediscover his/her connection with nature. Of course, the violent removal 
of wilderness inhabitants is always a necessary prerequisite to preparation for wilderness 
holidays for civilised tourists (Plumwood, 1993). Wilderness without beasts is sanitised, 
it is now wild but safe and, therefore, no longer wilderness. The repressed desires of the
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human mind are represented by the symbolic wilderness (Midgeley, 1983). The good and 
the evil bifurcate the natural world. Ambivalence is resolved by splitting the alien group 
into dichotomous images of deities and devils.
Sanity
The notion of being sane is one that requires a historical context to elicit its meaning. It 
usually means not being mad, and that in itself presents a dichotomy which is not only 
medical and psychological but also cultural and ideological. Alice’s referral to Luther for 
her own ‘madness’ contains several levels of meaning. The first of which is the 
medical/professional layer. As Alice comments: ...he thought she was crazy. It was even 
his job to think she was crazy, (p.75). Part of the medicalisation of mental health has been 
the ideological categorisation of normal versus abnormal: ...my parents have been waiting 
for this all their life, some sign that their daughter is normal, (p. 89). The historical and 
cultural contexts dictate the content of these categories. Indeed, a significant theme in the 
story is the role of psychotherapy in society. Whereas psychiatry was once the mainstay 
of mental diagnosis and cure, the recognition that there are emotional problems which do 
not necessarily involve psychological or biochemical disorders has led to the proliferation 
of psychotherapy and the legitimisation of the ‘talking cure’: I  came to see you because 
Dr. Dougherty thought I was crazy and referred me to you. (p. 8). Again, however, the 
concepts of normality and abnormality continue to play an important role as evident in 
Alice’s thoughts on being simultaneously crazy and sane: Even though he thought she was 
crazy, talking to him made her feel more sane. Even i f  he didn't believe her, at least 
someone else knew the truth, increasing the population o f her real world to two. (p.45).
The metaphorical level of meaning centres on the conflict in human identity. Social and 
personal identity consist of numerous conscious and unconscious influences, from family, 
society, culture, religion, sexuality, gender, ethnicity and politics. However, beneath these 
factors is the inherent and implicit contradiction - humans are both human and animal 
simultaneously; humans live two lives, one is the evolved animal with a highly developed
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cognitive system including language, technology and culture; the other is the ‘cultured’ 
human of the Enlightenment, no longer an animal but in the eyes of Biblical creationists 
and more recently, the new social creationists, a special biological, moral, intelligent, 
spiritual, meaningful being - human beings. Alice’s conflict is presented as real. She 
really does change into a wolf once a month: she is, for all intents and purposes, a 
werewolf. Part of the human aspects of the human animal has been the ability to signify, 
to tell stories, allegories, to use metaphor to illustrate the most difficult aspects of life 
through reference to something else. Narrative is a peculiarly human form of 
communication. Human identity, who and what we are, is inseparable from why we are 
or how we got here and there are few aspects of human existence to rival the importance 
and difficulty of these issues. The psychological implication rest on how we interpret our 
behaviour through metaphor, which metaphors we choose and why.
The final level of meaning here is the mythical tale of werewolves and the place of 
lycanthropy in modem society. Werewolves are creations which represent human 
antagonism towards wolves. They also symbolise the psychodynamic struggle within 
humans to come to terms with ‘animal’ desires especially violence and sex. Lycanthropy 
itself has been documented as a psychological disorder, a state of ‘madness’. Werewolves 
are cultural artefacts, hybrids that reflect the nightmares of the human imagination. 
Alice’s wolf is a modem day chimera, a female werewolf with a social conscience. 
Danvers, however, never questions her sanity: She hadn't anticipated the impossibility o f 
persuading a psychiatrist that you were sane and a werewolf at the same time. (p. 46).
As Foucault (1967) has claimed, madness is no longer culturally represented as another 
window into wisdom. It has been relegated beyond dreams, fantasies and the power of the 
imagination to the margins of acceptability, into the mire of deviancy. The exclusion of 
madness from intellectual life, has reinforced the association between rationality and 
humanity, and between rationality and masculinity (Midgeley, 1978). The emotions and 
desires of humans threaten to bring down the edifice of ‘reason’, the foundation to status
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hierarchies, and cause relapse into animality. In contrast to Alice’s psychological stability, 
Luther’s ‘madness’ is explicit as a commentary on the role of psychoanalysis in modem 
society and on the power imbued in relations between the analyst and analysand. Luther’s 
abuse of his power is part of his sexual obsession with Alice. His rationalisation of this 
obsession leads him to project his own sexual desires onto Alice: She experiences her 
sexuality as something so terrifyingly powerful that she dare not set it free (p. 23), and his 
justification for her apparent ‘madness’ reverts to her experience of attempted rape, but 
also supports Luther’s beliefs that Alice requires sexual liberation and that he is the only 
person qualified to give it: Add to that the feelings o f guilt such an attack often 
precipitates, and a delusion o f the sort she is experiencing is not at all unheard o f  (p.76).
The history of the werewolf is interwoven with religious stigmatisation of the wolf and 
cultural representations of madness and evil. During the Middle Ages, the Church 
constructed the wolf as the personification of evil itself, and any individual human who 
exhibited marginalised behaviours (such as schizophrenics, epileptics and the mentally 
disabled) was pressurised into admitting that they were werewolves, and as such were 
servants of Satan. The association of animals and the Devil is as powerful as the 
explanatory devil-possession is for insanity. The perceived, and constructed, image of 
animality as debased, irrational, immoral and inferior to the apotheosis of humans, made 
in the image of God, has pervaded both religious and secular animal imagery. As the 
belief in werewolves diminished in Europe, the association of the actual wolf with the devil 
became stronger. The negative image of the wolf as the purveyor of evil evinced the 
exploits of humans intent on the eradication of the species.
8.4: Freedom
Wilderness is not a place where there is no interaction between self and 
other, but where self does not impose itself It is a place to be visited on its 
own terms and not on ours. (Rolston, 1983:182)
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The final primary signifier identified at having a syntagmatic and paradigmatic structure 
and function is Freedom. In this narrative, Freedom is comprised of three sub-themes: 
Emotional, Physical and Familiar.
Emotional Emancipation
Emotional freedom is evident throughout the story as an orientating proposition, it guides 
the reader and viewer to the desires and conflicts experienced by the characters. At a 
metonymic level, emotional freedom illustrates the human desire to remove constraints on 
personal liberty, to fulfil ambitions and to live life as one desires, without the chains of 
conformity or predictability. This kind of contiguity invokes ideas of freedom of 
expression and equality. As a syntagmatic structure, emotional freedom is an ubiquitous 
theme for a variety of protagonists. Primarily, it is Alice’s search for emotional fulfilment 
that drives the story. Her desire for a complete life rather than two halves propels the 
narrative episodes. Emotional pressure has exerted itself on her from her parents: good 
God, Mother, he’s not a child! I  have plans. And I ’m sick to death o f hearing about the 
arguments you and Daddy may or may not have because o f something I  do or do not, 
understand? (p.23), her lovers, her colleagues, her therapist: You’ve ... explored territory 
you wouldn’t have set foot in when you first came here. (p. 8) and, finally, Dan himself. 
On the other hand, Dan is experiencing emotional pressure from Alice and his ex-wife, 
whilst Luther’s increasingly deranged mind perceives pressure in all directions.
As a selection of narrative, emotional freedom’s metaphorical meaning is a transposition 
of emotional needs and constraints to the paired opposites of rational:irrational and 
normal:abnormal. Emotional desires are often rationalised away due to conformity 
pressures and the expectations of others. The concept of an individual freedom is 
subsumed under the demands of social roles and predictable patterns of behaviour.
Freedom is more than the license to live life as one pleases. It also encompasses the world 
of fantasy, where anything is possible but still within the confines of discursive hegemony
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and repressed desire. Fantasy and freedom are conceptually close, the desires for one often 
dictate the parameters of the other. Freedom is an imaginary place inhabited by taboo and 
contingent on individual experience and social norms. The existential desire for freedom 
is often the desire not only to escape one’s environment, but also to escape one’s self. 
Such fantasies of deliverance do not sway comfortably with the biological boundaries of 
the individual and, therefore, are recaptured in the psychodynamic strategies of introjection 
and projection. If we cannot save ourselves, the next best thing - liberating another - will 
do.
Physical Independence
The complementary aspect to emotional freedom is physical freedom, and in this case apart 
from the usual desire to escape the social, regional or otherwise geographical boundaries, 
there is the problem of Alice’s desire to escape from her body, oscillating from the 
entrapment of the wolf by the woman to the imprisonment of the woman by the wolf. As 
she is encaged as the wolf in the basement: She is not looking for a way out. She knows 
there is none. (p.24). Escape from physical boundaries provides a tangible counterpoint 
to the more abstract notion of emotional freedom. Syntagmatically, physical freedom is 
the human search for the wilderness, to live beyond the constraints of human life, to 
experience the freedom of animal existence. A corollary to this romanticised notion of 
nature is the psychological conflict experienced by being simultaneously human and non­
human. This metonymic meaning signifies the contradictory nature of our animal selves 
and results in forlorn desires to escape ourselves, to replace the notion of a contrived 
humanity with the alleged freedom of animality. This desire to escape personal physical 
constraints is a common thread throughout the narrative.
Alice remembers as the wolf: At one time she ran in the country. She sees herself then, 
she sees herself now. When she comes to the woman now, it is always here in this small 
place. It is full o f her scent and no one else*s. (p. 25). The wolfs desire for freedom is 
evident in Danvers’ description of her experiences: What she wants and cannot find is play,
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like the ravens who used to spring into the air at her charge, then flutter down slowly 
behind her. (p. 25) ...she revelled in the monthly freedom of a night in the deep woods that 
lay beyond the fields, lay beyond the helpless tedium o f her father's farm. (p. 67). And as 
Alice as woman and wolf experience the physical constraints of conformity, so too does 
Dan desire escape from his emotional loneliness: He wanted to migrate. The sun and 
warm breeze, the grass and trees and freedom of spring, the youth scattered all around him 
restless to move, seemed to him a harsher environment than the frozen waters through 
which the penguin and his mate unnervingly swam toward home. (p.32).
The paired opposites that physical freedom refers to as part of its paradigmatic structure 
are centred on the dualisms of freedom: constraint, natural:artificial, inclusion exclusion 
and animal:human. Coveting freedom, while disciplined not to seize it, seems to be a 
symptom of rationalising interactive, dynamic subjectivities into unitary, self-contained, 
essential subjects, promoted through the Project of Enlightenment. Self-deception is not 
foolproof. The anxiety associated with establishing, and legitimising, identity permeates 
social life. The urge to escape the tyranny of ‘humanity’ can not, however, be achieved 
by presupposing a similar, yet oppositional, stereotype of nature.
Familiarity and Stability
Part of the psychological process of desiring freedom is the emotional basis which supports 
the concept of freedom. It is desired because it is meaningful and its meaning is derived 
from the emotions it elicits and the behaviours it sanctions. Consequently, to want to be 
free does not necessarily involve forsaking everything, but rather requires the desire for 
emotional fulfilment which often means a recognition of familiar circumstances where 
emotional contentment or the desire for familiarity is a vivid association. For Alice, this 
is a strong motivating force ...she winced that she had never found the same nest twice. 
(p.60). Freedom is not just a political and legal requirement, it is a profound 
psychological journey to discover the boundaries of oneself and the contingencies upon 
which a fulfilling life can be led. If these contingencies do not conform to any particular
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society’s normative expectations of an individual then freedom becomes a real issue of the 
emotions. In Wilderness, there is a conflicting desire for a different life, for escape from 
the tedium of modem life to the wild, untamed and feral existence that allows complete 
freedom and, on the other hand, there is an equally intense desire for known comforts, for 
the familiarity of the known, the recognisable, those aspects of an individual’s life history. 
The tension and splittings between these twins desires for freedom, for escape and return, 
resonate through the narrative.
Wilderness is more than escaping the metropolis, it is about the unidentifiable, alien 
aspects of metropolis itself, for Dan: Spring break had now begun, but he was not sure he 
wanted the freedom. Freedom to sit on this porch all day and watch total strangers go 
about their lives. Perhaps the familiar contours o f classes and papers and the fragile 
energy o f his students would be better, (p.35). There is not a simple urban: rural divide 
here, but an attempt to tap into the most problematic of human conditions, the relation 
between the evolved human animal and the cultured technological person. Familiarity, 
here, is the safety and stability of the known, what we can relate to and recognise as part 
of ourselves. As for Alice: She felt safer staying put, not wanting to upset the balance she 
had established. In this house, in her mother's house, in the bar she sometimes visited, 
she felt, if  not at home, at least less alien, with some measure or illusion o f control, (p.44). 
The wilderness is both an internal and external landscape. It signifies the anxieties and 
conflicts which humans have about their lives and their identities: It's what you have to 
leave behind to head into the wilderness, (p.52). Understanding wilderness should be a 
process of acknowledging both continuity and discontinuity, and of recognising this domain 
as the ‘uncolonised other’ (Plumwood, 1993). Wilderness is neither an alienation nor an 
assimilation into the self, it has its own autonomy.
Alice’s desire for freedom and the comfort of familiarity is satisfied by her relationship 
with Dan, her fear of isolation becomes a role reversal for her: She was afraid, but not o f 
him. She was afraid that now he might go away, the way she always did, even with the
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men she’d liked and who wanted her to stay. (p.80). The final familiar freedom for Alice 
as a woman is the emotional intimacy she experiences with him: Listening to the echo in 
her mind, she lay in Erik’s embrace, letting her tears flow like welcome rain. It had only 
lasted a moment, but she knew the sound, even though she ’d never given voice to it before. 
It was freedom, (p. 112). In the book, Alice’s lives as woman and wolf are reconciled and 
she and Dan ‘live happily ever after’ as she finds her own wilderness, an escape to nature 
for the wolf, and the acceptance and love of a man for her as a woman. In the derived 
television drama, the ending to the narrative is dramatically changed. Alice as the wolf 
finds the wilderness but does not return. She leaves the life of a woman and her 
relationship with Dan to live as a wolf despite Dan’s desire for her as a woman and 
acceptance of her as a wolf. The drama ends with Dan in a family scene with his wife and 
two young daughters, telling them a bedtime story. This fairy tale is about his relationship 
with Alice and her life as a wolf. He tells his children that Alice was happier as a wolf. 
And the final scene is of the wolf running through the forest, finally free.
The decision to change the ending is obviously made by the script writers and deemed 
suitable for television. The narrative is concluded with reference to itself as a story and 
is, therefore, diffused as the metaphorical and mythological aspects of the tale are erased. 
A happy ending here means that woman and wolf are separated and that Alice has chosen 
the life of the wolf, a decision for the apparent freedom of the wilderness. This ending 
sends several messages, not least that there will be a happy ending, a common narrative 
resolution but also the underlying paradigmatic structure is ignored. The deconstructed 
meaning associated with the humanranimal dichotomy is obliterated, and the ideological 
assumptions which support the dichotomy are retained - humans are not animals and they 
cannot live the life of animals and be content. The wilderness is romanticised as some kind 
of external salvation, beyond the reach of humans and the time it has taken to construct a 
narrative about species boundaries, human relations to other animals, the bestial 
construction of sexuality and rationality and the function of freedom in human life is 
wasted in a final acquiescence to ideological speciesist sensibilities. The drama failed the
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book and there are several reasons why that happened.
Discussion
One of the major reasons beyond the idiosyncrasies of the script writers and director of 
why the television drama deviated so much from the original text is to do with the 
pragmatics of television production. Producers want programmes to make money and to 
do that they need to have large audiences so that television companies will buy their 
programmes. In order to ensure large audiences (Wilderness averaged 8 million viewers 
for each of its three episodes) a drama has to abide by certain conventions. The first most 
obvious is that television is a visual medium. What we see is certainly as important, if not 
more so, than what we hear on television. Drama constitutes a set of events that are 
coherent and progress towards a resolution. The whole notion of the dramatic is highly 
relevant to television, the impressive, striking events and relations, the suspense and 
surprise involved in the dramatic telling of a story suit the visual media well. So, a 
successful drama has a good plot and strong characters. Wilderness the book meets both 
criteria, however, the major problem with the translation from a written text to a visual one 
is the inclusion of the protagonists’ thoughts that often describe motivations of behaviour. 
Moreover, the author’s description of a particular scene will bring detail to the attention 
of the reader that would most certainly be ignored by the viewer. So there are practical 
problems in the interpretation and translation of one medium to another. However, these 
difficulties do not excuse the intentional misrepresentation of the story. Some changes 
seem arbitrary and irrelevant: Alice was a part-time student and travel agent in the book, 
she became a university librarian in the drama; Alice’s aunt was also a wolf in the book 
and helped her in her search for other wolves, in the television drama, an academic who 
specialises in wolves tells Alice of a wolf sanctuary and assists her in her integration there; 
but the representation of sexuality - the naked images of Alice and the references to anal 
sex - and the changes to the ending have profoundly affected the meaning of Wilderness.
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On the whole, the television drama retains the syntagmatic structure of the narrative. The 
metonymic meaning of the primary elements holds the narrative propositions together in 
a coherent whole. The relationships are well defined and the sequence of events is 
maintained. However, the paradigmatic structure does not stand the test of media 
transformation. It is at this level of semiosis that the intertextuality of the narratives goes 
awry. The metaphorical aspects of the primary signifiers do not retain their original 
meaning. The subversion of the animal:human dichotomy is lost in the television drama. 
It reverts back to some of the two dimensional screen narratives on werewolves. Indeed, 
whereas the original text is a modem twist on the traditional lycanthropic tale, the screen 
adaptation is a reflection of the horror movie heritage. Naked women, savage animals, and 
saccharine endings are the stalwarts of that genre. Danvers’ attempts to subvert these 
images are denied in the visual translation of his story. The cultural assumptions that were 
being challenged in the book are evident in the semantic meaning of the television drama 
as coded frames of reference for the relationship between humans and other animals.
In relation to the model of dehumanisation, this semiotic analysis of Wilderness produces 
several insights. In terms of psychodynamically structured hegemonic discourse, the book 
has tried and succeeded to provide an alternative discursive space for understanding 
humans as animals and human relation to animals. The television drama, on the other, has 
interpreted the narrative through the lens of the dominant ideology which depends 
primarily on the human:animal hierarchical dualism. The concept of a linguistically 
structured unconscious mind is addressed through the psychoanalytic elements in the 
narrative revolving around Alice’s rebellion against her parents, her sexual reconciliation 
of emotional conflict and Luther’s degenerative grasp of reality. Although these episodes 
are evident in the book and the drama, it is a practical consequence of translation that the 
extent to which the wolf represents Alice’s unconscious and the woman represents the 
wolfs unconscious is severely underplayed. The relation between unconscious desire and 
available ideological discourses is mediated by the psychodynamic strategies of projection 
and introjection, and the ideological mechanisms of naturalisation and rationalisation. The
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human Self is the meeting point for the introjection of ‘human’ qualities in relation to the 
projection of ‘animal’ qualities onto the Other, the other animals. This hierarchical 
opposition is mediated by taboo, and the immutability of species is amongst the highest 
order of taboos. The undifferentiated category of animals reflects the psychodynamic 
construction of animals as cultural artefacts and moral surrogates. This association is 
sustained through the naturalisation of animals, their relegation to the natural sphere. 
Whereas, this process of exclusion leads to the highly differentiated special category of 
human through the rationalisation of humans, their defined status as rational and cultural 
humans.
This system of dehumanisation is evident at the level of semiosis between the two different 
forms of media. This warped intertexuality signifies the power of hegemonic discourse and 
the vulnerability of alternative paradigms. The werewolf is a therianthropic beast, a 
representation of cultural myths which signify the taboo intermediary category between 
human and animal through the creation of chimeras. In Danvers’ book the mythological 
chimera is the integrated human animal, in the television adaptation, the silver bullet 
translation destroys the chimera and once again privileges the humamanimal dichotomy. 
The aim of this translation and all its changes is to preserve other human:human 
dichotomies. The book gave a language of access to the humamanimal hierarchy which 
acts as a referent for all hierarchies. Giving that access to these hierarchies, through an 
authentic television translation of the story, is what the ‘regulators’ appear to have been 
scared of.
Wilderness, as an allegorical tale, tells the story of human representations of themselves 
as animals. In doing so, its insights are more than to the hierarchical boundaries between 
humans and all other animals. It provides perspicacity to the relations amongst humans 
which draw on the reasomemotion hierarchical dualism and all its contingencies. Humans 
are disciplined, through discursive power, to take subject positions which reproduce these 
dualisms. Their investments in these subjectivities permeate the construction of hierarchy
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amongst all animals. Wilderness makes claims for the reconstruction and redefinition of 
the human animal and, in doing so, it subverts all the other status hierarchies which 
exercise ideological violence and naturalise inequality. The werewolf, here, is not the 
traditional threat to human ideological estrangement from the nonhuman animal world, it 
is a menace more horrifying than that genre’s representation. The human animal (Alice) 
is a challenge to the foundations of hierarchy based on ‘rationality’ and the stigmatisation 
of the Other. These dualisms construct the world as a set of ‘naturalised’ hierarchies 
through which disciplinary power legitimises discourses of violence which are conditional 
on the establishment of hierarchy.
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PART THREE: RECONSTRUCTING THE BEAST
In the final part of this thesis, I draw together the empirical findings and illustrate their 
theoretical and practical implications. The popular discourses, identified through the 
framework discourse analysis and the media representations which support these discourses, 
explored here through a semiological content analysis, are examples of disciplinary power at 
work. They restrict beliefs and behaviour through convergence to speciesist ideologies. 
Individual people take up subject positions within these discourses to legitimise (and 
reproduce) their status as ‘human’ (not-animal). These investments are articulated through 
metaphorical and metonymic projections and introjections, resulting in the psychodynamic 
splitting of ‘animal’ into ‘pet’ versus ‘beast’. The psychodynamic construction of human 
subjectivity is predicated on the taboo (ambiguous) meaning of the ‘beast’. Resistance to this 
dispersed power is possible through challenges to the hegemony of these discourses and the 
ideological (and physical) violence they perpetuate. This contest is based on the 
deconstruction of the human:animal hierarchical dichotomy. Reconstructing the ‘beast’ 
removes ideological restrictions and replaces speciesism with ‘discourses of access’, new 
discursive spaces which acknowledge both the human and the nonhuman beast.
-275-
9: FAMILY, FOOD OR FANTASY: 
RECONSTRUCTING THE ‘BEAST WITHIN’
Overview
The fact that social psychology has neglected nonhuman animals (except as ‘human models’) 
does not surprise me given the experimental use of animals in much of modem psychology. 
To talk about nonhuman animals in the way that I have done here would undermine the moral 
responsibility, if not the scientific credibility, of those psychologists who exploit nonhuman 
animals in the name of giving psychology ‘scientific’ status. Positioning this research within 
psychology constitutes such a challenge to this exploitation, as Birke comments:
...to challenge the twin assumptions that animals are in nature, and that 
domination of nature is intrinsic to human culture, means to call into question 
the ethical grounds for using animals as ‘models’ for humans (Birke, 
1994:143).
What does surprise me, though, is the lack of application of some well established theoretical 
frameworks to the question of human subjectivity and nonhuman animal identity, even outside 
of psychology. Leach (1964) lay the foundations for this research in his seminal essay on 
animal categories and verbal abuse. As a structuralist, his work was influenced by Saussurean 
linguistics. Any delve into structuralism brings contact with Lacan’s (1977) conceptualisation 
of the linguistically structured unconscious and the parallels between metaphor and 
condensation, metonymy and displacement. And reading some of these protagonists of the 
structuralist movement leads one, inevitably, to post-structuralism and the insights of Foucault 
(1980) and Derrida (1982). What these theoreticians have written has provided this generation 
of psychologists the vocabulary, the concepts and the impetus to reconceptualise the world 
they live in. Hollway (1989) has succeeded in integrating these theoretical perspectives in a 
way in which content and process can be, simultaneously, theorised. The application of these 
theories to human relations with other animals was just waiting to happen.
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The thesis has attempted to map out this bestial territory which, simultaneously, divides and 
unites humans to the rest of the animal kingdom. Social psychology’s theorisation of human 
subjectivity, never mind identity, had not addressed the issue of how and why nonhuman 
animals are used in these constructions. Hollway’s work has confronted, and been motivated 
by, the issue of emancipation for women, through the analysis of the psychodynamic 
construction of subjectivity. My concern was to address the possibility, emanating from this, 
for the liberation of nonhuman and human animals from the dictates of anthropocentric and 
speciesist ideologies.
9.1 Theoretical Implications
Representations and discourses on nonhuman animals provide the resources for analysing and 
interpreting the psychodynamic constructions of human subjectivity. Deconstruction of these 
discourses, like those explored here in Chapters 6, 7 and 8, reveals the ways in which power 
pervades them and constructs knowledge about humans in relation to other animals.
Discursive Investments
This work is primarily theoretical based on the neglect in social psychology of human relations 
to other animals. By identifying the anti-speciesist potential in Hollway’s work, it became 
possible to deconstruct anthropocentrism and identify its root causes and far-reaching effects. 
This depended on the ability of this theory of human subjectivity to account for the 
contradictions in people’s beliefs and behaviour through the relation of the unconscious mind 
to the discursive world. Hollway’s concept of investment provided the intellectual tool by 
which I could excavate the contents of human representations and discourses on nonhuman 
animals. It also required using other theoretical devices which Hollway herself had drawn 
upon: Foucault’s analysis of power, Derrida’s concept of deconstruction, Lacan’s inquiry to
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the unconscious mind and Klein’s defence mechanisms, to interpret these texts and reconstruct 
a model of dehumanisation. By introducing Leach’s analysis of human and nonhuman animal 
categories, based on social distance and taboo, I was able to integrate these theoretical 
perspectives to account for the place of nonhuman animal identity in the construction of human 
subjectivity.
The strength of psychodynamic modelling is in its ability to transcend the individual: social 
dichotomy whilst, simultaneously, accounting for the conscious and unconscious emergence 
of individual human beings through the multiplicity of discourses. The way discourses 
constitute the subject, in a dynamic relation with unconscious investment, through suppressing 
and expressing signification, provides a theoretical account of the process and content of 
human subjectivity. Hollway provides a post-structuralist, anti-dualist explanation for how 
and why people become subjects within discourse. The use of Leach’s framework, for the 
analysis of nonhuman animal categories and verbal abuse, provides the context in which to 
explore the use of nonhuman animal identity in the construction of human subjectivity. Leach 
argued that taboo breaks up the environment so that it can be classified in terms of social 
distance from the Self. Through the empirical analyses, I have found evidence for Leach’s 
framework.
Ambiguous Animals
Leach’s original map of social distance proposed that ‘pet’ animals were neither wholly 
‘human’ or wholly ‘animal’, indeed, they occupy an ambiguous and, therefore, taboo, position 
between humans and other animals. As the participants in the interviews talked about their 
pets, it became clear that these animals are anomalous. They are, simultaneously, members 
of human families and strictly taboo when it comes to nonhuman animal use for food, at least 
in Britain. However, the descriptions of ‘pet’ animals within the Object, Referent and Utensil
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discourses conspire to position the pet, ideologically, on the ‘animal’ side of the human:animal 
dichotomy. The invocation of ‘choice’ as an ameliorating factor in why other cultures use 
these animals for food, undermines their ‘family’ status. These contradictions in the 
representations of pet animals are indicative of Leach’s analysis of ambiguity and taboo. The 
contradictory status can only be reconciled through the anthropomorphic projections and 
attributions which place them in the private realm of the home, and the zoomorphic projections 
and attributions, usually theriomorphic, which serve to dehumanise the pet and reconstruct the 
animal as objectified and pejorative. The metonymic use of pet animals, as theriomorphic 
representations of humans, reinforces their contradictory status as, simultaneously, animal and 
not-animal.
The representations of nonhuman animals which British people eat, as indicated by the 
participants in the interviews, are objectified. The living animal is comprehended as ‘meat’, 
dead and disconnected to its previous life. The taboos on whole animals and organs are 
testament to the need to deny that these pieces of flesh once belonged to a live animal. The 
realisation of this relation was a significant factor in the vegetarian participants’ exclusion of 
meat. Apart from the obvious health risks, it would be interesting to find out if the exposure 
of abattoir conditions in the recent ‘BSE crisis’ on television has had any effects in terms of 
reconnecting meat with its source. Agricultural animals are also subject to the objectification 
of pejorative use, as evident in the use of the ‘beast’ metaphors to describe a range of farm 
animals. The vituperative use of these animal names, especially against women, construct 
indifference, if not hostility, towards the fate of these animals. The representation of 
agricultural animals as ‘natural’ food is a construction based on contrived living conditions and 
the naturalistic fallacy (fantasy) that because humans are omnivores, it is morally justifiably 
to eat other animals, whilst eating people is morally abhorrent.
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Representations of the ‘beast’, through the semiological content analysis of the newspaper 
articles, illustrated how the Referent and the Object discourses interacted. Pervasive 
zoomorphism, including therianthropic and theriomorphic strategies, defined each of the 
domains, Human, Animal and Object. The use of nonhuman animal imagery to describe each 
of these categories is indicative of the ideology of speciesism, based in the humamanimal 
dichotomy. The fact that the inanimate objects did not have their own behaviour, for the 
writers to speak of, makes the use of nonhuman animal imagery plausible. Moreover, despite 
the predominance of Cartesian thinking, animals, apart from humans, do have a range of 
behaviours to draw upon so, again, the use of these images to describe Animal ‘beasts’ is 
credible. However, humans engage in a variety of behaviours which other animals do not and 
the neglect of these images, in favour for nonhuman animal representations in the construction 
of Human ‘beasts’, is a zoomorphic strategy based in the association of the morally negative 
‘beast’ with the nonhuman animal. This not only dehumanises those humans who are 
represented as bestial, it further reinforces the negative representation of nonhuman animals 
through their synonymous definition with the bestial.
9.2 The Deconstructed Beast
The basis of these representations of nonhuman animals is in the Christian and Cartesian 
hierarchical dualisms between humans and other animals, and between mind and body. The 
relegation of nonhuman animals outside the scope of moral consideration and rights is a direct 
descendant of these hierarchical constructions. To legitimise the widespread use and abuse of 
nonhuman animals as food, labour and entertainment, the rationalisation for these 
objectifications had to come from appeals either to the supposed lack of sentience (and, 
therefore, pain) in these animals or the notion that these animals are dependent on humans for 
their survival and, therefore, happiness (an inversion of the sentience argument). At the root
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of this rationalisation is the ideological position that humans are not really animals. The 
religious and secular elevation of humans is evident in the discourses and representation which 
emerged from this research. The chains of Christian and Cartesian hierarchy remain 
pervasive. The scientific world’s dubious double-edged use of nonhuman animals in research 
as, simultaneously, ‘models’ for humans yet denied the moral consideration of humans, has 
emerged from, and been legitimised by, this humamanimal dichotomy. In order for humans 
to be privileged, other animals must be penalised.
Anthropocentrism
Indeed, human ignorance of nonhuman animal lives, based on anthropocentric discourses, 
provides the structural parallel to other forms of ignorance and oppression. The use of 
nonhuman animal names, to objectify and dehumanise humans, is only one way of using these 
discourses to discriminate against the Other. The way in which hierarchy is defended as a 
‘natural’ way of constructing the world, renders prejudice and discrimination amongst people 
less offensive. The mistaken equation of ‘equality’ and ‘difference’ means that denying 
humans and other animals the right not to be violated appears logical. Humans are different 
to other animals and, therefore, they can state claims on legal and moral protection and 
defences against their status as not-animal. However, this is not an absolute dichotomous 
position as the characteristics which determine the humamanimal hierarchy (‘rationality’, 
intelligence, language) are replayed by humans against other humans. The structure of 
prejudice is built on status hierarchies, on privileged access to knowledge, produced by 
imbued power relations. The human:animal dichotomy is only one of these hierarchies but 
its strength lies in its clandestine nature. It is reproduced in homes with pets, on tables with 
meat and through symbolic representation. The ubiquity of the status of nonhuman animals 
as ‘family’, ‘food’ or ‘fantasy’ is the key to the power of ideological violence and the 
discursive structuring of knowledge about other animals and, by implication, about humans.
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The complex and contradictory nature of ‘humanity’ and ‘animality’ has meant that redefining 
these concepts has required that they are culturally and historically located. Identifying the 
legacies and endurance of Christian and Cartesian dualism, the religious and secular faces of 
speciesism, provides the cultural context in which to locate the relations between humans and 
other animals as emergent, historically constituted, social phenomena. The Biblical and 
scientific ‘beast’ represents the Other to be controlled, destroyed or reconstructed. Our 
cultural neglect of Darwinism has been a consequence of wanting to deny that humans are not 
‘worthy the interposition of a deity’ and, in the social sciences, wanting to deny the ‘animal’ 
body to the ‘human’ mind. The inherent dualism to these movements underpins the relegation 
of the status of the nonhuman animal to that of ‘beast’. Darwin provided an alternative to 
dualism. Through detailing the continuity amongst species, the rhetorical power of the ‘beast’ 
could have become disabled. But resistance to Darwin’s insights subjugated Darwinism to the 
realms of reactionary intellectual and religious denial. The social scientific construction of 
‘human’ continued to necessitate the psychodynamic construction of the ‘beast’, as Birke 
comments:
...the very existence of this mythical beast is a problem for it helps to 
reconstruct the nature/culture boundary. It is nature, pure biology. In turn, 
those who would defend a belief that there is a little bit of this creature in all 
of us use tales of the mythical beast as a victim of its genes to defend their 
beliefs. And so the fables of biological determinism - of animals as models for 
fixity in our own behaviour - persist (Birke, 1994:133-4).
Humanity is constructed in relation to animality and vice versa. The psychological basis of 
this dichotomy is the hierarchical expression of subject positions through discourse; the 
strategies of anthropomorphism and zoomorphism (therianthropism and theriomorphism); and 
positioning nonhuman animals in the Object, Referent and Utensil discourses. Using the 
model of dehumanisation, I have deconstructed the binary opposition human:animal to reveal
-282-
9: Family, Food or Fantasy:
Reconstructing the 'Beast Within ’
the position of the ‘beast’ as a cultural surrogate for human fears and desires. The 
deconstructed ‘beast’ illustrates the operation of taboo as pet animals are not meat, and 
agricultural animals are not pets. Those few animals which cross these borders, such as the 
rabbit, are subject to Leach’s analysis of obscenity. Equally, the ‘beast’ is synonymous with 
‘animal’. ‘Beasts’ may be described as human, but this representation will draw on nonhuman 
animal imagery to avoid the implication that humans really are animals. This deconstruction 
reveals the extent to which the terms ‘human’ and ‘animal’4 are dependent on one another for 
their meaning and value. The ‘beast’ is the taboo position between these naturalised 
categories; it signifies, simultaneously, continuity and discontinuity.
9.3 Methodological Post Scripts
The challenge of exploring nonhuman animal identity in relation to human subjectivity is 
significantly rooted in methodology. The need to use qualitative methods in this kind of 
research is justified by the nature of the theoretical questions. The intrinsic complexity to 
issues of nonhuman animal representations, and the reproduction of these images in discourse, 
means that only a qualitative design and analysis will do justice to this social psychological 
dilemma. Qualitative methods are characterised by two main issues. One concerns 
subjectivity and intersubjectivity, the other is triangulation.
Triangulation Revisited
Triangulation is based on the notion that social phenomena are dynamic, subject to change, 
emergent properties of social life and, therefore, multiple perspectives on the issue is an 
authentic way of accessing the meanings of the phenomena. Triangulation allows the 
exploration of the depth and breadth of complex issues. Furthermore, multiple methods will
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permit a focus on change and process. Using different methods to triangulate the research 
inquiry incorporates different perspectives and produces deeper insight to account for the 
intrinsic complexity of the issue.
In this research I have triangulated three methods - discourse analysis, semiological content 
analysis and narrative semiological analysis - and each of these methods has produced data and 
analysis which contribute to the whole of the research being more than simply the sum of its 
parts. Through the interviews I identified three principal organising discourses which 
pertained to different, yet overlapping, sets of nonhuman animal signifiers. These discourses 
were the dominant ways through which the interview participants organised their 
representations of nonhuman animals. Whether they were talking about pets, meat or animal 
images, these participants’ signifiers conformed to the Object, Referent and Utensil discourses. 
Each of these discourses contributed to the ideology of speciesism. Humans, because of their 
membership of Homo sapiens sapiens, were valued above and beyond all other animals. A 
significant part of the naturalisation of this ideology is that humans are not ‘real’ animals. 
Each of these discourses constructed nonhuman animals into ‘good’ or ‘bad’. There were 
animals that were ‘good’ pets and others that would make ‘bad’ pets. There were animals that 
would be suitable for meat and others that would not. There were affectionate uses of animals 
names as well as pejorative uses. Each of these identifications reflected the split of nonhuman 
animals into ‘good’ pets - unthreatening and in some Leachian sense not-animal - and ‘bad’ 
beasts - those animals that could be eaten or used negatively to represent humans. This is a 
simplification, of course, there are animals that can not be pets simply because it would not 
be practical, however, a large part of that problem has been addressed through the selective 
breeding and domestication of nonhuman animals for human use in the first place. Within 
British culture, some of those domesticated animals are pets and the rest are meat, rarely the 
twain shall meet.
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The Object discourse was identified as a heuristic for organising signifiers of nonhuman 
animals as material things that could be possessed, bought and sold, packaged and 
transformed. The Referent discourse was distinguished as a set of signifiers which identified 
nonhuman animals as the antithesis of humans, their moral and intellectual opposites. The 
Utensil discourse labelled signifiers which constructed nonhuman animals as implements for 
human use and benefit. The human participants were positioned and positioned themselves 
within these available discourses in order to construct and protect their subjectivities as 
‘human’, not ‘animal’. The semiological content analysis of the ‘beast’ metaphors explored 
the ambiguous nature of ‘beast’ representations as both synonymous with ‘animal’ and 
negatively identified with ‘human’. The process of dehumanisation explored within the 
context of the three dominant discourses was investigated here using ‘beast’ representations.
This analysis illustrated several aspects of the discourses identified in the previous study. The 
‘beast’ in the Object discourse was defined either as a neutral or technical term for ‘animal’ 
or as a negative representation of animal behaviour. Through the Referent discourse, the 
‘beast’ signifier, simultaneously, objectified nonhuman animals and dehumanised human 
animals. In the Utensil discourse, ‘beast’ signified the parsimonious representation of ‘bad’ 
behaviour in either humans or nonhuman animals.
The metaphorical representations of ‘beast’ related to the ontological divide between ‘human’ 
versus ‘animal’ and the cultural moral surrogacy that defines the bestial. The ontological 
status of nonhuman animals, represented through the dominant discourses as inferior, to 
humans was illustrated through the use of nonhuman animal ‘beast’ metaphors to describe 
humans and inanimate objects. The predominance of the nonhuman animal category of ‘beast’ 
metaphors testifies to the projection of the ‘beast within’ humans to the rest of the animal 
kingdom. The psychodynamic construction of nonhuman animals (the Other) as bestial
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preserves and protects the concept of humans (the Self) as moral, cultural and superior. The 
metaphors analysis illustrates the way in which psychodynamic positioning and reproduction 
of subjectivity occurs in the Object and Referent discourses.
The semiotic analysis of Wilderness revealed several insights to corroborate the findings of the 
two previous studies. The novel demonstrated that a contemporary translation of a popular 
myth could be undertaken which could potentially subvert the implicit messages of the original 
myth. By destabilising the species and gender boundaries which had previously defined the 
werewolf myth, the author, Danvers, had provided a text which could be interpreted as a new 
discursive space from which to draw new meanings about the relationship between humans and 
nonhuman animals, and between gender and species. The theriomorphic representation of the 
woman as the wolf signified the human animal. It deconstructed, through a fictional 
representation, the speciesist ideological assumption of humans as not-animals. It broke with 
the traditional therianthropic bestial representation of the werewolf as half-man half-animal. 
In doing so, the novel provided access to a non-hierarchical representation of ‘animal’, an 
inclusive representation which challenges the Object, Referent and Utensil discourses identified 
through the interview analysis. Furthermore, it contests the metaphorical representations of 
the bestial as ‘animal’, as the moral antithesis to ‘human’. The bestial is human because 
humans are animals. In Wilderness, the book, moral surrogacy is replaced with subjective 
continuity. Nonhuman ‘beasts’ are no longer the ‘scapegoats’ of human behaviour; they are 
constructed as parallel subjects of life not antithetical objects to be feared and subjugated.
The inability of the film makers to produce a credible translation of this allegorical tale speaks 
volumes about the hegemony of speciesist ideology. Here, the woman cannot exist as women 
and wolf - humans cannot exist simultaneously as animals. They must choose one or the 
other. To be ‘human’ is to reject the wilderness, to sentimentalise it and covet its ‘freedom’
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from the cultural constraints of being human. To be ‘animal’ is to be the wilderness, wild, 
untamable, threatening and bestial. These representations are legitimised by the human:animal 
ontological divide. Alternatives are suppressed beneath the power of dualism.
The discourse analysis, the content analysis and the semiotic analysis established the model 
of dehumanisation as an authentic account of the literal and symbolic uses of nonhuman animal 
identities in psychodynamic constructions of human subjectivity. This level of authenticity 
was only possible through the use of these multiple methods and triangulated design. To 
ensure the credibility of qualitative research within psychology it is necessary to be explicit 
about the way in which the research belongs to the discipline. It will be evident from the 
previous chapters that I have employed a variety of theoretical perspectives from a variety of 
disciplines. Indeed, the purpose of this multidisciplinary approach has been to enrich the 
model of dehumanisation and to compensate for psychology’s reluctance to move beyond 
modernism. I have located this research in the post-structuralist work of Hollway (1989), 
having drawn on important modernist and post-modernist concepts from a variety of 
theoreticians. The absence in the psychological literature on the relation between human 
subjectivity, an issue which has gained credibility within social psychology, and nonhuman 
animal identity has been the motivating force behind this research.
Reflexive Analysis
Subjectivity is commonly believed to mean the opposite of objectivity, being subjective is not 
to be objective and vice versa. Its relation to ‘rationality’ and the reason:emotion dichotomy 
have been explored in the thesis. Where in the majority of quantitative methods subjectivity 
has been maligned and eliminated in the name of objectivity, in qualitative research, 
subjectivity is a research tool, an insight to the mechanisms at work in any social phenomenon. 
Subjectivity, here, takes on the meaning of the subject, the description of individual human’s
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conscious and unconscious being. Within qualitative methodology, subjectivity is utilised 
through the notion of reflexivity and the researcher’s insight to her motivations and ways of 
doing research. Incorporating reflexivity into the research protocol goes a long way to 
ensuring that the ‘biases’ of research are made explicit as a legitimate part of the research 
process. Accounting for researcher subjectivity, through reflexivity, is part of the process of 
making research questions and their evaluation transparent. Emotional investments in research 
account for the position of researcher, through reflexive analysis, to the construction and 
interpretations of research findings.
It is also central to qualitative methodology to address the intersubjectivity between the 
researcher and the participants. This is obviously not relevant when the data are drawn from 
pre-existing texts, such as newspaper articles, literature and film. However, where other 
people are involved as participants in the research, it is essential to protect their confidentiality 
and anonymity, as well as inviting them to receive final reports and submit comments if they 
so wish. The time of treating humans as experimental ‘objects’ is long gone in social 
psychology. It time now to turn our attention to the role of nonhuman animals in psychology 
and insist in the same level of respect. The participants in this research were previously 
unknown to me, although since then I have had the opportunity to meet some of them again 
and their response to their participation has been predominantly positive. They have expressed 
interest in the work and appreciation for being asked to think about issues that some of them 
had never considered. They had found thinking about their relations to animals hard work but 
felt that there was some intellectual reward in addressing these issues for themselves.
I was conscious throughout the interviews that as a researcher I had a responsibility to the 
participants in my research not to judge them nor to misrepresent them. I tried to maintain 
the integrity of their beliefs to the best of my ability whilst illustrating contradictions when and
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where they emerged as part of the individual’s reproduction of their subjective position. That 
reproduction occurred in the intersubjective context of one-to-one interviews. In establishing 
rapport and providing a positive atmosphere for the participants to express their beliefs, I did 
not reveal my own perspectives on these matters. To some degree that may have been a 
failing on my part, a remnant of positivist, detached methods where the participant is not to 
be ‘contaminated’ with the researcher’s interests. However, I think that perhaps there is a 
prerequisite for maintaining some form of distance, after all interviews are not conversations 
in the conventional sense. I wanted to establish dialogue but not to contribute consciously to 
the inevitability of self-presentation on the part of the participants. To that end, during the 
interviews I did not consciously reinforce or contradict their beliefs, rather I aimed to produce 
a non-judgmental atmosphere in which genuine thoughts and feelings could be expressed.
Reflecting on the researcher’s investments in the research is a genuine way of providing some 
form of accountability for the research. My motivations from the beginning have been stated, 
and, at the end, they have not changed. The desire to address the status of nonhuman animals 
in the psychodynamic construction of human subjectivity has propelled the thesis through times 
of internal and external doubt in the legitimacy of this project. Accusations of obscurity and 
absurdity have been rife. However, the very tenets of qualitative research, so currently 
esteemed in social psychology, have provided me with some of the concepts (subjectivity, 
reflexivity, discourse) which have been the bedrock for my explorations. In the area of 
qualitative research, the dimensions of subjectivity, the relation between subject and object, 
issues of power and prejudice, I feel vindicated.
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9.4 Animal Liberation
Nevertheless, it is the practical implications of this research which have always been my 
motivations for doing it in the first place, and it is in the possibilities of social change where 
I find justification for this research. The practicalities addressed, here, are largely theoretical 
and, as there is nothing more practical than a good theory, let me elucidate on the implications 
of this work. The challenge to psychology, and to general ways about thinking about 
nonhuman animals, is to shatter the restraints influencing hegemonic discourse and explore 
knew ways of seeing and being. Analysing the process of dehumanisation has enabled me to 
replace the prejudiced and violent anthropocentrism with the anthropomorphic heuristic. This 
has meant engaging in a critical deconstruction of the Self in relation to the Other in order to 
identify and assess the position of nonhuman identities in relation to human subjectivities. 
This deconstruction has produced a new discursive space through problematising contemporary 
representations and discourses on the nature of nonhuman animals.
Discursive Resistance
An important part of the motivation behind this research has been an interest in the politics of 
change. In Chapter 4, I indicated some of the difficulties inherent to nonhuman animal 
liberation. Here I address some of these practical problems. The fact that nonhuman animals 
do not have the ability to empower themselves means that humans must provide a ‘voice’ for 
them. But this is not simply a question of human altruism. Humans must recognise, as I hope 
I have established through this research, that human emancipation is inextricably linked to 
animal liberation. As Joffe (1996) identified, there is a need to increase public awareness 
about issues which are perceived as threatening and are, therefore, subject to prejudice. To 
that end, there is a significant role for both public protest and education about the numerous 
violations of nonhuman animals by humans. However, the representation of that role has
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proven contradictory.
A significant part of the problem is the way animal rights and animal welfare are represented 
as antithetical. The representations of animal rights activists, by the interview participants, 
describe the processes by which media images of the defence of animal rights produce salient 
images of terrorism and extremity. There is a fear that animal rights ‘goes too far’, that it 
disturbs boundaries, identities and morality. Indeed, this is an inevitable consequence of 
reconstructing the ‘beast’. Where semantic interdependence is reinstated between humans and 
other animals, so moral interdependence will follow. The implications are extensive. To 
acknowledge that humans are animals, through more than just a casual reference to Darwin, 
invokes the moral and social contingencies of the deconstructed human:animal dichotomy. 
If we do not take ‘rationality’, ‘intelligence’ or ‘language’ as criteria for moral consideration 
as we affect not to do for humans, then the possibility of a consistent and agreeable charter 
for the treatment of all animals may be possible. The fact that it is not evident now in the way 
humans treat each other is testament to the ubiquity of mind:body dualism, somatophobia and 
the elevation of ‘reason’ to the detriment of emotion. Here, Kleinian theory on the resolution 
of the paranoid-schizoid position may provide some insight. As described in Chapter 4, 
infants develop from this position of splitting objects into ‘good’ and ‘bad’ parts and then 
projecting or introjecting accordingly to the ‘depressive’ position through which there is a 
tolerance and acceptance of ambivalence - that there is both ‘good’ and ‘bad’ in all objects 
including the Self. The acceptance of this ambivalence decreases the desire to split objects in 
order to protect the ‘good’ part of the Self. For my analysis, if people can come to accept the 
ambivalence of being ‘simultaneously both animal and human’ then the problem as Leach 
(1982) identified it would cease to be so problematic.
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If we cannot achieve some sense of harmony amongst humans, it is said, then it is obtuse to 
insist on the inclusion of other animals to a moral system which fails humans. This would be 
true if it were not for the fact that this moral system, derived from the Enlightenment Project, 
succeeds in obscuring the disciplinary effects of ‘rationalist’ discourses, as Masson and 
McCarthy comment:
When humans refuse to inflict pain on others, surely it is because they assume 
they feel. It is not because another person can think, nor because they can 
reason, nor because they speak that we respect their physical boundaries but 
because they feel. They feel pain, humiliation, sorrow and other emotions, 
perhaps even some we do not yet recognise. If, as I believe, animals feel pain 
and sorrow and all the other emotions, these feelings cannot be ignored in 
behaviour towards them. A bear is not going to compose Beethoven’s Ninth 
Symphony, but then neither is our next-door neighbour. We do not for this 
reason conclude that we have the freedom to experiment upon him, hunt him 
for sport or eat him for food. (Masson and McCarthy, 1996:218).
Tracing the emergence of these concepts allows the identification of an appropriate space to 
resist the power of these discourses. Dehumanisation is the process by which people objectify 
themselves and other animals. The starting point of dehumanisation is the mind:body dualism 
(religious and secular) which elevates the notion of ‘reason’ to the detriment of ‘emotion’. 
Humans and other animals are differentially assigned their semantic and ideological status 
according to these hierarchical dualisms. This relation between the subject and the object 
informs other status hierarchies. Dehumanisation, as a psychodynamic strategy, uses post- 
Enlightenment, anthropocentric and androcentric constructions and definitions of ‘human’ to 
exercise power and discriminate against animals (including humans) based on their exclusion 
from the realm of the ‘soul’, ‘reason’ or ‘culture’. The consensual, disciplinary power of 
these discourses converges into homogenising ideological violence. The naturalisation of this 
violence is a product of these divisive discourses. This research was designed as a challenge
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to the epistemological basis of such homogeneity.
By comparing the restrictive popular and media discourses with the subverting discourse of 
Wilderness, it is possible to propose an alternative ‘discourse of access’, access to the 
previously naturalised hierarchical status of certain subject positions, such as that of ‘human’ 
in opposition to ‘animal’:
...the discourse of access flattens subject positions in any situation by divesting 
them from the prestige they carry (Humphreys and Kirtsoglou, 1997:21).
The ‘prestigious’ subject positions, sustained by anthropocentric discourses and the 
reproduction of speciesist ideologies, can only be challenged by undermining the authority 
attached to them. This authority is sanctioned by ‘discourses of truth’ which naturalise 
hierarchy and promote violence. Recognising the dualistic foundations of hierarchy and the 
spurious nature of these discourses would invalidate their stature. Wilderness, the novel, 
provides this kind of access by illustrating the fallacy of binary oppositions, through the 
deconstruction of the human:animal dichotomy, and the redefinition of the ‘beast’. The 
inability of the television production company to translate these themes onto the screen is 
testament to the pervasive power of speciesism. This thesis, through also deconstructing the 
‘beast’, has attempted to play a role in the undermining of that power.
Alien Animals
As we approach the millennium, insecurity about human status on Earth has been reflected in 
the anxieties we feel about the universe in a series of films and television programmes on 
UFOs and extraterrestrials. The human exploration of the unknown - Space - and the 
inconceivable - aliens - is the cosmic mirroring of local earthly concerns. This double-edged 
anxiety/curiosity streak, expressing itself at a cultural level in these texts, corresponds to
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Hollway’s appropriation of Klein’s motivating force behind projection and introjection - 
anxiety. A range of films - Independence Day, Event Horizon, The Fifth Element, Men In 
Black, Contact, Alien: The Resurrection - have articulated human anxiety through the 
inversion human(self): animal (other) hierarchy. The alien:human hierarchy is here to stay. 
These representations, implicitly, question human hierarchical constructions and the 
exploitations which arises from them. They reflect human anxiety about human identity, 
boundaries and the meaning of life. The aliens of our own habitat (Earth), nonhuman animals, 
are made familiar and controllable through anthropomorphism and zoomorphism. The same 
strategies are being incorporated in the representation of these alien animals. Their depiction 
as arthropodal and reptilian is a manifestation of a deep psychological fear of the Other. And 
the zoomorphism of these creatures as representative of animal species which humans have 
difficulty relating to and, therefore, understanding (the subject of numerous phobias) is the 
articulation of the home-based fear of those animals. I am reminded of an episode of The 
Twilight Zone which expresses these fears astutely. My adaptation, here, illustrates the 
essence of my argument:
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‘To Serve Man’
An American man is telling a story from a room with all the necessities - food, warmth, light 
but no luxuries. He is depressed as he recalls when he worked for the United Nations, how 
a ship landed on Earth from Outer Space. Of course the people o f Earth were petrified but 
the aliens who emerged from the ship gave the people a book and began to eliminate war, 
poverty and disease from Earth. It was this man’s and a female colleague’s job to decode the 
book written in a strange language. As he began to work on the title he realised that the title 
o f the book was 'To Serve Man’. As news o f this spread, people throughout the world grew 
to like and trust the aliens. They were the new saviours o f humanity. The man and women 
worked tirelessly on decoding the rest o f the book, a long and detailed script. As the woman 
finally deciphers the meaning o f the text, people from around the world begin to board alien 
ships which have come to take human tourists to the alien’s planet. The man is amongst them 
as a representative o f the United Nations. As the man is at the entrance to the ship, he sees 
his colleague. She runs into the crowd, screaming that she has decoded the rest o f the book. 
The man looks at the woman. The doors to the ship close in front o f him and all the others 
as the woman’s words stab his ears: ‘I t’s a recipe book!!!’
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Appendix I: Interview Schedule: Experiences with Animals
If you had to characterise yourself as an animal, what would that animal be?
(A) PETS
Do you have, or have you ever had, any pets?
How would you describe the relationship between yourself and your pet?
How would you describe your pet?
What kind of animals make good pets?
(B) MEAT
What kinds of animals do you consider to be meat?
What do you think of vegetarianism?
England has a reputation of being a nation o f ‘animal-lovers’, would you agree? 
What do you understand by the term ‘animal welfare/rights’?
Do you think people/animals have rights?
(C) REPRESENTATION
What images come to mind when I say ‘beast’?
Can you think of animal images that are used to describe humans?
What effects do you think calling people by animal names has?
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Appendix II: Ethics Protocol
Hi, my name is Gemma Harper. I am the principal researcher on a project entitled:
Deconstructing the Beast:
Contemporary Representations and Discourses on the Nature of Animals in Urban Britain
This project is being supervised by the Department of Social Psychology at the London 
School ofEconomics. I may be contacted on this phone number 0171 955 7018 should you 
have any questions.
Thank you for your willingness to participate in this research project. Your participation is 
very much appreciated. Just before we start the interview, I would like to reassure you that 
as a participant in this project, you have several very definite rights.
First, your participation in this interview is entirely voluntary.
You are free to withdraw from the interview at any time.
This interview will be kept strictly confidential and will be available only to myself and the 
evaluators of this project.
Excerpts from this interview may be made part of the final research project, but under no 
circumstances will your name or identifying characteristics be included in this report.
I would be grateful if you would sign this form below to show that I have read you its 
contents.
------------------------------------------------- (signed)
------------------------------------------------- (printed)
------------------------------------------------- (dated)
Please send me a report on the results of this research project. (Circle one)
YES NO
Address for those requesting research project:
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Appendix III: Biographical Details of the Interview Participants
SEX AGE VEG/MEAT RESIDENCE RELIGION
INTERVIEW
1 Female 23 Veg Seven Oaks Atheist
2 Female 25 < tro St. Albans Atheist
3 Female 29 Veg London Agnostic
4 Female 29 Veg Hampton Atheist
5 Female 20 Veg London Agnostic
6 Female 19 Meat London Agnostic
7 Female 24 Meat Richmond Christian
8 Female 33 Meat Richmond Agnostic
9 Female 22 Meat Bromley Agnostic
10 Female 21 Meat
W est.
Supermare Christian
11 M ale 30 < o no Famham Agnostic
12
■ j
Male 23 Veg London Atheist
13 Male 36 Veg Famham Agnostic
14 Male 23 Veg Illford Atheist
15 Male
. .j
29 Veg Fulham Agnostic
16 Male 20 Meat Luton Atheist
17 Male 26 Meat London Agnostic
18
I
Male 33 Meat London Atheist
19 Male 26 Meat London Atheist
20 M ale 19 ! Meat London Christian
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Appendix IV: Chart 1 - Animal as Family Members
Male Meat
CHART 1 - ANIMALS AS FAMILY MEMBERS
1.1 Relationship 1.2 Identify 1.3 Responsibility 1.4 Utility
MM l
quite endearing 3, He was 
ju s t one o f the 
family...He aiway seemed 
to know the hierarchy of 
die family 3, had a few 
good fights 4, g f boring 6 
dg good coni|»any, loyal 
6, good pet loyal & 
odedient 8, rbts & gp 
boring 8
puppy boisterous 4, cts 
ungrateful 6
dg like to have one but 
can 't look after it 
properly vet 6
I thought he was great he 
was quite...superb taking 
fo r a walk he always 
wanted to fight the other 
dogs (laughs) 4, good 
entertainment 4, big 
tropical fish tanks 
relaxing, pretty 7, tortoise 
novel 9, pet should be 
entertaining 9
MM2
dg special rel w mum 2. 
dg not close 3., no rel w 
gf 3, ct emotional bond 4, 
computer ct (tamagotchi) 
no different except it 
doesn't sit on your lap 
and not warm 5
ct jum py, affectionate, 
very independent I ,  dg 
character 2
neglected dg cruel 3, dg 
disciplined training 
strange rough on them, 
not free at all 4
emotionally involved w 
toys & gf the same 3, I 
know dgs appear to get a 
lot out of their owners 
affections but I just 
wonder whether that's  
kind of...reaIly you 
wonder who's getting 
what out of what and...is 
the dg just being nice to 
you because you feed it.
4, pets submissive, 
dominated, power, fit into 
your regime S
MM3
dg playing together 3, rel 
changed as got older 4, dg 
fun, something to do 9, 
You know even a cow can 
be a pet if you can relate 
to it 9. friendship 9
ct wise, clever, d idn 't get 
run over 8
dg requires more 
attention than cat 8, pets 
expensive 9, birds not 
designed to be in a cage 
10
MM4
fascinated by ct 
characteristics, very 
independent, attention or 
ignore you 3, v close, 
played a lot together, 
grew up together, part of 
family 3, company 4, ct 
surrogate grandchild for 
parents, ignored 4, hms, 
gf boring, meaningless 5
ct lovely 2, cat around 
town, real personality 3, 
cts more intelligent than 
dgs even though can 't 
train them 3, ct distinctive 
7, rbs non aggressive 8, 
spiders ugly & horrible 10
1
1
1
1
1
cruel to not let cts have 
freedom of outside 4 
rodents smell & require 
lots of attention 9
fish household objec s  8, 
pots status symbols 18
MM5 1
gf amusing, play with, 
contact, interaction, 
feedback stimulating, 
attention 2, people 
become strongly bonded j 
to their animals 2 as one j 
of the family, dgs relate | 
to owners 3, insects not I 
good pets cos too small 
for interaction 6, the 
fundamental point about 
having pets is the 
interaction between the 
owner and the pet itself 6
rbs cute cuddly image 4, 
ct calm animal, 
independent, solitary 9
j
1
bdg esay to look after but 
not free 5, dislike aspect 
of clearing up after bdg 9
dgs good for health 
walking 3, gf manlelpeice 
item 4, bdg pleasant from 
a selfish point o f view 6, 
dgs provide security 7
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Appendix V: Coding Schedule for ‘Beast’ Metaphors
LA BE L D E F I N I T I O N E X A M P L E
CATEGORY
1 BODY
PHYSICAL APPEARANCE: ATTRACTIVENESS. SIZE. 
AESTHETICS. FACIAL FEATURES
Beauty o f a beast... He-may-be-hideous-bul-he's-rich.-powerful-and-
easily-flattered-factar.
CATEGORY
2 V IO LEN C E
PHYSICAL. IDEOLOGICAL INSTITUTIONAL. SEXUAL 
VIOLATION OF ANOTHER. BRUTALITY. FEROCITY. 
SAVACERY
W ho knows when an obedient, nicely behaved husband might be 
transformed, come the full-tim e whistle, into a slavering, snorting 
beast?
H U M A N
CATEGORY
3 SA TA N ISM
BLACK MAGIC. PAGANISM. DEVIL-WORSHIP. THE NUMBER 
OF THE BEAST AND BESTIALITY. DEMONIC. FIEND. 
VILLAIN
H e saw a seven foot beast, half-man. half-bird....it was a 
manifestation o f the devil.
CATEGORY
4 ENEM Y
OPPOSITION. XENOPHOBIA. RACISM. DEHUMANISATION 
OF THE OTHER ADVERSARY. ANTAGONIST. RIVAL 
NEMESIS
M igual N o d a l a supremely talented player, was reviled as the beast 
o f  Barcelona before a kick had been kicked, a beefeater was depicted 
executing a m atador... the images o f cultural denigration were 
fighting for space by Saturday morning.
c a t e g o r y
3 RARE
UNUSUAL DIFFERENCE. UNIQUENESS. DISTINGUISHED. 
STRANCE. SINGULAR
O'Toole is that rare beast. an actor with a tremendous dramatic 
sense o f the narrative o f his own early life...
CATEGORY
1 FANTASY
FANTASTICAL CREATURES: ALIENS. MYTHICAL ANIMALS. 
HYBRIDS
...the slimy beast that burst through the stomach o f actor John Hurt 
in the 1979  movie...
CATEGORY
2 W IL D
WILDLIFE. UNTAMED ANIMALS. FREE IN OW N HABITAT. 
UNDOMESTICATED. FERAL UNCIVILISED. NATURE
The fa x  is a handsome, intelligent and even admirable beast but, like 
many wild animals, it is a clever and ruthless killer.
A N I M A L
CATEGORY
3 D O M E S T IC
SELECTIVELY BRED ANIMALS USED FOR PRODUCTION 
AND CONSUMPTION
I f  you're looking fo r  a beast to burdan with blame, the Irish cow is 
already carrying plenty.
c a t e g o r y
4 W O R K
BEASTS OF BURDAN. TRAINED ANIMALS. ENTERTAINMENT 
ANIMALS. LABOUR FUNCTIONAL AND PERFORMING
I t  is not tha t Spaniards delight in being cruel to animals, rather that 
t h y  regard humans and animals in a different light and see the 
death o f a bull by a matador's sword as something which can ennoble 
both man and beast. *
CATEGORY
3
GENERALISED
O T H E R
REFERENCES TO ALL ANIMALS AS BEASTS: 
DIFFERENTIATING HUMANS FROM OTHER ANIMALS I t  is work which has differentiated man from beast.
CATEGORY
1 O BSTA CLE
METAPHORS FOR OVERCOMING OBSTACLES. TAMING 
THE BEAST. TRIUMPH OVER NATURE. BARRIER HURDLES. 
RESTRAINTS. DETERRANTS
The fir s t summer o f the cadet's f r s t  yea r  - known in military circles 
as 'T he Beas? - is a time o f sleep andfood deprivation, o f intensive 
physical and intellectual challenges, and a time when the men (so to 
speak) are separarted from the boys.
c a t e g o r y
P O W E R
METAPHORS OF THE POWER OF THE BEAST. STRENGTH. 
FORTITUDE. STAMINA POTENCY. PUISSANCE. VIGOUR 
AUTHORITY. ENERGY
O u t o f this vista comes an earth-shattering scream and a beast of 
such savage and raw. uncompromising power.
O B J E C T
CATEGORY
3 TH REA T
METAPHORS OF THREAT. FEAR OF DOMINATION. FEAR OF 
THE OTHER DEHUMANISATION OF THE O TH ER 
INTIMIDATION. DANCER MENANCE. PERIL
I f  the authorities refuse to allow such an old-fashioned beast onto the 
proper market, the threat is that the shares will in December be 
delisted.
CATEGORY
4 SIZE
REFERS TO THE IMMENSITY OF OBJECTS. THEIR HUGE 
PRESENCE. FAR-REACHING EFFECTS
There's no visible sign o f the kind o f beast you  are about tofind 
lurking in Sutcliffe's cellar... the country's largest store o f vintage 
solid tyres and wheels.
c a t e g o r y
5 O T H E R M1SCELIANEOUS REFERENCES TO OBJECTS AS BEASTS
Europe is evolving into much the beast that Britain has fought hard 
for since the 1950s.
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